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Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) are a group of large autonomous 
wireless nodes communicating on a peer-to-peer basis in a heterogeneous environment 
with no pre-defined infrastructure. In fact, each node by itself is an ad hoc network with 
its own management. MANoNs are evolvable systems, which mean each ad hoc 
network has the ability to perform separately under its own policies and management 
without affecting the main system; therefore, new ad hoc networks can emerge and 
disconnect from the MANoN without conflicting with the policies of other networks. 
The unique characteristics of MANoN makes such networks highly vulnerable to 
security attacks compared with wired networks or even normal mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
This thesis presents a novel security-management system based upon the 
Recommendation ITU-T M.3400, which is used to evaluate, report on the behaviour of 
our MANoN and then support complex services our system might need to accomplish. 
Our security management will concentrate on three essential components: 
 Security Administration  
 Prevention and Detection 
 Containment and Recovery 
 
In any system, providing one of those components is a problem; consequently, dealing 
with an infrastructure-less MANoN will be a dilemma, yet we approached each set 
group of these essentials independently, providing unusual solutions for each one of 




The contributions of this research are threefold. First, we defined MANoN Security 
Architecture based upon the ITU-T Recommendations: X.800 and X.805. This security 
architecture provides a comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for MANoN that 
could be applied to every wireless network that satisfies a similar scenario, using such 
networks in order to predict, detect and correct security vulnerabilities. The security 
architecture identifies the security requirements needed, their objectives and the means 
by which they could be applied to every part of the MANoN, taking into consideration 
the different security attacks it could face.      
 
Second, realising the prevention component by implementing some of the security 
requirements identified in the Security Architecture, such as authentication, 
authorisation, availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation has 
been proposed by means of defining a novel Security Access Control Mechanism based 
on Threshold Cryptography Digital Certificates in MANoN.  
 
Network Simulator (NS-2) is a real network environment simulator, which is used to test 
the performance of the proposed security mechanism and demonstrate its effectiveness. 
Our ACM-MANoN results provide a fully distributed security protocol that provides a 
high level of secure, available, scalable, flexible and efficient management services for 
MANoN. 
 
The third contribution is realising the detection component, which is represented by 
providing a Behavioural Detection Mechanism based on nodes behavioural observation 
engaged with policies. This behaviour mechanism will be used to detect malicious nodes 
acting to bring the system down. This approach has been validated using an attacks case 








I declare that the work described in my thesis is original work undertaken 
by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at Software Technology 
Research Laboratory (STRL), at De Montfort University, United Kingdom.  
No part of the material described in this thesis has been submitted for the 
award of any other degree or qualification in this or any other university or 
college of advanced education.  
 
















First and Foremost, my deepest thankfulness goes to the most merciful ALLAH for all 
his blessings and bounties he gave me since I was born, without his blessings I would 
not be in this place at all.  
Most importantly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, 
Professor Hussein Zedan, without his support, patients and guidance this thesis would 
have been impossible to achieve. I was fortunate enough to have him by my side, 
meetings with him was enjoyable and discussions were insightful. The only thing I can 
say to him is thank you for everything. 
Also, I wish to thank my supervisor Dr. Antonio Cau for his professional guidance and 
critical comments which helped to improve my technical writing. I also want to thank 
Dr. François Siewe for his technical suggestions and guidance to improve this thesis. 
Special appreciation goes to Dr. Iman Almomani for her significant support and 
insightful comments through the earliest phase of my research. 
I am deeply indebt to my father and mentor Professor Hilal Al-Bayatti who was and 
still behind everything I have learned and achieved in my life. He made sure that I was 
never bothered with any responsibilities other than my research. I owe everything I have 
to him. I love to express my deepest gratitude to my Mother, for her care, patience, 
support, prayers and for the endless nights she was looking after me. Without her, I am 
nothing. Also, I love to thank my lovely sisters Rasha and Rana for their love, concern 
and engorgement along the way. My parents you made this work possible through all 
your love, patience, generosity and understanding. My gratitude is inexpressible. I could 
not possibly give back to you what you have lost to support me. I am trying to honour 




I would like to thank all my colleagues at the Software Technology Research Laboratory 
group – De Montfort University for their constant support and making STRL such a 
simulating and friendly environment for research. 
Last but not least, big gratitude goes to my friend and brother Dr. Mohammed Taye for 
all his encouragement and advices. Our friendship started here and will last forever. 
Also I wish to thank my dearest and best friends Manar Yusur, Moqdad Khalid, Mostafa 
Saed and Mudher Issa for all the encouragement and nice words they gave me all these 
years.  
  
      
 
 















1. Ali H. Al-Bayatti, H. Zedan, A. Cau, “Security Solution for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network of Networks (MANoN)”, IEEE Fifth International Conference of 
Networking and Services ICNS, pp. 255 – 262, April 2009. 
 
2. Ali H. Mohammed, H. Zedan, and A. Cau, “Security Architecture for 













Table of Content  
VIII 
 







TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................VIII 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................XIV 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................XV 
List of Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................XVIII 
 
CHAPTER 1 ...............................................................................................................................................1 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1 
 
1.1 Research Motivations ………................................................................................1  
1.2  Problem Formulation Statement and Security Solutions ......................................2  
1.3  Original Contributions ..........................................................................................4  
1.4 Success Criteria………………………………..…………………………………6 








CHAPTER 2 ...............................................................................................................................................9  
Overview on Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks ......................................9  
 
2.1 Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN)..................................................9  
    2.1.1 Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) ........................................................10  
2.1.1.1  History and Background of MANET ..........................................10 
2.1.1.2  MANET Characteristics………………………….…………..…11 
2.1.1.3  MANET Challenges ……………………………………………14 
2.2  Network Security.................................................................................................16  
    2.2.1 Security Requirements.............................................................................16  
    2.2.2  Security Attacks.......................................................................................20  
    2.2.3 Implementing Security Solution for MANET…..………………………25  
    2.2.4 Cryptographic Background......................................................................29 
2.2.4.1  Symmetric Key Algorithms.........................................................30  
2.2.4.2  Asymmetric Key Algorithms.......................................................31  
2.2.4.3  Digital Certificates.......................................................................35  
2.2.4.4  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)……….......................................36  
2.2.4.5  Validity and trust..........................................................................39  
2.4  Conclusion ………………….............................................................................43  
 
Chapter 3 ………………………………………….………………………..………...…………….……..……44 
Critical Review of Security Management for MANoN …………..………44 
 
3.1 Security Management for MANoN ……………………………………….……44 
    3.3.1 Network of Networks (NoN) …………………………………….…….44  
    3.1.2 Security Challenges in MANoN ……………………………………….45 
3.2 Key Management in MANoN ………………………………………………….46 
    3.2.1 PKI-based Key Management System ......................................................47 
Table of Content  
X 
 
 3.2.1.1  Partially Distributed Certificate Authority ……………………..47 
3.2.1.2  Fully Distributed Virtual CA.......................................................51 
3.3 Intrusion Detection techniques …………………………………………………52 
    3.3.1  Intrusion Detection techniques for mobile wireless 
networks...........................................................................................................................54 
    3.3.2  Intrusion Detection Using Agents in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks..........................................................................................................................56 
3.4 Security Management Schemes ..........................................................................58  
    3.4.1 A Security Management Scheme Using a Novel Computational 
Reputation Model for Wireless and Mobile Ad hoc Networks........................................58 
    3.4.2  Security Management in Hierarchical Ad Hoc Network ........................60 
    3.4.3 Policy-Based Security Management for Ad Hoc Wireless 
Systems............................................................................................................................61 
3.5   Conclusion ...............................................................................................................62 
 
Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................................................64 
Security Architecture for MANoN ....................................................................64 
4.1  Introduction .........................................................................................................64 
4.2  Security Architecture ..........................................................................................65 
    4.2.1 Security Requirements ............................................................................66 
    4.2.2  Security Layers ........................................................................................68 
    4.2.3 Security Planes ........................................................................................70 
4.3 Security Attacks ..................................................................................................71 
4.4  End-to-End Security Solution Design in Tabular form .......................................72  
4.5  Conclusion ...........................................................................................................83 
 
Chapter 5 ................................................................................................................................................84 
Security Management Techniques ...................................................................84  
 
Table of Content  
XI 
 
5.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................84 
5.2 Securely Managing MANoN ..............................................................................86 
5.3 Implementing Security Requirements Defined in the Security Architecture …..87 
5.4 MANoN System Model ………………………………………………………..89 
5.5 Security Mechanism Evaluation ……………………………………………….90 
    5.5.1 NS-2 Based Evaluation ...........................................................................90 
    5.5.2 Network Simulator: NS-2 .......................................................................90 
   5.5.3  Simulation Environment of the Security Mechanism .............................94 
    5.5.3.1  Simulation Environment of the Security Mechanism .................95 
 5.5.3.2  Parameters Values .......................................................................95 
5.6 Summary .............................................................................................................98 
 
Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................................99 
Algorithm1: Access Control Mechanism for MANoN (ACM-MANoN) 
..........................................................................................................................................99 
 
6.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................99 
6.2 Network and System Model ..............................................................................100  
6.3 ACM-MANoN Certificate Management Framework .......................................101 
    6.3.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificates .....................102 
    6.3.2 ACM-MANoN Implementation ............................................................103  
    6.3.3 Digital Certification Revocation ...........................................................109 
    6.3.4 Coping with Misbehaviour Users ..........................................................110 
6.4 ACM-MANoN Evaluation ................................................................................112 
    6.4.1 NS-2 Based Evaluation .........................................................................112 
     6.4.1.1  Simulation Environment ...........................................................113 
 6.4.1.2  Evaluation Metrics ....................................................................113 
 6.4.1.3  Parameter Values ......................................................................114 
 6.4.1.4  Results and Analysis .................................................................115 
Table of Content  
XII 
 
     6.4.1.4.1  Success Ratio ................................................................120 
     6.4.1.4.2  Delay .............................................................................123 
     6.4.1.4.3  Overhead .......................................................................120 
     6.4.1.4.4  Average Number of Retries ...........................................127 
6.5 Discussion .........................................................................................................129 
    6.5.1 ACM-MANoN Applications .................................................................129 
    6.5.2 ACM-MANoN Security Attacks ...........................................................131 
    6.5.3 ACM-MANoN Certificates ...................................................................132 
6.6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................132 
 
Chapter 7 .............................................................................................................................................135 
Algorithm2: Detection Algorithm for MANoN ..........................................135 
 
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................135 
7.2 Network Design and System Model .................................................................136 
7.3 BD-MANoN Certificate Management Framework ...........................................138 
    7.3.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificate ......................138 
    7.3.2 Implementation of Behaviour Detection ...............................................140 
 7.3.2.1  Syntax Expressions ...................................................................143 
 7.3.2.2  Behaviour Analyser ...................................................................147 
7.4 Coping with Misbehaviour Users ......................................................................150 
7.5 Conclusion .........................................................................................................154 
 
Chapter 8 .............................................................................................................................................155 
Case Studies .............................................................................................................155 
 
8.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................155 
8.2 Case Study 1: Military Environment .................................................................156 
    8.2.1 Components Definition for Military Environment ...............................157 
Table of Content  
XIII 
 
    8.2.2 Securing the Military Environment .......................................................158 
8.3 Conclusion .........................................................................................................167 
 
Chapter 9 .............................................................................................................................................168 
Conclusion and Future work ............................................................................168 
 
9.1 Summary ...........................................................................................................168 
9.2 Contributions .....................................................................................................170 
    9.2.1 Security Architecture for MANoN ........................................................171 
    9.2.3 Security Management and Security Mechanisms for Managing Digital 
Certificates in MANoN..................................................................................................171 
 9.2.3.1  ACM-MANoN ..........................................................................173 
 9.2.3.2  BD-MANoN ..............................................................................174 
9.3 Achieving Success Criteria ...............................................................................174 
9.4 Evaluation with Related Work ..........................................................................175       
















List of Tables  
XIV 
 
LIST of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Defence against MANET attacks...................................................................40 
Table 4.1: Applying security requirements to the Infrastructure Layer, Management 
Plane.................................................................................................................................69 
Table 4.2: Applying security requirements to the Infrastructure Layer, End-user Plane  
..........................................................................................................................................70 
Table 4.3: Applying security requirements to the Communication Layer, Management 
Plane.................................................................................................................................71 
Table 4.4: Applying security requirements to the Communication Layer, End-user Plane 
..........................................................................................................................................73 
Table 4.4: Applying security requirements to the Routing Layer, Management Plane    
..........................................................................................................................................74 
Table 4.6: Applying security requirements to the Routing Layer, End-user Plane.........75 
Table 4.7: Applying security requirements to the Application Layer, Management Plane 
..........................................................................................................................................76 
Table 4.8: Applying security requirements to the Application Layer, Management 
Plane.................................................................................................................. ...............77 
Table 4.9: Technologies for satisfying Security Requirements......................................82 
Table 5.1: The parameter values used in NS-2 based simulation...................................97 
Table 6.1: The parameter values used in NS-2 based simulation.................................115 








List of Figures  
XV 
 
LIST of Figures  
 
Figure 2.1:  Mobile ad hoc network of four nodes, node A communicates with node D    
..........................................................................................................................................12 
Figure 2.2: The Classification Security Layer Attacks…………………...……………24 
Figure 2.3: Symmetric encryption scheme......................................................................27 
Figure 2.4: Asymmetric encryption scheme...................................................................29 
Figure 2.5: Digital Signature Example...........................................................................30 
Figure 2.6: X.509 Digital certificate format....................................................................34 
Figure 2.7: Direct trust model.........................................................................................37 
Figure 2.8: Hierarchical trust model...............................................................................37 
Figure 2.9: Web of trust model.......................................................................................38 
Figure 3.1: The configuration of (Z-H) Key Management Service................................45 
Figure 3.2: Threshold Signature......................................................................................46 
Figure 3.3: Share refreshing............................................................................................47 
Figure 3.4: A conceptual model of an IDS agent............................................................51 
Figure 3.5: Layered Mobile Agent Architecture.............................................................53 
Figure 3.6: Reputation Assistant Mechanism.................................................................55 
Figure 3.7: Responsive / Preemptive Security Management Architecture.....................58 
Figure 4.1: MANoN Security Architecture.....................................................................63 
Figure 4.2: Security solutions in tabular form................................................................68 
Figure 5.1: the implementation of the security requirements using the proposed security 
mechanisms......................................................................................................................88 
Figure 5.2: MANoN two scenarios.................................................................................89 
Figure 5.3: Security mechanism evaluation ...................................................................91 
Figure 5.4: Simulator usage from MobiHoc survey.......................................................92 
Figure 5.5: Schematic structure for NS-2.......................................................................93 
Figure 6.1: Network Model of ACM-MANoN.............................................................101 
List of Figures  
XVI 
 
Figure 6.2: The Structure of ACM-MANoN Digital Certificates.................................102 
Figure 6.3: Request & Validation of the certificates.....................................................104 
Figure 6.4: Finding a set of legitimate users in order to perform TC...........................105 
Figure 6.5: Forwarding the Authorisation certificate to the requesting node...............105 
Figure 6.6: Visual Basic tool used to measure the evaluation metrics of MANoN......116 
Figure 6.7: Success ratio, Delay, and Average Retries versus ATI..............................117 
Figure 6.8: Overhead versus ATI..................................................................................117 
Figure 6.9: Comparison between the simulated and calculated delays.........................118 
Figure 6.10: Success Ratio, delay and average retries versus routing protocol............119 
Figure 6.11: Overhead versus routing protocols...........................................................120 
Figure 6.12: Success Ratio, delay and Number of Packet versus number of retries        
........................................................................................................................................121 
Figure 6.13: Success Ratio versus mobility and network size .....................................122 
Figure 6.14: Success Ratio versus speed and network size..........................................123 
Figure 6.15: Average delay versus mobility and network size.....................................124 
Figure 6.16: Average delay versus speed and network size..........................................125 
Figure 6.17: Overhead versus mobility and network size.............................................126 
Figure 6.18: Overhead versus speed and network size.................................................127 
Figure 6.19: Average number of retries versus mobility and network size..................128 
Figure 6.20: Average number of retries versus speed and network size.......................128 
Figure 6.21: Military Applications for the ACM-MANoN..........................................130 
Figure: 6.22 Civilian applications of ACM-MANoN algorithm..................................131 
Figure 7.1: Network Model of BD-MANoNs...............................................................137 
Figure 7.2: A wide-covered heterogeneous network....................................................138 
Figure 7.3: The Structure of BD-MANoN Digital Certificates....................................139 
Figure 7.4: Behaviour Detection Architecture..............................................................143 
Figure 7.5: Creation of States........................................................................................148 
Figure 7.6: Trace satisfies a Property............................................................................149 
Figure 7.7: Man in the Middle Attack...........................................................................152 
List of Figures  
XVII 
 
Figure 7.8: Tunnelling Attack.......................................................................................153 


















List of Acronyms  
XVIII 
 
List of Acronyms  
 
ACM   Access Control Mechanism  
ACL   Access Control List  
AES   Advanced Encryption Standard 
AODV   Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector  
ARAN   Authenticated Routing protocol for Ad hoc Network 
ARPA   Advanced Research Project Agency 
ARIADNE  A Secure On-Demand Routing for Ad hoc Network 
ATI    Authentication Time Interval 
BBN   Back Bone Node 
BD   Behaviour Detection  
CASe   Certificate Authority Servers 
CAC   Certificate Authority Combiner  
CA   Certificate Authorities 
CH    Cluster Head 
CRL   Certificate Revocation List 
DAC   Discretionary Access Control 
DARPA  Defence Advanced Research Project Agency 
DC    Data Collector 
DCF   Distributed Coordination Function 
DNS   Domain Name Service 
DoS   Denial of Service  
DSDV   Destination Sequence Distance Vector  
DSR   Dynamic Source Routing 
DSSS   Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum 
 
List of Acronyms  
XIX 
 
FCAPS  Fault-management, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and 
Security 
FHSS   Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum 
GBBN   Global Back Bone Node 
GN    General Node 
IDS   Intrusion Detection System 
IFQ   Interface Queue 
IPS    Intrusion Prevention System 
IR   Infrared  
ITU-T   Institute Technology Union- Telecommunication Standardization 
Sector  
LBBN   Local Back Bone Node 
LDB   Local Data Base 
LL   Link Layer 
MAC   Medium Access Control 
MAC   Mandatory Access Control 
MANET  Mobile Ad hoc Network 
MANoN  Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
MOCA  Mobile Certificate Authority 
MP   MOCA Protocol 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NoN   Network of Networks 
NS-2    Network Simulator 2 
OAM&P  Operation, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning 
OSI   Open System Interconnection  
OTCL   Object-oriented extension of TCL 
P   Public Key 
PAN   Personal Area Network 
List of Acronyms  
XX 
 
PC   Personal computer 
PGP   Pretty Good Privacy 
PK    Public Key 
PKI   Public Key Infrastructure 
Pr   Private Key 
QoS    Quality of Service 
RA   Reputation Assistant 
RA   Registration Authority 
RAM   Reputation Assistant Mechanism 
RBAC   Role Based Access Control 
RF   Radio Frequency 
RIT   Route Information Table 
RREP   Route Reply  
RREQ   Route Request  
RPC   Remote Procedure Call 
RWP   Random WayPoint 
SAR   Security Aware ad hoc Routing protocol  
SEAD   Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector Routing  
SK   Private Key 
SMT   Secure Message Transmission 
SN   Sequence Number  
SoS    System of Systems 
TCP   Transmission Control Protocol 
TTP   Trusted Third Party 
UK   United Kingdom  
URSA   Ubiquitous and Robust Access Control   
US   United States  
VINT   Virtual InterNetwork Testbed 
WLAN  Wireless Local Aria Network 
List of Acronyms  
XXI 
 
WoT   Web of Trust  























1.1 Research Motivations 
The aims of wireless technology meet the need for fast, reliable and secure information 
exchange, communication networks in the future have become an integral part of our 
society. The success of any corporation depends largely upon its ability to communicate. 
The emerging MANoN technology attempt to offer users with anytime and anywhere 
services in a large heterogeneous infrastructure-less wireless network, based on 
collaboration between individual network nodes. In the last few years, there has been 
considerable interest in MANoNs, as they have significant potential in military 
situations, such as disaster recovery situations and rescue missions, and in commercial, 
smart homes and academic institutions such as class/conference room applications. 
 
The unique characteristics of MANoN are decentralised decision making (lack of central 
authority), policy conflicts, dynamic changing topology, short range connectivity, shared 
radio channel, limited resource availability and physical vulnerability which make such 
networks highly vulnerable to security attacks compared with wired, infrastructure-
based wireless networks or even normal Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET). 
 
Consequently, the main challenge facing MANoN is security, in precise security 
management that needs deep investigation and proper solutions. Providing security 
management is considered to be the most crucial solution to the MANoN security 
problem, since MANoN deals with different aspects such as providing efficient key 
management, routing and security administration especially prevention and detection 




techniques. In addition, a successful security management system represented by 
providing proper prevention and detection techniques will ensure the implementation of 
most of the security requirements such as authentication, authorisation, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Security Solutions  
 
Based on the growing demands of military and industrial projects for evolvable systems 
[101, 102], our state-of-the-art MANoN is an excellent solution to those demands, as it 
deals with multi wireless ad hoc networks under its own policies, regulations and 
management in a heterogeneous environment, with no pre-defined infrastructure; each 
ad hoc network has the ability to emerge or disconnect without affecting the main 
MANoN system. Nevertheless, providing these types of systems is one thing and 
providing security is another. Therefore, such networks are highly vulnerable to security 
attacks compared with wired networks or even normal mobile ad hoc networks. 
In general, MANoN faces major issues and challenges that need to be considered when 
designing this type of network. Security is our main concern and the focus of this 
research. We found that providing security management is a proper solution required by 
any system, and our system is not exempted from this network policy.  
Before discussing the essential aspects of security management, we need to design a 
comprehensive security foundation/architecture upon which to implement our security 
requirements. Hence, we designed a security architecture based upon the ITU-T 
Recommendations, X.800 and X.805 [56, 57], which provides a comprehensive, bottom-
up, end-to-end security solution for MANoN that could be applied to every wireless 
network that satisfies a similar scenario using such networks in order to predict, detect 
and correct security vulnerabilities. The security architecture identifies the security 
requirements needed, their objectives and the means by which they could be applied to 




every part of the MANoN, taking into consideration the different kinds of security attack 
it could face.      
 
In order to achieve the objectives of the security requirements defined in the security 
architecture for MANoN, a set of mechanisms must be proposed to enforce these 
security requirements and forestall any attempts to evade them.  
 
Various technologies can be applied to implement the security requirements. Modern 
cryptography – including public key cryptography, digital signatures and digital 
certificates – are the most powerful tools that can be used to implement most of the 
security requirements, including authentication, authorisation, data confidentiality, data 
integrity and non-repudiation. 
 
In fact, cryptography techniques are part of the essential security management tools as 
they fall into the Prevention and Detection component [59]. This category is one of the 
central aspects of security management in MANoN, which requires effective 
mechanisms in order to achieve and implement the defined security requirements.  
 
We realised the prevention component by implementing some of the security 
requirements identified in the Security Architecture, such as authentication, 
authorisation, availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation, that 
have been proposed by means of defining a novel Security Access Control Mechanism 
based on Threshold Cryptography Digital Certificates in MANoN. Moreover, we 
evaluated our security mechanism by the Network Simulator (NS-2), which is a real 
network environment simulator used to test the performance of the proposed security 
mechanism and demonstrate its effectiveness.  
 
 




Furthermore, we implemented a detection component, which is represented by providing 
a Behavioural Detection Mechanism based on nodes behaviour compared with our 
system policies. This behaviour mechanism will be used to detect malicious nodes 
acting to bring the system down. This approach has been validated using a proper 
formalisation and an attacks case study to cope with misbehaving nodes. 
 
1.3 Original Contributions 
 
This thesis makes the following main original contributions. 
 
Security Architecture for MANoN: A security architecture is proposed that provides 
the specification of a comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for a MANoN that 
could be applied to every wireless service provisioning scenario using this type of 
network in order to detect, predict and correct security vulnerabilities. The security 
architecture identifies seven security requirements that protect against all major security 
threats trying to attack the MANoN. These attacks are characterised by accidental or 
intentional generation, of either inside or outside origin, and using active or passive 
behaviour. The security architecture is defined based upon ITU-T Recommendations 
X.800, and X.805.  
This security architecture appears in our publication [75, 4]. 
 
Security Management for MANoN: A novel security-management system is proposed 
based upon Recommendation ITU-T M.3400 [58], which is used to evaluate, report on 
the behaviour of our MANoN and support the complex services our system might need 
to accomplish. In addition, we will concentrate on providing the essential components 
Prevention and Detection. Novel security mechanisms are used to satisfy the objectives 
of security requirements, such as authentication, authorisation, availability, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation. We assume that MANoN is 
operating in heterogeneous wireless environments such as WLANs and cellular systems. 




In this novel mechanism, two different algorithms will be defined for two different 
scenarios. 
 
 ACM–MANoN: The access control mechanism for MANoN proposes a 
prevention technique against malicious acts, which are provided using threshold 
cryptography digital certificates where all ad hoc networks are pre-defined and 
managed by other heterogeneous infrastructure-base. Moreover, a hierarchy trust 
model is used by the PKIs of the heterogeneous wireless networks, and provides 
a high level of security, availability and a well certification management service 
for MANoN. This mechanism is evaluated using the Network Simulator NS-2. 
NS-2 evaluation tests the proposed algorithm in a real network environment and 
measures communication costs using other evaluation metrics, such as success 
ratio, delay, average number of retries and overhead. The results of the 
evaluation study proves that ACM-MANoN is fully distributed security protocol 
that provide a high level of secure, available, scalable, flexible and efficient 
prevention management services for MANoN. ACM-MANoN appears in our 
publication [4]. 
 
 BD-MANoN: The behaviour detection mechanism for MANoN, propose a 
detection technique which may be used to differentiate between normal and 
malicious nodes. This detection algorithm is provided in a heterogeneous 
MANoN in which some of our networks are pre-defined and others are emerging 
surreptitiously. This mechanism will be carried out by our administrator nodes, 
which is based on the behaviour and actions of other nodes with comparison of 
our security policies. This mechanism is evaluated in a real time military 
environment, where different scenarios and policies have been introduced; this 
evaluation shows the availability, flexibility, and high level of security detection 




against malicious and untrustworthy nodes in the MANoN system. BD-MANoN 
appears in our publication [4]. 
 
 
1.4 Success Criteria 
 
To judge the success criteria of our research, the following research questions must be 
fulfilled in our thesis: 
 
 For a well deployed security architecture which has never been provided for 
MANoN, how can an end-to-end security architecture be applied to network 
entities, services and applications in order to detect and predict security 
vulnerabilities?  
 Is the MANoN system securely managed? Security management includes three 
essential components: Security Administration, Prevention & Detection and 
Containment & Recovery, does the system contain any security solutions for 
these components?   
 What kind of protection is needed and against what threats? 
 What are the distinct types of network equipment and facility groupings that 
need to be protected? 
 Providing authentication and authorisation will be major factor towards 
providing the other security requirements any system might need to present a 
secure system, the question is, does our research provide these requirements? 
 
These criteria will be revisited in the conclusion chapter to argue that such solutions 
exist and met in our research.   
 
   




1.5 Thesis Outline  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 presents the characteristics and challenges of MANoN. It investigates the 
security issues in MANoN by discussing security requirements, security attacks and 
security challenges. It then provides the cryptographic background needed to illustrate 
previous work and the mechanisms proposed in this area of study and moreover, related 
work in the area of security management for MANoN. 
 
Chapter 3 uses the two ITU-T Recommendations X.800 and X.805, to propose the 
security architecture for MANoN that provides the specification of a comprehensive, 
end-to-end security solution. The security architecture defines security requirements and 
how they could be applied throughout the MANoN system, taking into account the 
various security attacks it could face.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the integration of heterogeneous wireless networks in order to 
enhance MANoN security. It proposes a novel security-management system based upon 
Recommendation ITU-T M.3400, which is used to evaluate and report on the behaviour 
of our MANoN and support complex services our system might need to accomplish. It 
assumes that a MANoN operates in a heterogeneous environment, and presents two 
algorithms for two different scenarios. The methodologies used to evaluate the two 
algorithms are illustrated.  
 
Chapter 5 proposes a new security access control mechanism based on threshold 
cryptography digital certificates in our MANoN system, providing a set of security 
requirements: authentication, authorisation, data integrity, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. This is a fully distributed security protocol that provides a high level of 




secure, available, scalable, flexible and efficient security management services for 
MANoN. This mechanism is evaluated using the network simulator NS-2. 
 
Chapter 6 proposes a novel security detection protocol for managing digital certificates 
based on behaviours in the MANoN system. This is a fully distributed security protocol 
that provides a high level of secure, available, scalable, flexible, reliable and efficient 
security management services for MANoN. This approach is validated using an attacks 
case study to cope with misbehaving nodes. 
 
Chapter 7 the evaluation of our approach was made with a military case study holding 
two scenarios. The military case study proposed concerns defined and undefined mobile 
armies engaging in unknown high risk territory.    
 
Chapter 8 summarises the work presented in this thesis, highlights the significance of 













Overview on Mobile Ad hoc 
Network of Networks (MANoN) 
 
Objectives 
 Define basic security concepts  
 Provide an overview for MANoN 
 Present an overview of the network security 
 Present an overview of the cryptography background 
 
2.1   Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) 
Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) is a group of large autonomous 
wireless nodes communicating on a peer-to-peer basis in a heterogeneous environment 
with no pre-defined infrastructure. In fact, each node by itself is an ad hoc network with 
its own management. MANoNs are evolvable systems, which mean each ad hoc 
network has the ability to perform separately under its own policies and management 
without affecting the main system; therefore, new ad hoc networks can emerge and 
disconnect from the MANoN without conflicting with the policies of others. The unique 
characteristics of MANoN make such networks highly vulnerable to security attacks 
compared with wired networks, or even normal mobile ad hoc networks. MANoNs are a 
combination of both ad hoc networks and network of networks; to elaborate more on 
MANoN we need to discuss each component separately. This chapter will consist of an 
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overview of MANoN. The present research focuses on tackling the security challenges 
and proposing different security solutions for our MANoN. The following sections will 
investigate the security aspect of communication in MANoN by discussing the security 
requirements, security challenges, different security attacks, key management issues, 
and the mechanisms used in the literature to manage mobile ad hoc networks securely. 
 
2.1.1 Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are increasingly popular and successful in the 
industry and commercial of wireless technology in the future, as indicated by the 
increasing use of Bluetooth. This section will focus on the unique characteristics of 
MANET and the most important challenges facing this type of network. 
 
2.1.1.1 History and Background of MANET 
The principle behind ad hoc networking is multi-hop (a scenario of multi-hop will be 
shown later) relaying, which traces its roots back to 500 B.C. Darius I (533-486 B.C.), 
the king of Persia, invented an innovative communication system that was used to send 
messages and news from his capital to the remote provinces of his empire by means of a 
line of shouting men positioned on tall structures or heights. This system was more than 
23 times faster than normal messengers available at that time. The use of ad hoc voice 
communication was introduced in many ancient/ tribal societies with a string of 
repeaters of drums, trumpets or horns.  
In 1970, DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Project Agency) [24] had a project 
known as Packet Radio, where several wireless terminals could communicate with one 
another on a battlefield. Packet radio extended the concept of packet switching (evolved 
from point-to-point communication networks) to the domain of broadcast radio 
networks.  
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During the 1970s, a group of researchers led by Norman Abramson (and others 
including N. Gaarder and N. Weldon) invented ALOHAnet [1], which linked the 
universities of the Hawaiian Islands together by broadcast property to send/ receive data 
packets in a single radio hop system. Even though ALOHAnet was established for fixed 
single-hop wireless networks, the ALOHA project led to the development of a multi-hop 
multiple-access packet radio network (PRNET) under the sponsorship of the Advanced 
Research Project Agency (ARPA) [2]. Unlike ALOHA, PRNET permits multi-hop 
communications over a wide geographical area, helping to establish the notion of ad hoc 
wireless networking in the same year [79]. 
 
2.1.1.2 MANET Characteristics 
 
The study and development of infrastructureless wireless networks have been very 
popular in recent years. MANET belongs to the class of networks which does not 
require the support of wired access points or base stations for intercommunication. A 
mobile ad hoc network is unlike a static network, as it has no infrastructure. It is a 
collection of mobile nodes where communication is established in the absence of any 
fixed foundation. The only possible direct communication is between neighbouring 
nodes. Therefore, communication between remote nodes is based on multiple-hop. 
These nodes are dynamically and arbitrarily located in such a manner that the 
interconnections between nodes are capable of changing on a continual basis. Each 
mobile node acts as a host and a router, relaying information from one neighbour to 
another [94]. For example, in Figure 2.1, nodes A and D must enlist the aid of nodes B 
and C to relay packets between them in order to communicate.  
MANETs have various defining characteristics that differentiate them from other wired 
and wireless networks, such as [110, 3, 76]: 
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 Infrastructureless: MANETs are formed based on the collaboration between 
independent, peer-to-peer nodes that wish to communicate with each other 
for a particular purpose. No prior organisation or base station is defined and 
all devices have the same role in the network. In addition, there are no pre-set 
roles such as routers or gateways for the nodes participating in the network 
unless specific arrangements are provided.  
 
 Dynamic Topology: MANET nodes are free to move around; thus they could 
be in and out of the network, constantly changing its links and topology. In 
addition, the links between nodes could be bi-directional or unidirectional.  
 
 Low and Variable Bandwidth: Wireless links that connect the MANET 
nodes have much smaller bandwidth than those with wires, while the effects 
of interference, noise and congestion are more visible, causing the available 
bandwidth to vary with the surrounding conditions and to be even more 
reduced.  
 
 Constrained Resources: In general, most of the MANET devices are small 
handheld devices ranging from laptops, smartphones and personal digital 
assistants (PDA) down to cell phones. These devices have limited power 
(battery operated), processing capabilities and storage capacity.  
 






 Limited Device Security: MANET devices are usually small and portable, 
and are therefore not restricted by location. As a result, these devices can be 
easily lost, damaged or stolen.  
 
 Limited Physical Security: Wireless links make MANET more susceptible 
to physical layer attacks, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, jamming and 
Denial of Service (DoS). However, the decentralised nature of MANETs 
makes them better protected against single failure points.  
 
 Short Range Connectivity: MANET depends on radio frequency (RF) or 
infrared (IR) technology for connectivity, both of which are generally short 
range. Therefore, the nodes that wish to communicate directly need to be in 
close proximity to each other. To overcome this limitation, multi-hop 
routing techniques are used through intermediate nodes that act as routers to 
connect distant nodes. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Mobile ad hoc network of four nodes, node A communicates with node D 
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Since ad hoc networks can be deployed rapidly without the support of a fixed 
infrastructure, they can be used in situations where temporary network connectivity is 
needed. Examples include conferences, meetings, crowd control, shared whiteboard 
applications (office workgroup), multi-user games, robotic pets, home wireless 
networks, office wireless networks, search and rescue, disaster recovery and automated 
battlefields. These environments do not naturally have a central administration or 
infrastructure available. 
 
2.1.1.3 MANET Challenges  
The main challenges in the design and operation of MANET comes from the lack of a 
centralised entity (infrastructureless) - such as base stations, access points and servers, 
the possibility of rapid node movement and the fact that all communications are 
conducted over the wireless medium. Owing to the unique characteristics of wireless ad 
hoc networks, the major issues that affect the design, deployment and performance of an 
ad hoc wireless system and that are interesting research areas in MANETs are as 
follows: 
 
 Medium Access Scheme: As ad hoc networks lack any centralised control, the 
distributed arbitration for the shared channel for transmission of packets is the 
primary responsibility of a medium access control (MAC) protocol [121, 63].  
 
 Routing: The existence of mobility in ad hoc networks implies that links 
between nodes construct and break occasionally. Hence, new routing protocols 
are needed [69, 80].  
 
Chapter 2 Overview on Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) 
15 
 
 Multicasting: As ad hoc networks require point-to-multipoint and multipoint-to-
multipoint voice and data communication, and as ad hoc networks are mobile, 
the nodes links need to reform periodically. Moreover, most of the multicast 
protocols rely on the fact that routers are static, and that once the multicast tree is 
formed, tree nodes will not move. However, this is not so for MANET [117].  
                  
 Energy Management: As MANET nodes act as host and routers, and are 
powered by small batteries with limited lifetime, consequently, necessary 
consideration must be taken [68]. 
 
 TCP Performance: Unfortunately, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is 
unable to distinguish the presence of mobility and network congestion. Hence, 
some enhancement or changes are needed to ensure that the transport protocol 
performs properly without affecting the end-to-end communication throughput 
[39, 125]. 
 
 Service Location, Provision, and Access: the question arises: should there be a 
continued assumption that the traditional client/Server RPC (Remote Procedure 
Call) paradigm is appropriate for MANET? Owing to the limitations in 
bandwidth and the heterogeneity of the devices in ad hoc networks, this may not 
be attractive. Also, how can a mobile device access a remote service in an ad hoc 
network or how it can advertise its desire to provide services to the rest of the 
devices in the network? All these issues demand research [126]. 
 
 Security: The unique characteristics of MANET present a new set of serious and 
essential challenges to security design; these include open peer-to-peer network 
architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints, and highly 
dynamic network topology. These types of challenges clearly make a case for 
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creating security solutions that achieve both broad protection and desirable 
network performance [22, 73, 126, 25]. 
 
 
Although MANETs are enjoying a growth in the number of applications and possess 
many attractive features, they nevertheless face several challenges, as is plainly shown 
above. Each of these challenges can be considered as a separate research area needing 
thorough examination. 
 
2.2   Network Security 
When discussing network security in general, three important aspects need to be 
considered: security requirements, security attacks and security mechanisms.  
Security requirements include the functionality necessary to provide a secure 
networking environment, while security attacks cover the methods that could be 
employed to break these requirements. Security mechanisms are the fundamental 
structure blocks used to provide and enforce the security requirements. 
 
2.2.1 Security Requirements  
Security requirements will be a vital solution to different attacks and threats (explained 
in section 2.2.2). If the key requirements are provided, then security will be much easier 
to achieve. In addition, those security requirements listed below should be implemented 
in any system in order to provide a high level of security; however, implementing all 
those requirements in one system is impossible. Researchers have tried implementing a 
set of key requirements to provide major security needs to any system.    
The key requirements are being defined by several unions such as the International 
Telecommunications Union represented by their ITU-T Recommendation X.805 and 
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X.800, and they are as follows [3, 76, 104, 32]: Access control; Authentication; Non-
repudiation; Data confidentiality; Data integrity; Availability and Privacy.   
 
Authentication: Authentication is essential to ensure that both end peers are who they 
claim to be (genuine) and not impersonators. Without proper authentication, no other 
requirement can be correctly implemented. For example,  if two nodes are using 
symmetric-key encryption to exchange messages securely, and one of them becomes 
compromised as a result of the lack of proper authentication, then all encrypted material 
such as the shared key and the encryption algorithm will be readily available to that 
misbehaved node. Techniques to authenticate users securely are essential to the 
operation of MANET. Moreover, an adversary might masquerade nodes by gaining 
unauthorised access to resources and sensor information. Moreover, an adversary might 
interfere with the operation of other nodes in the network. 
 
Authorisation and Access Control: This ensures that only authorised nodes have the 
permission and privilege to perform in the network. Nodes participating in the network 
need to have proper authorisation to access and share resources, services, applications 
and personal information on that network. There are various approaches to access 
control:  
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) offers a means for defining the access control to 
the users themselves. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) involves centralised 
mechanisms to control access to objects with a formal authorisation policy. Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) enforces the notion of roles within the subjects and objects.  
 
Availability: Essential services must be provided by a node at any time when they are 
needed, irrespective of attacks. In addition, availability of a network means that its 
services should be accessible, when needed, even in the event of break-ins.  
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Data Confidentiality: This concerns preventing unauthorised entities (intermediate 
nodes) from understanding the contents of the message. Confidentiality is not restricted 
to survivability of users‘ information only, such as strategic or tactical military 
information, but also to the - survivability of the routing information. Confidentiality 
can be obtained using any of the well-known encryption methods with proper key 
management systems. 
 
Data Integrity: Guarantee data is not modified, deleted, removed, recorded, corrupted 
and re-transmitted by unauthorised entities either by radio failure or malicious attack. 
This is most essential in circumstances such as banking, military operations and 
equipment controls (e.g. trains or planes) where such changes could cause serious 
damage.  
 
Non-repudiation: This ensures that the receiver and sender can not deny receiving and 
sending packets to or from other nodes. This approach can detect and isolate the 
compromised node. If A received an erroneous message from B with the intention of 
breaking down A‘s system, after that A can accuse B of providing proof of sending 
erroneous information, and expose B to other nodes to convince them that node B is a 
malicious node and not to route through B in the future. This is very important in cases 
of disagreement over some situations. This can be obtained using methods such as 
digital signatures that relate the data or action to the actual signer.  
 
Privacy: Privacy ensures that the location and identity of nodes are protected against an 
adversary. Moreover, it provides protection of information flow so that an adversary can 
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Other requirements the system might need [19]:  
Timeliness: Routing updates should be delivered in a timely manner. Update messages 
that arrive late might reflect the wrong state of the network and might lead to a large loss 
in information. 
Isolation: This requires that nodes should be able to identify misbehaving nodes and 
isolate them. Alternatively, routing protocols must be immune to malicious nodes.  
Lightweight computation: Many devices connected to an ad hoc are assumed to be 
battery powered with limited computational ability. They might not be able to carry 
large cryptography algorithms. 
 
Self-stabilisation: Nodes should be able to recover from attacks independently in real 
time without human intervention. If nodes are self-stabilising to malicious attacks, then 
the attacker will remain in the network, and continue sending erroneous messages in 
order to bring the system down, but it will be easier for nodes to locate the attacker. 
Survivability: This is the capability of the system to fulfil its mission in a timely 
manner, in the presence of accidents, failures, intrusion or malicious attacks. Mission 
means restoring and maintaining essential services during and after the attack, even if a 
large portion of the system has been damaged or destroyed. Requirements of the 
survivability system are resistance to, recognition of, recover from, adoption and 
evaluation [89].  
 
Anonymity: Neither the node nor the system should by default expose information, such 
as MAC address and IP address, that might put the system at risk.  
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2.2.2   Security Attacks 
As mentioned, security in ad hoc wireless networks is very important, especially in 
military applications. The lack of any central administration makes MANET more 
vulnerable to attacks than wired networks. Consequently, attacks in ad hoc networks are 
generally divided into two broad categories, namely, Passive and Active attacks.  
A passive attack refers to the attempts that are made by malicious nodes to perceive the 
nature of activities and to obtain information transacted in the network without 
disrupting the operation. For example, eavesdropping, active interference, leakage of 
secret information, data tempering, impersonation, message replay, message distortion 
and denial of service. Detection of passive attacks is complicated, since the network 
operation is not effected. Using encryption methods are great solution to overcome such 
problems example of encryption mechanisms is encrypting the data being transmitted, 
thereby making it hard for eavesdroppers to gain any active information from the data 
being transmitted.   
An active attack refers to the attacks that attempt to alter, inject, delete or destroy the 
data being exchanged in the network. Those attacks can be executed by internal or 
external attackers, if the attacks are carried out by nodes that do not belong to the 
network (outside the network) that attack will be an external attack, which will be easier 
to defend, because users expect any act from an external node. Otherwise, if the attack 
comes from an insider node (part of the network), it will be an internal attack, which 
can cause considerable damage to the network because it is much harder to defend, as it 
is unfeasible to detect a malicious node and then prevent it from disrupting the network.  
These attacks can be prevented by using regular security mechanisms such as encryption 
techniques and firewalls. Internal attacks come from compromised nodes that are 
actually part of the network; they are known as compromised nodes. Internal attacks are 
more serious and difficult to detect than external ones.  
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This section gives brief descriptions of some of the main active attacks known in most 
networks [3, 76, 32, 78, 31, 113]. 
 
• Denial Of Service (DoS) 
DoS is an active attack that attempts to make resources unavailable to its 
intended users. The attacker tries to prevent legitimate users to access services 
offered by the network. DoS can be carried out in different ways, but in the end 
causing the same problems. It can be carried out in the classical way by flooding 
centralised recourses (e.g. base stations) and permitting the system to crash or to 
interrupt its operation. Owing to the unique characteristics of ad hoc networks, 
DoS can be launched in different ways that do not exist in other wired or 
wireless networks and which can be launched at any layer of the protocol stack, 
for example, radio jamming and battery exhaustion on physical and MAC layers 
by disturbing the on-going transmissions at the wireless channels. On the 
network layer, an adversary could launch DoS on the routing protocols leading to 
a degrading in the QoS of the network by making routing protocols drop a 
certain number of packets. On higher layers, an adversary could bring down 
critical services, such as key management service (explained later). 
 
• Impersonation  
The attacker tries to copy the behaviour or the action of an authorised node to 
gain the same facilities of the original node, either to make use of the network 
resources that might be unavailable to it under normal circumstances, or in an 
attempt to disturb network functionality by injecting erroneous routing 
information [45]. Man-in-the-middle attack is one form of impersonator. An 
adversary may read or falsify messages between legitimate users with out letting 
either of them know that they have been attacked. 
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• Disclosure  
A compromised node may try to disclose secret information to unauthorised 
nodes in the network; therefore communication must be protected against any 
eavesdropper trying to disclose confidential information that is being exchanged. 
Also, secret data must be protected from unauthorised access.  
 
• Repudiation  
In simple terms, this occurs when nodes tries to deny having any involvement in 
particular action or communication with other nodes. 
 
• Routing Attacks  
Those attacks occur on the network layer, when several types of attacks are 
mounted on the routing protocols which are aimed at disrupting the operation of 
the network. These are the major routing protocols attacks, which are described 
briefly: 
- Routing table overflow: The main goal of this attack is to create an 
overflow of the routing table and to prevent new legitimate routes from 
being created, which can be achieved by an adversary node trying to 
create routes to non-existence nodes.  
- Location disclosure: This type of attack can reveal some information 
about the location of the node or give a description of the network 
structure. 
- Blackhole attack: In this attack, a malicious node tries to advertise it 
self as having the shortest path to the specific destination (falsify 
advertisement) whose packets it wants to intercept. After gaining 
access between the required communications, the malicious node can 
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do anything, like performing a DoS attack or alternatively it can use its 
place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack. 
- Packet Replication: In this attack, a malicious node replicates stale 
packets. This devours additional bandwidth and battery power 
resources available to the elements, and also causes unnecessary 
confusion in routing process. 
 
- Sleep deprivation: This attack occurs in Ad hoc networks only 
because of the power limitation that ad hoc networks have. Thus, an 
attacker will try to consume battery life by requesting unnecessary 
routes or forwarding Packets (garbage) to nodes, by using for example 
Blackhole attack. 
 
• Military Attacks 
Every network used by the military will need full protection, by providing 
maximum security. In a military environment, routing attacks can be divided into 
two types: 
-Strategic routing attacks: Strategic routing attacks include intelligence 
gathering. This type of attacks might cover desolation of enemy networks 
in the preparation of battle. Additionally, because of the attack, the 
attacker could gain some information about where the enemy is about to 
strike next. Nevertheless, once a routing attack has finished, the network 
can usually be brought back into use in a short amount of time.  
 
-Tactical routing attacks: Tactical attacks could be used most 
effectively during battles. This attack could use the information gathered 
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about the topology of the network. The main goal could be to disable 
some important part of a network temporarily by using DoS attacks. 
 
• Layers Attack  
As seen in Figure 2.2, this section summarises the attacks that a MANET layer 
faces.  
 
The security architecture for MANoN will be proposed in Chapter 3. It provides a 
comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for a MANoN in order to detect, predict, 
and correct security vulnerabilities. It identifies the security requirements, their 
objectives, and the means by which they could be applied to MANoN, taking into 
consideration the different security attacks it could face. 
 
In order to enforce the implementation of the security requirements, a set of security 
mechanisms needs to be defined. Cryptography is one of the most powerful tools that 
can be used to achieve most of the security requirements, such as authentication, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation. The following section will provide 
the cryptographic background that is needed to understand the work already done to 
manage and secure a MANoN, as well as current research. 
 






2.2.3    Implementing the Security Solution for MANET 
The proposed security architecture for MANoN is comprehensive and technology-
independent. This section explains how this security architecture can be implemented.  
There are various types of attacks against MANoN that have been dealt with in previous 
research. Table 2.1 presents some of these attacks [96], [24], [46], [44], [122], [41, 17] 
and how they fit into the classifications defined in the security architecture (section 4.3), 
Security Attacks 

































Figure 2.2: The Classification Security Layer Attacks [76] 
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as well as mentioning some of the proposed methods of dealing with these types of 
attack.  
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stable) to the destination node 
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[122] [23] 
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during the path-finding process (in 
on-demand routing protocols) or in 
the route update messages (in table-






Attacks where adversaries have full 
control of a number of 
authenticated devices and behave 
arbitrarily to disrupt the network 
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very frequent generation of beacon 
packets, or forwarding of stale 
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SEAD [46] 
Sybil attack Active 
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External 
A Sybil attack is one in which an 
attacker subverts the reputation 
system; it can be created by 
presenting multiple identities which 
















Several types of attacks mounted 
on the routing protocols which are 
aimed at disrupting the operation of 
the network, such as: routing table 
overflow, routing table poisoning, 
packet replication, route cache 








Repudiation  Active 
International 
Internal 
Refers to the denial or attempted 
denial by a node involved in a 
communication of having 
participated in all or part of the 
communication, regardless whether 








Attacker aims to obstruct or limit 
access to a certain resource which 
could be a specific node or service 





Impersonation  Active 
Intentional 
External 
Attacker uses the identity of 
another node to gain unauthorised 
access to resources or data. This 
attack is often used as a 
prerequisite to eavesdropping. By 
impersonating a legitimate node the 
attacker can try to gain access to 
the encryption key used to protect 
the transmitted data. Once this key 
is known by the attacker, he can 
ARAN [24] 
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Table 2.1: Defence against MANoNs attacks 
successfully perform the 




2.2.4   Cryptographic Background  
 
Cryptography [103, 100] is the art and science of keeping messages secure from 
unauthorised persons; or it is the science of using mathematics to encrypt and decrypt 
data. Cryptography enables sensitive information to be stored or transmitted across 
insecure networks such as the internet so that it cannot be read by anyone except the 
intended recipient. The main goals of cryptography are confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation.  
 
In the idiom of cryptography, unique data sent from one user to another is called 
plaintext. This plaintext is converted into ciphertext by the process of encryption – that 
is, the application of certain algorithms or functions. An authentic recipient can 
decrypt/decode the ciphertext back into plaintext by the process of decryption. 
Mathematically, if M represents the plaintext message and C represents the ciphertext 
message, then we can say: 
 
                                𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∷  E Μ = 𝐶  
         𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∷ 𝐷 𝐶 = 𝑀  
 
The processes of encryption and decryption are governed by keys, which are small 
amounts of information used by the cryptographic algorithms. Keys must be kept secret 
to ensure security of the system, which is called a secret key. The secure administration 
of cryptographic keys is called key management.  
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There are two primary kinds of cryptographic algorithms: symmetric key algorithms, 
which use the same key for encryption and decryption, and asymmetric key algorithms, 
which use two different keys for encryption and decryption. In the following sections, 
these two algorithms will be discussed in addition to digital signature, digital certificate, 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Web of Trust (WoT) models. 
 
2.2.4.1   Symmetric Key Algorithms  
 
In conventional cryptography, symmetric key algorithms [103, 100] rely on the presence 
of the shared key at both the sender and receiver, which has been exchanged by some 
previous arrangement (e.g. through a secure communication channel). This shared key is 
used for both encryption and decryption. It means that symmetric key cryptography is 
the process whereby the sender and the receiver use the same key private key (k) to 
encrypt and decrypt. Symmetric encryption is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Alice encrypts 
the plain text message m using the shared key k and converts it into cipher text c. In 
order to recover the plain text message m, Bob decrypts the received cipher text c using 
the same key used for the encryption. 
Symmetric-key algorithms can be divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers. Stream 
ciphers encrypt the bits of the message one at a time, while block ciphers take a number 
of bits and encrypt them as a single unit. Blocks of 64 bits have been commonly used; 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm approved by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in December 2001 uses 128-bit blocks [81].  
 
Symmetric key algorithms are usually quicker to execute electronically, but needs a 
secret key to be shared between the sender and receiver. When communication needs to 
be recognised among nodes, each one of the sender-receiver pair should share a key, 
Chapter 2 Overview on Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) 
31 
 
Figure 2.3: Symmetric encryption scheme [61] 
which makes the system non-scalable. If the same key is used between more than two 
nodes, a breach of security at any one point makes the whole system vulnerable. 
 
2.2.4.2   Asymmetric Key Algorithms  
 
The problems of key management in symmetric key algorithms are solved by public key 
cryptography (asymmetric key) the concept of which was introduced by Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin Hellman in 1976 [26]. Public key cryptography is forms of cryptography 
were a user has a pair of cryptographic keys - a public key and a private key. The private 
key is kept secret, while the public key may be widely distributed. The keys are related 
mathematically, but the private key cannot be practically derived from the public key. A 
message encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only with the corresponding 
private key. 
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The public key encryption scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.4. At the beginning, both 
Alice and Bob should have a pair of public and private keys. If Alice wants to send an 
encrypted message m to Bob, she first needs to get Bob‘s public key (PK
Bob
) and make 
sure that this key is authenticated. This public key is used to encrypt the message m and 
convert it into cipher text c. Bob can then decrypts this cipher text using the 
corresponding private key (SK
Bob
) which is known only by him.  
 
The two main branches of public key cryptography are:  
 
• Public key encryption — to ensure confidentiality a message should be 
encrypted with a recipient's public key which cannot be decrypted by anyone 
except the by the recipient possessing the corresponding private key. 
 
• Digital signatures — to guarantee authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation a 
message signed with a sender's private key can be confirmed by anyone who has 
access to the sender's public key, thereby proving that the sender signed it and 
that the message has not been tampered with. 
 
A central problem for public-key cryptography is proving that a public key is authentic, 
and has not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third party. The usual 
approach to this dilemma is to use a public-key infrastructure (PKI), in which one or 
more third parties, known as Certificate Authorities (CA), certify ownership of key 
pairs. Another approach, used by Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), is the Web of Trust (WoT) 
method to ensure authenticity of key pairs. 
A very popular example of public key cryptography is the RSA system [103, 100] 
developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, which is based on the integer factorisation 
problem. In RSA, to encrypt a message m or decrypt a cipher text c, the following 
calculations are performed:  
Chapter 2 Overview on Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN) 
33 
 
Figure 2.4: Asymmetric encryption scheme [103] 
𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑛 
𝑚 = 𝑐𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 
A major benefit of public key cryptography is that it provides a method for employing 
digital signatures. Digital signatures permit the receiver of information to verify the 
authenticity of the information's origin, and also that the information is intact. Thus, 
public key digital signatures provide authentication and data integrity. A digital 
signature also provides non-repudiation, meaning that it prevents the sender from 




A digital signature serves the same purpose as a handwritten signature. However, a 
handwritten signature is easy to counterfeit. A digital signature is superior to a 
handwritten signature in that it is nearly impossible to imitate. It also attests to the 
contents of the information as well as the identity of the signer.  
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Figure 2.5: Digital Signature Example [100] 
The basic manner in which digital signatures are created is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Instead of encrypting information using someone else's public key, it is encrypted with 
the sender‘s private key. If the information can be decrypted with the sender‘s public 
key, then it must have originated with that sender.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.5, Alice wants to send a message m to Bob which is signed 
by her. Alice uses the hash digest of the message m and her private key to create the 
signature. First she uses a hash function on the message m and computes the hash digest. 
Then, she encrypts this digest using her private key (SKAlice) and sends it with the 
message to Bob. Bob recomputed the digest by applying the same hash function on the 
received message m and compares it with the digest resulted from decrypting the 
signature using the public key of Alice (PKAlice). If both digests match, then the message 
m must have originated from Alice and not been modified during transmission. 
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2.2.4.3 Digital Certificates  
 
One issue with public cryptography is that users need to be sure that they are encrypting 
to the correct identity. In an environment where it is safe to exchange keys freely via 
public servers, man-in-the-middle attacks [32] are a potential threat. This type of attack 
is able to read, insert and modify at will, messages between two parties without either 
party knowing that the link between them has been compromised. The attacker must be 
able to observe and intercept messages passing between the two victims.  
 
For example, if Alice wants to send a message to Bob in a secure manner, she will ask 
for his public key. If Emma is able to intercept the messages between Alice and Bob and 
she is able to obtain the public key of Bob, the man-in-the-middle attack can be started. 
First, Emma will impersonate the identity of Bob and send her public key to Alice 
instead of Bob‘s public key. When Alice receives this key, she will believe that it really 
belongs to Bob and use it to encrypt the message and then send it back to Bob. This 
encrypted message is intercepted again by Emma.  
 
This time Emma decrypts the message using her private key, keeps a copy of it and re-
encrypts it using the correct public key of Bob. Once this message is received by Bob, 
he will believe that it was sent by Alice [114]. This example shows the need for Alice 
and Bob to have some way of ensuring that they are truly using each other's public keys 
rather than the public key of an attacker. Otherwise, such attacks would be generally 
possible, in principle, against any message sent using public-key technology.  
 
Digital certificates are used to prevent the type of attack described above. A digital 
certificate is an electronic document which incorporates a digital signature to bind 
together a public key with an identity-information, such as the name of a person or an 
organisation and their address. The certificate can be used to verify that a public key 
belongs to an individual. In a typical public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme, the 
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signature will be of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) called a Certificate Authority (CA). The 
signatures on a certificate are attestations by the certificate‘s signer that the identity 
information and the public key belong together.  
 
X.509 is a commonly used standard for clarifying digital certificates following the PKI 
scheme. It is published as ITU recommendation ITU-T X.509 [54]. The structure of a 
X.509, version 3, digital certificate is shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
2.2.4.4 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) contains the certificate storage facilities of a 
certificate server, but also provides certificate management facilities, and the ability to 
issue, update, revoke, store, retrieve, and trust certificates. The main feature of a PKI is 
the introduction of what is known as a Certification Authority (CA). A CA is an 
example of a TTP, which facilitates interactions between two parties who both trust the 
third party. A CA issues digital certificates for use by other parties. 
  
A CA could be a person, group, department, company or other association that an 
organisation has authorised to issue certificates for its users. A CA's role is similar to 
that of a government‘s Passport Office. A CA creates certificates and digitally signs 
them using the CA's private key. Because of its role in creating certificates, the CA is 
the central component of a PKI. Using the CA's public key, anyone wishing to verify a 
certificate's authenticity verifies the issuing CA's digital signature, and hence the 
integrity of the contents of the certificate and, most important, the public key and the 
identity of the certificate holder [121].  
 
The main services provided by the PKI are [32, 54]:  
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 Registration: An important step before starting to issue a digital certificate for a 
user is to verify the identity of this user. This is the role of the Registration 
Authority (RA). The user will provide the RA with different information, such as 
name, e-mail address and organisation. The RA will then verify the correctness 
of this information by requiring the user to provide proof of identity such as a 
driving licence or ID-Card. Once the RA has proved the identity of the user, a 
certification request will be sent to the CA. RA in general is an optional part in 
the PKI. If it is not present, the registration service will become the responsibility 
of the CA.  
 
 Initialisation: The most important information that a user needs to be initialised 
with before starting to use the digital certificate is the public key of the CA. The 
user will use the CA‘s public key to verify any certificate signed by this CA.  
 
 Certification: This is the main service provided by the PKI. After receiving a 
certification request from the RA, the CA will issue a digital certificate and then 
sign this certificate with its private key. The structure of the certificate should be 
defined; ITU-T recommendation X.509, for example standardised its certificates. 
All the information that needs to be completed in the certificate will be provided 
by the RA.  
 
 
 Key update: The user‘s keys and the corresponding digital certificate are valid 
for a specific time, varying from days to years. Therefore, this service is 
responsible for updating these keys on a regular basis, which depends on the 
application itself.  
 





 Revocation: Each digital certificate has an issue and expiry date. Each 
certificate is revoked after its expiration time, as determined by the CA. Each CA 
should therefore update the certificates of its users before the expiry time. In 
addition to that, the CA needs to revoke a certificate if the private key becomes 
compromised or if any of the information included in the certificate has been 
changed.  
 
 Certificate and Revocation Notice Distribution: After issuing a digital 
certificate, the CA should send this certificate to its owner who should be able to 
distribute the certificate to other users in the system. In the case of infrastructure-
based networks, the digital certificates can be distributed through publicly 
accessible servers.  
 
Figure 2.6: X.509 Digital certificate format 
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In addition to that, all the system users should be informed if any certificate has been 
revoked. A common method that can be used is called Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL). The CRL lists all the digital certificates that have been revoked. The CA will 
publish this CRL on a regular basis. The problem of the CRL is the time between 
compromising a certificate and revoking it. This time could be significant. This problem 
can be solved using online servers that allow the certificate users to query in real time 
the validity of any certificate. 
 
2.2.4.5 Validity and Trust  
 
Every user in a public key system is vulnerable to mistaking a fake certificate for a real 
one. Validity is confidence that a public key certificate belongs to its purported owner. It 
is essential in a public key environment where a particular certificate‘s authenticity must 
constantly be established. For example, in an organisation using PKI, no certificate is 
considered valid unless it has been signed by a CA which is trusted by everyone.  
Validity can be established in various ways:  
 
 Manually: the owner of a public key could be asked to hand over physically 
a copy of this key when it is required. This is often inconvenient and 
inefficient.  
 
 Certificate’s fingerprint: This is just like a human fingerprint. It is used by 
PGP [86, 127, 33], where every certificate has a unique fingerprint. The 
fingerprint is a hash of the user's certificate and appears as one of the 
certificate's properties. In PGP, this fingerprint can appear as a hexadecimal 
or a series of so-called biometric words, which are phonetically distinct and 
are used to make the fingerprint identification process a little easier. The 
verification of the latter fingerprint works only if the owner‘s voice is known.  
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 Trust: one way to establish validity of a certificate is to trust that a third 
party has gone through the process of validating it. A CA, for example, is 
responsible for ensuring that, prior to issuing to a certificate, he or she has 
carefully checked it to make sure that the public key really belongs to the 
supposed owner. Any user trusting the CA will automatically consider any 
certificates signed by the CA to be valid. In PGP [86, 127, 33], a CA can also 
be a meta-introducer. A meta-introducer gives not only validity to keys, but 
gives also the ability to trust keys upon others. The meta-introducer enables 
others to act as a trusted introducer who can validate keys with the same 
effect as that of the meta-introducer. They cannot, however, create new 
trusted introducers. In an X.509 [54] environment, the meta-introducer is 
called the root Certification Authority (root CA) and trusted introducers 
subordinate Certification Authorities.  
 
In general, there are three different trust models that can be followed, which dictate how 
users will go about establishing certificate validity. The trust models are [86]:  
 
 Direct Trust: It is the simplest trust model, which is used by most of the 
cryptosystems in some way. As can been seen in Figure 2.7, John trusts that 
Bob‘s key is valid because he knows where this key came from, and vice versa. 
An example of this model is the CA keys which are directly trusted by all users 
belong to the same PKI.  
 
 Hierarchical Trust: This trust model is used by the PKI. There is a root CA 
which is directly trusted. This CA (meta-introducer) may certify certificates 
themselves, or may certify certificates that certify other certificates (trusted 
introducer) down some chain. As shown in Figure 2.8, the hierarchical trust 
model is represented as a tree. The leaf certificate's validity is verified by tracing 
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Figure 2.7: Direct trust model 
Figure 2.8: Hierarchical trust model 
backwards from its issuer to other issuers, until a directly trusted root (CA) 
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Figure 2.9: Web of trust model [100] 
 Web of Trust: a web of trust uses both the direct and the hierarchical trust 
models. The certificate can be verified directly or by some chain going back to a 
directly verified certificate. PGP is a good example of using the web of trust 
model. PGP does not depend on any centralised CA. Any user could sign the 
certificate of another user. This process continues until a web of trust is 
established Figure 2.9. 
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Understanding the possible form of attacks is always the first step towards developing 
good security solutions. Two types of security mechanisms can generally be applied: 
Prevention and Detection.  
Prevention technique is always associated with cryptography; meanwhile, providing 
detection is much harder to achieve as it is used to discover an intruder attempting to 
penetrate the network to perform an attack. 
 
2.3   Summary 
 
In this chapter, the major issues and applications of Mobile Ad hoc Network of 
Networks were described. Moreover, this chapter discusses all the general information 
of ad hoc networks and tackles security challenges, security requirements and security 
attacks. The applications of ad hoc wireless networks include military applications, 
collaborative and distributed computing and emergency operations. Each of the 
challenges, security requirements and security attacks are discussed in detail.  
 
In the next chapter, as we are dealing with security management for MANoN with 
concentration on prevention and detection techniques, we describe some of the solutions 
provided in the main features of our security management, showing appropriate key 
management services, a selection of intrusion detection techniques and best matching to 





    
 
 




Review of Security Management for MANoN 
Objectives 
 Highlight MANoN challenges  
 Present related work in key management service 
 Present related work in IDS techniques  
 Present related work in security management schemes for MANoN  
 
3.1   Security Management for MANoN 
This section discusses the issues and challenges in security management for MANoN. It 
also presents some solutions proposed in the literature to ensure MANoN security. 
 
3.1.1 Network of Networks (NoN) 
As mentioned, MANoN is a combination of both ad hoc networks and NoN, after 
highlighting the characteristics, challenges and background of ad hoc networks, NoN 
must be illustrated and fully described. First of all, the concept of NoN was recognised 
from system of systems (SoS), which are a collection of dedicated systems that attach 
resources and capabilities together to obtain new and more complex systems offering 
more flexibility then normal constant systems [10]. Following that, the new term NoN 
was presented; this is a number of networks interconnecting with each other by 
communication paths, and managed by a unified authority. Each network by itself is 
under its own legacy that enables it to function on its own; it comprises hardware and 
software, each potentially under separate management and ownership.  
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NoN provides new promising services to its users, in addition to the services provided 
by its component networks. The entities of a NoN are large autonomous, decentralised, 
mobile and dynamically configurable, all of which makes them capable of operating 
under partial information. 
The concept of NoN is widely used in military and emergency situations; Spencer and 
Ironside [51] showed how the British army required this type of networks in their 
operations in order to reach a high level of security. As a result, we combined both ad 
hoc networks with NoN to create the new state-of-the-art Mobile Ad hoc Network of 
Networks (MANoN); although new advantages were obtained by creating this type of 
networks, new challenges have been noticed. 
 
3.1.2 Security Challenges in MANoN  
This section discusses certain unique characteristics of MANoN that make the design of 
a foolproof security management for MANoN a very challenging task. These unique 
characteristics can be summarised as follows [110, 76]: 
 
 Shared broadcast radio channel: This is in opposition to wired networks, 
where a separate dedicated transmission line can be provided between two end 
users. The radio channel used for communication in MANoN is broadcast in 
nature, and is shared by all nodes in the network, allowing a malicious node 
easily to obtain data being transmitted 
 
 Insecure operational environment: The operating environment where 
MANoNs are used may not always be secure. One example is a battlefield, 
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where ad hoc nodes can move in and out of the enemy zone. Consequently, these 
nodes could become highly vulnerable to security attacks 
 
 Lack of central authority: In wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless 
networks, monitoring the traffic on the network is possible through certain 
central points, such as routers, base stations, and access points, and to implement 
security mechanisms at such points. Since such central points are absent in 
MANoN, these mechanisms cannot therefore be applied in this type of networks 
  
 Lack of association: MANoNs are dynamic in nature. Nodes can join and leave 
the network at any time. In addition, as each network is a legacy on its own, 
mobile networks can disconnect and evolve separately from the main MANoN. 
If there is no proper authentication mechanism that associates nodes with a 
network used, an intruder would be able to join the network easily and carry out 
attacks.  
 
 Limited resource availability: The resources in MANoN, such as bandwidth, 
battery power and computational power are limited, making it difficult to 
implement complex cryptography-based security mechanisms in such networks.  
 
 Physical vulnerability: In general, MANoN nodes are compact and hand-held 
in nature. They could easily be damaged and are also vulnerable to theft and to 
being lost.  
 
 Confliction of interest: MANoNs consist of a number networks, each with its 
own management having the ability to operate and evolve separately from the 
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main MANoN. Moreover, each network will have a set of policies to follow, 
regardless of the main MANoN; therefore, conflicts in policies might occur 
when moving from one MANET to another.  
 
3.2   Key Management in MANoN  
Most of the mechanisms used to provide security requirements mentioned in 2.2.1 need 
the use of some kind of cryptography keys. MANoN poses certain specific challenges in 
key management, owing to the lack of infrastructure in such networks. Three types of 
infrastructure that are absent in MANoN have been identified in [6]. The first type is 
routing infrastructure, in the form of fixed routers and stable links between them. The 
second is server infrastructure, consisting of online servers, which provide various 
services such as domain name service (DNS), directory services and trusted third party 
services.  
 
The third type is organisational and administrative support, such as registration of users, 
issuing of certificates and cross-certification agreements between different user 
domains. Problems of applying cryptography, in order to achieve different security 
requirements in networks with full support infrastructure, are typically encountered; in 
MANoN, these problems present a real challenge. In fact, any cryptographic means is 
ineffective if key management is weak. Key management is a central aspect of security 
in MANoN, and requires the effective management of digital certificates.  
 
Solutions to the problem of public key management in MANoN have already been 
proposed; they utilise one of two approaches; PKI or the web of trust. Our security 
mechanisms employ PKI-threshold cryptography; as a result, we will focus on PKI, as 
shown in the following sections. 
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3.2.1 PKI-based Key Management System 
To adapt PKI to ad hoc networks, threshold cryptography is used to supply a distributed 
CA comprised of multiple mobile nodes that cooperatively provide certification 
services. The idea of the threshold scheme was introduced by Shamir in [98]. A (k, n) 
scheme allows a secret, for example a CA signing key to be divided into n shares, such 
that for a certain threshold k<n, any k components could merge and produce a valid 
signature; whereas fewer k-1 shares would be unable to do so. The PKI-based solutions 
can be classified into partially-distributed CAs [126, 120, 4, 63, 68, 115], where some 
MANoN nodes are selected to play the role of CA, and fully-distributed CA [70, 71, 72], 
where all MANoN nodes can participate in playing the role of CA. 
 
3.2.1.1 Partially Distributed Certificate Authority   
The Partially-Distributed Threshold CA Scheme (Z-H) presented by Zhou and Haas 
[126] was one of the first efforts to address the key management issue in MANoN. The 
authors proposed a distributed public-key management service for ad hoc networks. The 
service as a whole has a public key (PK) and a private key (SK). It is assumed that the 
public key is known to all ad hoc nodes, while the private key is divided into n shares 
using an (k, n) threshold cryptography. These shares are assigned to n nodes called 
servers (Figure 3.1). To sign a certificate in this service, each server will use its share to 
generate a partial signature and then forward it to the combiner c. Having at least k 
correct partial signatures will allow the combiner to compute the complete signature.  
 
When using a (2, 3) threshold cryptography scheme (Figure 3.2), in order to sign a 
message m, each server will generate a partial signature for the message m using its 
share, and then forward it to the combiner c. In this example, the server 2 fails to submit 
its partial signature even though, the system was able to generate the complete signature 
and attach it to the message m.  
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Figure 3.1: The configuration of (Z-H) Key Management Service 
Besides threshold signatures, the proposed key management service also employs 
proactive share refreshing in order to tolerate mobile adversaries, and to adapt its 
configuration to changes in the network. Each server i generates randomly the following 
shares (si1, si2…, sin) and then sends them to the other corresponding servers through 
secure channels. Once a server j receives all its shares from the other servers, the new 
share of j can be calculated using the formula: s′j (new) = sj (old)+  𝒔𝒊𝒋
𝒏




The application of threshold cryptography ensures that the system can tolerate a certain 
number k-1 < n of compromised servers, in the sense that at least k partial signatures are 
needed to compute a correct signature. However, this proposal, assumes that there is an 
authority that initially empowers the servers, and that some of the nodes must behave as 
servers and others as combiners. Also, it does not describe how the value k is chosen, 
how a node can contact k servers securely and efficiently when the servers are scattered 
across the whole area, and how the server and combiner roles are distributed and used, 
or what the case would be if the node could not find enough servers or a combiner to 
generate the signature.  
Nor is the question of the distribution of refreshed secret shares in an efficient and 
secure way addressed. In addition, this proposal has not been evaluated in real network 
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Figure 3.2: Threshold Signature 
environments in order to test the availability of the key management system, its 
communication costs and its ability to cope with different types of attacks. In Chapter 5, 
our Access Control Mechanism shows a dependency on this type of key management 
system, taking into consideration all the negatives the system might go through and 
trying to address them.  
 
 
Mobile Certificate Authority (MOCA) is a key management system proposed by Yi, 
Naldurg, and Kravets [6, 120]. It is basically an extension of Z-H [126] that follows the 
same direction by building a distributed certificate service with the help of threshold 
cryptography. In their approach, the focus is on distributed CA services and 
communication between the nodes and the server nodes, which are called the mobile 
certificate authorities (MOCAs). MOCA suggests that the nodes exhibiting the best 
physical security and computational resources should be selected as MOCAs. The 
MOCA scheme also moves the combiner function of Z-H from the CA servers to the 
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Figure 3.3: Share refreshing 
requesting end nodes. This improves the availability of the system, since the nodes no 
longer depend on the CA server nodes to combine the partial certificate signatures. 
 
 
A MOCA certification protocol, MP, is proposed to provide efficient and effective 
communication between nodes and MOCAs. MP unicasts the certificate requests to β -
specific MOCAs. Finding the path to these MOCAs is based on fresh routing entries or 
short distances. With the (k, n) threshold scheme, k MOCAs are required to complete a 
certification service. In order to increase the probability of receiving at least k responses, 
the value of β will be: β = k + α (selecting the value for the parameter α depends on the 
application itself). Once availability drops, the protocol returns to flooding (as in Z-H). 
MP maintains there own routing tables and co-exists with a standard ad hoc routing 
protocol. 
MOCA leads to problems such as determining who judges the level of security and who 
chooses MOCAs, how to ensure that MOCAs are distributed uniformly and how nodes 
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can discover the paths to MOCAs securely, since most secure routing protocols are 
based on the establishment of a key service. MOCA inherits high communication costs 
from threshold cryptography. Caching alleviates the problem to some extent when the 
network stays static, so that the cached routes are valid for a relatively long period of 
time. However, in the more volatile MANoN topology, this optimisation will be 
insufficient. Also, the MP maintaining its own routing tables in parallel with a standard 
ad hoc routing protocol is a waste of bandwidth, and as such is superfluous. 
 
3.2.1.2 Fully Distributed Virtual CA  
 
Ubiquitous and Robust Access Control (URSA) [70, 71, 72] provides a fully 
distributed threshold CA scheme. Similar to the partially distributed CA schemes H-Z 
and MOCA, it depends on a threshold signature system with a (k, n) secret sharing of the 
private CA key. As opposed to the partially distributed CA schemes, it provides a fairer 
distribution of the burden by allowing all nodes to get a share of the private CA key. A 
coalition of k one-hop neighbours forms the local CA functionality. It does not need any 
underlying routing protocol, only a node density of k or more one-hop neighbours. 
Mobility may help locate the required number of CA nodes. The nodes are trusted in the 
entire network when they receive a valid certificate. Any node holding a certificate can 
get a share of the private CA key. A new secret share is calculated by adding partial 
shares received from a combination of k neighbours. At the initial state of the system, a 
set of nodes will receive their certificates from a dealer. Once k nodes have been 
initialised, the dealer is removed. In this scheme, it is assumed that the certification 
service is delivered within one-hop neighbourhoods. The authentication of new nodes 
can be done through some reliable out-of-bound physical proof, such as human 
perception. 
URSA takes the process a step further by letting every node hold a share of the CA 
secret key, and any k nodes are able to recover the key. However, as in the Z-H proposal 
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[126], the first k nodes must be initialised by a trusted authority. In addition to this 
drawback, the security depends on the system-wide parameter k. Since each node is now 
a certificate server, and compromising any k of them will disclose the private signing 
key, it actually endangers security to have a small k relative to the total number of 
nodes. However, if k is too big, it regresses to the basic form of threshold CA as Z-H. 
Limiting CA service requests to one-hop neighbourhoods is bandwidth-efficient and 
good for scalability. Distributing CA functionality boosts the availability of private key 
shares. Anyone capable of collecting k shares or more can reconstruct the private CA 
key. Like any public key format relying on a trusted entity, there is no easy way to 
change the private/public CA key pair during process. Finally, URSA seems to be 
susceptible to the Sybil attack [27]: an attacker can take as many identities as necessary 
to collect enough shares and restructure the system‘s private key. 
 
3.3   Intrusion Detection Techniques  
Intrusions are defined as any set of actions that compromise confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the system. The intruder detection is the second line of defence which 
studies how to discover an intruder (internal or external node) attempting to penetrate 
the network to perform an attack [99]. The possible existing types of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) in MANoN are:  
 Standalone IDS 
- no data exchanged; each node runs an IDS and detects attacks 
independently.  
 
 Distributed and Cooperative IDS 
- every node participates in intrusion detection by having local and global 
detection decision-making. 




 Hierarchical IDS  
- suitable for multilayered MANoN. Cluster head (CH) nodes in clusters 
perform the task of IDS and act as checkpoints such as routers in wired 
networks. 
 
 Mobile agent for IDS 
- mobile agents are ―codes‖ that can traverse the network. Each agent is 
assigned to perform a specific task (in this case IDS). 
Many of IDSs have been proposed, most of them concentrate on cooperative analysis, 
yet not many methods are the same as our detection method; therefore, we concentrate 
on two types of intrusion detection systems (cooperative and mobile agents).  
 
3.3.1 Intrusion Detection Techniques for Mobile Wireless Networks 
Zhang, Lee and Huang [123] implemented local and collaborative decision-making in 
anomaly detection. In this approach, each ad hoc node participates in detecting locally 
and independently malicious acts. Each node holds an individual IDS agent that 
monitors local activities. It detects local traces and responds to them. If IDS detects an 
intrusion locally with strong evidence, then that node can decide that intrusion is 
happening and initiates an alarm response. 
However, if the evidence is not strong enough but needs further investigation in a wider 
area in the network, then the IDS agent can start a collaborate procedure, which is a 
distributed consensus algorithm. This procedure works by generating the intrusion 
detection state information between neighbour nodes. The intrusion detection state 
information can vary from a simple level-of-confidence value such as: 
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Figure 3.4: A conceptual model of an IDS agent 
- ―with P% confidence, node A concludes from its local data that there is an 
intrusion‖; 
- ―with P% confidence, node A concludes from its local data and neighbour states 
that there is an intrusion‖; 
- ―with P% confidence, node A, B, C..., concludes from its local data that there is 
an intrusion‖; 
to a more specific state that lists the suspects, like  
- ―with P% confidence, node A concludes from its local data that node X has been 
compromised‖; 
Figure 3.4 shows the conceptual model of an IDS agent.  
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This architecture is well structured, yet the false alarm level of this algorithm is high; 
moreover, the authors mentioned collecting evidence without giving strong arguments of 
what type of evidence the agent is collecting and how it has been collected. There is no 
actual real-time analysis for observed nodes. Many situations might be changed 
depending on the environment, and there is no specific comparison with normal acts. 
Therefore, this algorithm is not sufficiently efficient for detection of malicious nodes in 
mobile ad hoc network systems.   
 
3.3.2 Intrusion Detection Using Agents in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
Kachirski, and Guha [64] proposed an IDS based on mobile agents technology; it 
provides a light weight and low-overhead mechanism based on the mobile security agent 
concept. Mobile agents are dynamic with high autonomy and mobility; they can 
automatically detect their current environment and respond accordingly. Moreover, tasks 
and works can be assigned to it by its users [20]. The main contribution of this approach 
is the efficient distribution of mobile agents with specific IDS tasks according to their 
functionality across the wireless ad hoc networks.  Another advantage is providing a 
restricted computation-intensive analysis of overall network security to a few special 
nodes which are dynamically elected, and overall network security is not entirely 
dependent on any particular node. 
The proposed IDS architecture shown in Figure 3.5 is built on a mobile agent structure 
that holds the specific functionality:  
 
Network Monitor: Only certain nodes have sensor agents for network packet 
monitoring, since we are interested in preserving total computational power and the 
battery power of mobile hosts.  
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Figure 3.5: Layered Mobile Agent Architecture 
Host Monitoring: Every node on the mobile ad hoc network is observed internally by a 
host-monitoring agent. This includes monitoring system-level and application-level 
activities. 
 
Decision Making: Every node decides on its intrusion threat level on a host-level basis. 
Certain nodes collect intrusion information and make collective decisions about 
network-level intrusions. 
 
Action: Every node has an action module responsible for resolving intrusion situations 










This architecture provides hierarchical agents in order to represent a lightweight IDS 
with certain functionality, making the total network load smaller by separating the 
functional categories and assigning an agent to a specific function. In this way, the 
workload of a proposed IDS system is distributed among the nodes to minimise the 
power consumption and IDS related processing time by all nodes.  
 
The author has provided an IDS based decision making mechanism and Intrusion 
detection process which assumes that each node with its Local Agent is responsible for 
evaluating other nodes with the help of other neighbour nodes to provide any kind of 
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activity. Although this algorithm looks convenient by reducing false alarms, it is 
unreasonable, because if an agent is itself compromised then the same problems of high 
false alarm and false reporting will occur. Also, if agents are compromised, the system 
might fail as the system depends on Cluster Head (CH).  
 
3.4   Security Management Schemes  
In general, different security schemes were used to deal with security management of 
MANET; none provides a full description of the three essential components of security 
management [59]. All research is focused on providing prevention or detection 
components. This subsection will highlight most of the schemes used to provide such 
management.  
 
3.4.1 A Security Management Scheme Using a Novel Computational 
Reputation Model for Wireless and Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
This type of security management is proposed by Azzedine Boukerche, and Yonglin 
Ren [112] and focuses on prevention technique, as it presents a set of management 
mechanisms based on trust and reputation to prevent malicious nodes from entering the 
trusted community.  
This reputation management system depends on a central node with two assisted nodes 
evaluating those of its neighbour; it utilises a new technique named Reputation Assistant 
Mechanism (RAM), in which the central node has two reputation assistants, as shown in 
Figure 3.6.  
Based on the evaluation of node C to the neighbour node D, a final decision will be 
taken for either excluding or to keeping node D in the community. To elaborate futher, 
Figure 3.6 shows that when node C tries to evaluate node D, it will inquire an assistant 
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Figure 3.6: Reputation Assistant Mechanism  
from its Reputation Assistant nodes A and B; therefore, these RA will provide node C 
with the trust value of node D. If neither of the RA nodes has the node D reputation in 













After receiving the trust values, node C measures the weighted means to make its final 
correspondent decision. The following formula calculates the average trust value Trust 
AVG from the set of reputation assistant S. 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 AVG = 
 {𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑖=1  𝑅𝐴𝑖 ,𝐷  | 𝑅𝐴𝑖  ∈𝑆}
𝑛
     (1) 
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Where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝐴𝑖 ,𝐷  is the trust value of the trust assistant RAi to a certain node D. 
Formula (2) computes the weight wi of each reputation assistant, based on its own trust 
values in the entire set of reputation assistants S. 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝑅𝐴𝑖 ,𝐷 )
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑉𝐺
     (2) 
 
Formula (3) evaluates the node‘s final trust. 
𝑇 =
𝑤𝐶×𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝐶 ,𝐷)+ 𝑤𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑖 ∈𝑆 ×𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝑅𝐴𝑖 ,𝐷 )
𝑛+1
       (3) 
 
Where Trust(C, D) is the trust value of the central node C to the same node D and wc is 1 
for the central node, because wc is taken as a standard to measure the importance of the 
reputation evaluations from other reputation assistance; therefore, node C will make the 
decision based on its and RA knowledge.  
 
Discussion: first of all, trust and reputation is gaining more and more attentions; in ad 
hoc networks, nodes can gain or lose credit based on their behaviours, so only trusted 
nodes can participate in evaluating other neighbour nodes. This scheme divides the 
nodes into three parts, depending on their role in the community: the central node, 
reputation nodes and regular normal nodes.  
The author did not mention to whom and how those roles have been assigned; moreover, 
depending on the neighbours‘ reputation, evaluation is inconsistent as different nodes 
might evaluate a specific action depending on specific acts and those acts are not 
compatible. For instance, if I trust and evaluate a person for fixing my car, do I trust him 
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to fix my PC? So, from my point of view it is not efficient to use the trust and reputation 
scheme to prevent malicious nodes.  
 
3.4.2 Security Management in Hierarchical Ad Hoc Network 
Proposed in [29], this scheme suggests a security management policy based on the 
hierarchical routing; the key management system is managed in a hierarchical form, and 
each cluster head is a subserver. Actually, this scheme is based on the threshold 
cryptography cluster head which provides the key distribution to its nodes. 
We found that this paper does not provide a real security management system nor secure 
policy system. The only improvement of this hierarchical security management system 
is a combination of cluster head and threshold cryptography key management services to 
solve the vulnerability of the CA. 
 
3.4.3 Policy-Based Security Management for Ad Hoc Wireless Systems 
Proposed in [5], this provides a policy-based network security management mechanism 
called the ―Ripple Effect‖ to achieve integration and adaptation, and to activate different 
levels of security for ad hoc wireless systems. This mechanism has three distinguished 
functions:  
Responsive Policy activation strategy – for protecting nodes under current attack; this 
type allows the host to raise the security policy level up to three levels, depending on the 
type of attack the system or the node is going through;  
Pre-emptive policy activation strategy – for protecting nodes under potential attacks. In 
other words, when nodes are potentially under new attack, they send a warning message 
to their neighbours to prepare them against potential attacks;  
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Figure 3.7: Responsive / Preemptive Security Management Architecture  
Ripple-ring effect policy activation strategy – for controlling how to propagate attacking 
warnings for triggering different levels of defence techniques. Whenever an attack 
occurs in the network a certain level of host or network QoS degrades; therefore, this 
function helps to minimise these negatives.  
Discussion: this scheme provides a well-defined policy-based security management 
system to provide prevention against malicious nodes trying to bring the system down. 
Few disadvantages have been shown in the system. First, many assumptions have been 
introduced; for example, the author assumes that all attacks are detectable. Second, as 
shown in Figure 3.7, the policy architecture is too complicated; i.e. it can be reduced to 
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3.5   Summary  
This chapter has investigated the security issues in MANoN. It discussed previous work 
proposing to solve key management and security management with both essential 
prevention and detection services.  For key management, efforts were made to adapt the 
hierarchical trust model in order to provide secure, available key management services, 
such as the MOCA and threshold cryptography. On the other hand, Intrusion Detection 
Systems using cooperative, individual and mobile agent have been introduced to provide 
an effective second line of defence against internal and external attacks, which are 
harder to predict. Finally, many security management systems, such as policy, 
hierarchical and reputation based schemes that implement the components prevention or 
detection security level of defence against malicious nodes have been discussed.   
Solutions to the security problems in MANoN should be built upon a strong foundation. 
This means specialised security architecture for MANoN that helps in modelling this 
type of networks, addressing security challenges, defining security attacks and security 
requirements and describing principles and plans to achieve all the objectives of such 
requirements. Then a security mechanism must be proposed to enforce the 
implementation of these objectives. This methodology, by which MANoNs are to be 
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Chapter 4  
Security Architecture for MANoN 
Objectives 
 Provide a novel end-to-end security architecture for MANoN 
 Identify security requirements, layers, planes, their objectives and the 
means by which they could be applied to every part of the MANoN  
 Address MANoN security challenges  
 Propose a security solution for all wireless networks that satisfies 
MANoN requirements 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The unique characteristics of MANoN, such as broadcast radio channels, lack of central 
authority, lack of association, limited resources availability, physical vulnerability and 
policy conflicts (nodes following their own network policies and at the same time 
obeying different policies another MANET might enforce), which make such networks 
highly vulnerable to security attacks when compared with wired, infrastructure-based 
wireless networks and even normal ad hoc networks. This chapter proposes a 
technology-independent Security Architecture for MANoN based upon the ITU-T 
recommendations: X.800 [56] and X.805 [57]. This Security Architecture appears in our 
Publication [4] [75]. 
ITU-T X.805 defines a network security architecture created to address the global 
security challenges of service providers, enterprises, and consumers applicable to 
wireless, optical and wired-line voice networks. This security architecture addresses 
security concerns for the management, control, services and applications. 
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The proposed MANoN security architecture provides a comprehensive, end-to-end 
security solution for MANoN that could be applied to every wireless network that 
satisfies the MANoN requirements in order to predict, detect and correct security 
vulnerabilities any system might face. The Security Architecture identifies the security 
layers, security plans, security requirements, their objectives and the means by which 
they could be applied to every part of the MANoN, taking into consideration the 
different security attacks it might face.       
This chapter is organised as follows: in section 4.2 the MANoN Security Architecture is 
proposed. This security architecture identifies the security requirements, security layers 
and security planes and proposes an end-to-end security solution for MANoN. Section 
4.3 shows the security attacks the system might face. Section 4.4 shows the security 
solution in tabular form. Section 4.5 explains some technology-independent 
implementations for this Security Architecture. In Section 4.6, the conclusions will be 
drawn.  
 
4.2 Security Architecture  
As we have learned from the history of security attacks [19], security cannot be 
considered separately after the whole system has been designed; instead, security must 
be considered as an inseparable aspect in the development of the system. As a result, our 
security architecture was designed to address the global security challenges of 
consumers, users, services and other applications. In order to prevent any type of 
attacks, external or internal, passive or active, a set of requirements must be identified in 
our MANoN, as shown in Figure 4.1.   
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4.2.1 Security Requirements  
Security requirements are a set of measures used to address a particular aspect of 
network security, which is governed by a specific set of security policies. The Security 
Architecture identifies seven major sets of requirements that protect the MANoN against 
all major security threats; these requirements are:  
 
 Authentication means that the correct identity is known to the communicating 
parties. Nodes communicating with each other need to verify each other‘s 
identity in order to be satisfied that they are communicating with the right party. 
 
 Authorisation protects against unauthorised use of network resources. It ensures 
that only authorised nodes are able to perform in the network.   
 
 Availability means that entities, services and resources are available against all 
kinds of attack. It ensures that there is no denial of authorised access to network 
services when needed, should unforeseen events impact upon the network.  
 
 
 Non-repudiation means that entities cannot deny execution of a specific action. 
Any given entity should be liable for its actions, and should not be allowed to 
deny responsibilities of these actions. This is very important in cases of disputes 
or disagreement over some events.   
 
 Data Confidentiality means that messages or packets are kept secure from any 
unauthorised disclosure. Data confidentiality ensures that the content of data‘s 
cannot be understood by unauthorised entities. This can be achieved using any of 
the available encryption techniques provided, if proper access key systems are 
used. 
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 Data Integrity means that messages are unaltered during any communication. 
The data is protected against unauthorised modification, deletion, creation and 
replication. 
 
 Privacy provides for the protection of information that might be gleaned from 
the observation of network activities. It implies protecting the identity and/or 
location of the node in the network. Protecting privacy involves more than data 
encryption, and requires more sophisticated techniques to hide the identity or the 










































































Figure 4.1: MANoN Security Architecture 
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After defining our security requirements, we must show how they can protect our 
system against all major security threats, and how they can be applied to every part of 
the MANoN. In order to provide a comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for 
MANoN, we need to satisfy these security requirements to a hierarchy of network 
equipment, which is referred to in our architecture as security layers. 
 
4.2.2 Security Layers 
In order to provide a comprehensive solution, we divide our complex MANoN logically 
into separate architectural components. This separation allows a systematic approach to 
the MANoN that can be used in the planning of new security solutions for other security 
threats our MANoN system might face.  
Moreover, the success of the OSI [14] model applied in designing network protocols is a 
good example to follow in designing security protocols. A layered architecture can 
provide advantages such as modularity, simplicity, flexibility and standardisation of 
protocols. Figure 4.1 depicts four security architecture layers for MANoN, which are 
built upon one another to provide a network-based solution. The functionality of each 
layer is explained below.   
 
 Trust Infrastructure: The trust infrastructure security layer represents a 
fundamental building block of the network, consisting of the basic relationships 
between nodes. An example is given by the explanation of Zhou and Hass [126] 
of a well-deployed PKI environment (threshold cryptography), as there is no 
centralised certification authority in which public and private keys are exchanged 
between all nodes. The security association established in the trust infrastructure 
layer must serve the upper layer security mechanisms.  
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 Communication: The communication security layer consists of the transmission 
facilities protected by the security requirements, as well as security mechanisms 
such as physical protection mechanisms. Security Mechanisms deployed in this 
layer keeps transmitted data protected from eavesdropping, interception, 
alteration and dropping [52].     
 
 Routing: The routing security layer consists of basic transports and connectivity 
security mechanisms applied to routing protocols as well as the individual nodes; 
since each node in the ad hoc network acts as host and router, our MANoN is not 
different from that perspective. Moreover, nodes must exchange information 
about their neighbours to construct the network topology in order to apply one of 
the ad hoc routing protocols (Proactive, Reactive and Hybrid) [95]. Every node 
is required to participate in the routing activity, which makes routing an 
important aspect of our system in order to keep the network connected. Routing 
security layers involves two aspects: secure routing and secure data forwarding. 
In secure routing, nodes are required to cooperate in order to share correct 
routing information, thus keeping the network connected efficiently, whereas in 
secure data forwarding, data packets must be protected from tampering, 
dropping, and altering by any unauthorised party [88].  
 
 Application: The application security layer concentrates upon the security of the 
network-based services and network protocols that perform sub-network access 
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4.2.3 Security Planes  
After dividing our security architecture into four layers, we need to handle it from 
different perspectives, so we consider two distinct security planes, the Management 
Plane and the End-to-End User Plane, which are protected by our security requirements 
from any threats and attacks, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
   
 Management Plane: The management security plane supports FCAPS (Fault-
management, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security) [12]. 
Moreover, it is concerned with the protection of OAM&P (Operation, 
Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning) [38], functions of the nodes, 
services and applications. This plane will highlight the management of our 
MANoNs system. 
 
 End-User Plane: The end-user plane deals with end-user data flow (information 
flow) and security mechanisms related to the end users of the system [55].  
These security planes are designed in such a way that events on one security plane are 
kept totally isolated from the other. At the same time, each layer depends on each other 
to provide a flexible foundation to our system and mechanism.  
Having shown the components of our security architecture, we believe that each part has 
its own specific security needs. Hence by dividing it into layers and planes and by 





Chapter 4 Security Architecture for MANoN 
71 
 
4.3 Security Attacks  
An attack is an assault on MANoN‘s security that attempts to evade security requirements 
and violate MANoN‘s security policies. Any system and network might be susceptible to 
attacks, causing the system to break down. MANoN attacks could be generated accidentally 
or intentionally, and could originate from inside or outside the network, resulting in an 
active or passive method of attack.   
 
 Accidental vs. Intentional. An ―accidental attack‖ has no premeditated intent. 
For example, network malfunctions and software bugs fall into this category. An 
―intentional attack‖ may range from informal examination using easily available 
monitoring tools to complicated attacks using special network knowledge. 
  
 Active vs. Passive. An ―active attack‖ attempts to alter network resources or 
affect their operation. A ―passive attack‖ attempts to learn or make use of 
information from the network but does not affect network operations.  
 
 
 Insider vs. Outsider. An ―inside attack‖ (compromised node) is an attack 
initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter (an ―insider‖), i.e. an entity 
authorised to access network resources but using them in unauthorised way 
which is not approved by those who granted the authorisation. An ―outside 
attack‖ is initiated from an unauthorised or illegitimate user of the network. 
 
In the next section, a definition of a set of principles and a plan describing a security 
structure for the end-to-end security solution are given. The proposed solution identifies 
security issues that must be addressed in order to prevent these types of attack. 
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Figure 4.2: Security solutions in tabular form           
4.4 End-to-End Security Solution Designed in Tabular Form 
Our security architecture proposes a comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for 
MANoN.  This security solution addresses the global security challenges of MANoN in 
order to predict and correct security vulnerabilities.  
Figure 4.2 presents the security architecture in tabular form, showing the interaction of 
the eight proceeds between the security layers and security planes.  
Each of the eight proceeds represents a unique perspective for consideration of the seven 
security requirements. It should be noted that the satisfaction of the security 
requirements will raise different definitions and objectives, and will consequently 
comprise different sets of security measures. The tabular form is a conventional method 
of describing the aims of the security requirements for each proceed. Therefore, Tables 
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Authorisation   Authentication 
Availability 
  
  Non-repudiation 
Data Confidentiality   Data Integrity 
Privacy 
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Securing the management plane of the Trust Infrastructure layer is concerned with 
securing the operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P) of the 
high priority nodes (Servers and Combiners) in the MANoN system. Table 4.1 explains 
the objectives fulfilled by applying the security requirements to the infrastructure layer 
in the management plane.  
                                             
                                  Proceed 1: Infrastructure Layer & Management Plane  
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures only authorised nodes can gain access to different MANETs. 
Ensures that only high priority nodes can perform administrator or 
management activities on other nodes or network devices. This applies to 
all MANoN management nodes.  
Authentication Ensures that the identities of the performing administrator or management 
activities on nodes or network devices are who they claim to be in each 
MANET.   
Availability  Ensures the availability of high priority nodes and services provided by 
them. This includes protection against all active attacks (DoS) and 




Provides a record identifying the nodes performing administrative or 
management activity on the nodes or network devices and the action that 
was performed. This record can be used as evidence of the originator of 
the administrative or management activity.  
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensure that data transferred between the administrative entities cannot be 
viewed or understood (e.g. keys and data bases). Protects the 
administrative authentication information (e.g. administrator 
identification and passwords) from unauthorized access or viewing. 
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  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the administrator nodes are not 
modified, deleted, created or replicated.  
       Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify high priority nodes 
and their network devices, base station location and identity from 
unauthorised nodes.  
 
 
Securing the end-user plane of the infrastructure layer is concerned with securing user-
data and voice as it resides in each high priority node in the system. Table 4.2 shows the 
objectives of applying the security requirements to the Infrastructure layer at the 
management plane. 
 
                                  Proceed 2: Infrastructure Layer & End-User Plane  
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only high priority authorised nodes can gain access to 
different end-user data of each MANET. 
Authentication Identifies the identities of the high priority nodes attempting to gain 
access to end-users data in every MANET.   
Availability  Ensures the availability of all end-user nodes and services provided 
(e.g. providing credentials) by them. This includes protection against 
all active attacks and passive attacks of the administrative 
authentication information.  
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the node performing activity on the end-
user nodes that is actually performed. This record can be used as 
evidence of the access to end-user data.  
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensures that data transferred between the end-users cannot be viewed 
or understood. Protects the end-user information from unauthorized 
access or viewing. 
Table 4.1: Applying security requirements to the Infrastructure Layer, Management Plane 
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  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the end-user and the high 
priority nodes are not modified, deleted, created or replicated.  
Privacy Protects the information that can be used to identify end-user nodes 
and their network devices, base station location and identity from 
unauthorised nodes.  
 
 
Securing the management plane of the communication layer is concerned with securing 
the operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P) of the network 
transmission facilities. Table 4.3 shows the objectives of applying the security 
requirements to the communication layer in the management plane. 
 
                                  Proceed 3: Communication Layer, Management Plane   
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only authorised nodes are allowed to perform 
administrator or management activities of network transmission 
facilities. 
Authentication Verifies the identity of the nodes that are performing administrator or 
management activities of the network transmission facilities.    
Availability  Ensures the availability of the transmission facilities and services 
provided by the high priority nodes. This includes protection against 
all active attacks and passive attacks of the administrative 
authentication information.  
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the entities or devices performing the 
administrative or management activity of the network transmission 
facilities and the action that was performed. This record will be used 
as proof that the administrative or management activity was 
performed with an indication of the nodes or network devices that 
Table 4.2: Applying security requirements to the Infrastructure Layer, End-user Plane 
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Table 4.3: Applying security requirements to the Communication Layer, Management Plane 
performed it.  
       Data 
Confidentiality  
Protects all files used in creation and execution of the network 
transmission facilities from unauthorised access or viewing. This 
applies to files stored or being transmitted across the network.  
Protects the network transmission facilities‘ administrative or 
management information (e.g. user identification and passwords, 
administrator identification and passwords) from unauthorised access 
or viewing. 
Data Integrity  Ensures that all files used in the creation and execution of 
transmission facilities can not be modified, deleted, created or 
replicated. This protection applies to files inhabitant in nodes and 
network devices being transmitted across the network or stored as 
offline. The same type of consideration is applied to transmission 
facilities administrative or management information (e.g. 
administrator identification and passwords, user identification and 
passwords). 
      Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify transmission 




Securing the end-user plane of the communication layer is concerned with securing the 
user-data and voice of the network transmission facilities. Table 4.4 shows the 
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Table 4.4: Applying security requirements to the Communication Layer, End-user Plane 
                                  Proceed 4: Communication Layer & End-User Plane  
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only authorised nodes can gain access to different end-
user data of each MANET for all transmission facilities. 
Authentication Identifies the identities of the nodes to communicate or access end-
users‘ data in every MANET.   
Availability  Ensures the availability of all end-user transmission facilities and 
services provided (e.g. providing credentials) by them. This includes 
protection against all active attacks and passive attacks. 
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the node performing activity on the end-
user nodes and the action that is actually performed. This record can 
be used as proof of the access to end-user data.  
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensures that data transferred between the end-users cannot be viewed 
or understood. Protects the end-user information from unauthorized 
access or viewing. 
  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the end-user nodes are not 
modified, deleted, created or replicated. This applies to the 
configuration information resident in nodes and network devices, 
being transmitted across the network or stored offline. 
      Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify transmission 
facilities of the end-user nodes, base station location and identity from 
unauthorised nodes.  
 
 
Securing the management plane of the routing layer is concerned with securing the 
operations, administration, maintenance and provisioning (OAM&P) of the transmitted 
nodes. Table 4.5 shows the objectives of applying the security requirements to the 
routing layer in the management plane. 
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Table 4.5: Applying security requirements to the Routing Layer, Management Plane 
                                  Proceed 5: Routing Layer, Management Plane   
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only high priority nodes are authorised to perform 
administrator or management activities on transmitted nodes. 
Authentication Verifies the identity of the high priority nodes that is performing 
administrator or management activities of the transmitted nodes (host 
& router).    
Availability  Ensures that the ability to administer or manage the transmitted nodes 
by authorized entity can not be denied. This includes the protection 
against the active attacks and passive attacks of the network 
transmission facilities administrative authentication information. 
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the entities or devices performing the 
administrative or management activity on the network transmitted 
nodes. This record will be used as proof that the administrative or 
management activity was performed with an indication of the nodes or 
network devices that performed it.  
       Data 
Confidentiality  
Protects all files used in creation and execution of the transmitted 
nodes from unauthorised access or viewing. This applies to files 
stored or being transmitted across the network.  
Protects the nodes‘ administrative or management information (e.g. 
user identification and passwords, administrator identification and 
passwords) from unauthorised access or viewing. 
Data Integrity  Ensures that all files used in creation execution of transmitted nodes 
can not be modified, deleted, created or replicated. This protection 
applies to the files inhabitant in nodes and network devices, being 
transmitted across the network or stored as offline.  
      Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify the transmitted 
nodes from unauthorised entities.  
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Table 4.6: Applying security requirements to the Routing Layer, End-user Plane 
Securing the end-user plane of the Routing layer is concerned with securing the user-
data of the transmitting nodes. Table 4.6 shows the objectives of applying the security 
requirements to the routing layer in the end-user plane. 
 
 
Proceed 6: Routing Layer & End-User Plane 
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only authorised nodes can gain access to different end-
user data of each transmitted node in the MANoN. 
Authentication Identifies the routing request from the end-user nodes that are 
attempting to communicate or access end-users data in every 
transmitted node in the MANoN.   
Availability  Ensures the availability between transmitted nodes and services 
provided (e.g. providing credentials) by them. This includes protection 
against all active attacks and passive attacks. 
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the nodes performing activity on the 
end-user nodes is actually performed. This record can be used as proof 
of the access to end-user data.  
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensures that data transferred between the end-users cannot be viewed 
or understood. Protects the end-user information from unauthorized 
access or viewing. 
  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the end-user nodes are not 
modified, deleted, created or replicated. This applies to the 
configuration information resident in nodes and network devices 
being transmitted across the network or stored offline. 
      Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify end-user nodes 
and their network devices (transmission facilities), base station 
location and identity from unauthorised nodes.  
 
Chapter 4 Security Architecture for MANoN 
80 
 
Table 4.7: Applying security requirements to the Application Layer, Management Plane 
Securing the management plane of the application layer is concerned with securing the 
operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P) of the nodes 
application (SSL and SSH). Table 4.7 shows the objectives of applying the security 
requirements to the Application layer in the management plane. 
                                  Proceed 7: Application Layer & Management Plane  
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only high priority nodes are authorised to perform 
administrator or management activities of the network-based 
applications. 
Authentication Ensures that the identities performing administrator or management 
activities on nodes or network devices are who they claim to be in each 
MANET.   
Availability  Ensures the availability of high priority nodes and applications provided 
by them. This includes protection against all active attacks and passive 
attacks of the administrative authentication information.  
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the nodes performing administrative or 
management activity on the nodes or applications and the action that was 
performed. This record can be used as proof of the originator of the 
administrative or management activity.  
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensures that data transferred between the administrative entities cannot 
be viewed or understood. This applies to application files resident in 
network devices, being transmitted across the network or stored offline.  
  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the administrator nodes are not 
modified, deleted, created or replicated. This applies to application files 
resident in network devices, being transmitted across the network or 
stored offline. 
       Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify high priority nodes 
and their applications from unauthorised nodes.  
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Table 4.8: Applying security requirements to the Application Layer, Management Plane 
Securing the management plane of the application layer is concerned with securing user-
data provided to the node applications. Table 4.8 shows the objectives of applying the 
security requirements to the application layer in the end-user plane. 
 
                                  Proceed 8: Application Layer & End-user Plane  
Security REQ.                                         Security Objectives  
Authorisation Ensures that only authorised nodes are able to access and use network-
based applications. 
Authentication Verifies the identities of nodes attempting to access or use network-based 
applications. 
Availability  Ensures that the access of network-based application by end nodes cannot 
be denied. This includes protection against all active attacks and passive 
attacks of the administrative authentication information.  
Non-
repudiation 
Provides a record identifying the end nodes activity on the network-based 
applications and the action that was performed. This record will be used 
as proof of access to and use of the application by the end node. 
        Data 
Confidentiality  
Ensures that data transferred between the end-user entities cannot be 
viewed or understood. This applies to application files resident in 
network devices, being transmitted across the network or stored offline.  
  Data Integrity  Ensures that the data transferred between the end-user nodes are not 
modified, deleted, created or replicated. This applies to the application 
files resident in network devices, being transmitted across the network or 
stored offline. 
       Privacy  Protects the information that can be used to identify end user nodes and 
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Attacks on a MANoN attempt to evade security requirements (authorisation, 
authentication, privacy, data confidentiality, availability, data integrity, and non-
repudiation), which are defined in the Security Architecture for MANoN.  
In order to satisfy the objectives of the security requirements (section 4.2.1) and protect 
MANoN from various types of security attacks, there are various technologies that can 
be used. Table 4.9 shows examples of some of these technologies.  
 
These technologies could be applied to satisfy the objectives of the security 
requirements in the eight proceeds explained above. The specification of each 
technology and the way of applying it varies from proceed to proceed and between 
security requirements.  
The next chapter will introduce a novel Access Control Mechanism and Behavioural 
Detection technique for Managing Digital Certificates in the State-of-the-art MANoN 
fulfilling the objectives of authentication, authorisation, availability, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation at proceeds (1, 2, 7, 8).  
 
Security Requirements  Technique Used 
Authorisation  Password, Access Control List (ACL), Firewall 
Authentication Shared Secret, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Digital 
signatures, digital certificate 
Privacy (Partially by) Encryption, Mechanisms to hide locations and 
Routing protocols used 
Data confidentiality  Encryption 
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Table 4.9: Technologies for satisfying Security Requirements  
Availability Intrusion Detection Systems/ Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(IDS/ IPS) 
Data Integrity Hash functions, Digital certificate 
Non-repudiation Digital Signatures, System logs 
 
 
4.5 Summary   
A security architecture for MANoN is proposed. The security architecture presents a 
comprehensive, end-to-end high level security solution for MANoN that could be 
applied to any wireless service provision scenario exploiting MANoN in order to 
predict, detect and correct security vulnerabilities.  
The security architecture is defined upon the ITU-T recommendations, X.800 and 
X.805. The proposed security architecture identifies seven security requirements that 
protect the system against all major security threats attempting to attack MANoN. 
Attacks on MANoN are characterised by accidental or intentional generation, either 
internally or externally and the use of active or passive behaviour. We have illustrated a 
methodical approach for securing MANoN by taking each Proceed between any layer 
and plane as a unique perspective, with consideration for the seven requirements that 
presented eight tables describing the objectives of the security requirements for each 
Proceed.  
Finally, the application of the proposed security for MANoN in order to achieve end-to-
end security solutions for MANoN using different technologies is explained.  
   
 




Security Management Techniques 
Objectives 
 Define our security management components upon recommendation ITU 
M.3400 
 Present an introduction to our security mechanisms ACM-MANoN and 
BD-MANoN 
 Present the methodology used to evaluate our security mechanisms  
 Propose the parameter values used in the NS-2 simulation environment 
 Design our MANoN system model  
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the Security Architecture that provides a comprehensive, 
end-to-end security solution for MANoN. In order to satisfy the objectives of the 
security requirements defined in this architecture, we need to propose a set of 
mechanisms to enforce these security requirements, and forestall any attempts to evade 
them; but first of all, we need to explain and define our system, to find whether our 
MANoN is a burden or advantage to the real life situations and how these security 
mechanisms could be implemented for a MANoN, which will be explained later in this 
chapter. Moreover, we will highlight the main points for implementing a comprehensive 
securely managed system.    
Chapter 5 Security Management Techniques  
85 
 
This chapter presents a novel security-management system based upon 
Recommendation ITU-T M.3400 [58], which is used to evaluate, report on the 
behaviour of our MANoN and support the complex services our system might need to 
accomplish. 
In this chapter, novel security mechanisms are used to satisfy the objectives of security 
requirements such as authentication, authorisation, availability, data integrity, and non-
repudiation in Proceed (1), Proceed (2), Proceed (7) and Proceed (8) previously defined 
in Chapter 4. 
In the present chapter, we propose novel, efficient security mechanisms for managing 
digital certificates in MANoN. We will assume that MANoNs are operating in 
heterogeneous wireless environments such as WLANs and cellular systems. We define 
two different algorithms for two different scenarios.  
The first algorithm manages digital certificates when all ad hoc nodes are part of other 
infrastructure-based wireless networks, meaning that all nodes are defined and known to 
each other in the MANoN (Access Control Mechanism for MANoNs (ACM-MANoN)). 
This algorithm is based on the hierarchical trust model used with threshold cryptography 
as our PKI, to provide a high level of secure, available and well managed certification 
service.  
 
The second algorithm assumes that some of the ad hoc nodes are present in other 
wireless networks, meaning that only some of the nodes are defined in our MANoN. In 
this case, the mechanism will be a combination of behaviour detection and threshold 
cryptography (Behaviour Detection for MANoN (BD-MANoN)); in other words the 
digital certificates will be managed by a behaviour detection algorithm. The following 
two chapters will prove that the proposed mechanism is still fully distributed and that it 
provides a high level of secure, available, scalable and efficient management services 
for MANoN.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents a new security 
mechanism for managing digital certificates in MANoN. It explains how this 
mechanism implements the security requirements, as well as identifying two algorithms 
for two different scenarios in the security mechanism. Section 5.3 describes the 
evaluation methodologies we used to test the performance of the proposed security 
mechanism. Finally, the outcomes are summarised. 
 
5.2 Securely Managing MANoN 
Providing security management is critical for any system, and our MANoN is not 
exceptional; our security management will be described upon the Recommendation 
ITU-T M.3400 perspective, showing three essential components: 
 Security Administration  
 Prevention and Detection 
 Containment and Recovery 
 
In any system, providing one of those components is a problem, but if we are dealing 
with an infrastructure-less MANoN, it will be a dilemma, yet we approached each set 
group independently, providing unusual solutions for each one of them. 
The Security Administration function sets are those needed for planning and 
administrating security policies and managing security related information. Owing to the 
lack of underlying infrastructure, depending on a central administration is impossible, 
raising one of the major issues ad hoc networks might face [99].                                                                                                     
That is why we employ threshold cryptography as our key management service, and a 
distributed authority inherits a number of CA nodes (explained in detail in chapter 6 and 
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chapter 7) with higher computational power delegated to carry out the administration 
duty, which will be known as Back Bone Nodes (BBN).  
Prevention and Detection, the prevention function sets, are those needed to prevent 
intrusion, whereas detection function sets are those needed to detect an intrusion. To 
prevent or detect illegitimate users, the security requirements must be defined and 
satisfied; therefore, we designed novel security mechanisms to satisfy these 
requirements. Chapter 6 explains our prevention mechanism, which is based on 
authentication and authorisation digital certificates in a pre-defined MANoN scenario. 
Meanwhile, chapter 7 illustrates the state-of-the-art behaviour detection algorithm that 
shows how nodes can act without the need of any strict security mechanisms. 
The Containment and Recovery function sets are those needed to deny access to an 
intruder, repair damage done by an intruder, recover losses and to update the system 
whenever needed. As known, providing an online periodic system to our infrastructure-
less MANoN is already complicated enough; in chapter 6, our MANoN scenario shows 
that some nodes have a high-level transmission facility, enabling them to connect 
through other heterogeneous networks, such as satellite, unmanned aerial vehicle, or 
cellular (demonstrated in chapter 6) networks, to obtain an online periodic system.  
 
5.3 Implementing Security Requirements Defined in the   
Security   Architecture 
Various technologies can be used to implement the security requirements defined 
previously in Chapter 4. Modern cryptography – including public key cryptography, 
digital signatures and digital certificates – are the most powerful tools that can be used 
to implement most security requirements, including authentication, authorisation, data 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation.  
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The unique characteristics of MANoN make the application of these technologies a real 
challenge. This issue is tackled in this chapter by proposing new security mechanisms, 
namely the access control and behaviour detection mechanisms. 
 
The proposed security mechanisms will focus on the proceeds of the trust infrastructure 
and application layers (proceeds 1, 2, 7, 8) defined in the previous chapter. This is 
because of the importance of this object in representing the main functionalities of 
MANoN as wireless access networks. As shown in Figure 5.1, the security mechanisms 
will satisfy authentication and authorisation, and help toward forcing other security 
requirements such as availability, data confidentiality, availability, data integrity and 
non-repudiation. Chapter 6 and 7 will highlight these requirements, showing how our 
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Figure 5.2: MANoN two scenarios 
5.4 MANoN System Model  
Our system model involves a number of autonomous nodes interconnecting with each 
other by wireless communication in a heterogeneous environment. Each node is an ad 
hoc network, which has the ability to operate separately with its own supervision and 
management, creating what is known as MANoN. Each network has the ability to 
disconnect and join on different bases without affecting the main system. We have 
defined two scenarios for our MANoN:  
First, all the MANETs are pre-connected by wireless connection to exchange data, and 
to update information on each other (e.g. private and public keys).  
In the second place, not all MANETs are predefined in the MANoN community. Figure 
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5.5 Security Mechanisms Evaluation 
This section discusses the methodology used to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed security mechanism ACM-MANoN. It shows what the evaluation metrics are 
and which simulation environments are used to test them, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
5.5.1   NS-2 Based Evaluation 
The behaviour of the ACM-MANoN in real network environments needs to be tested, 
the overhead caused by this security protocol measured and the time needed to perform 
successful certificate authentication services calculated. Therefore, a suitable network 
simulator must be chosen to provide the communication performance of the proposed 
security mechanism. This section will justify the application of the NS-2 simulator to 
simulate the security mechanism, as well as showing how the simulation environment is 
set, what the simulation metrics are and what parameter values have been used. 
 
5.5.2   Network Simulator: NS-2 
In order to evaluate the performance of the security mechanism ACM-MANoN, in terms 
of communication cost, they must be implemented using one of the available network 
simulators suitable for simulating such types of wireless network.  
Many researchers in MANET have evaluated and simulated their work using various 
approaches and simulation tools. The most popular network simulators are Network 
Simulator-2 (NS-2) [112, 29, 5], Global Mobile Information System Simulation Library 
(GloMoSim) [37] and OPNET Modeler [84]. Some work has been simulated using self-
developed code. 
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The authors in [62] surveyed the 2000-2005 proceedings of the ACM International 
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc). They found 
that NS-2 is the most frequently used of all simulators in MANET research: ―35 of the 
80 simulation papers that state the simulator used in the simulation study used NS-2 
(43.8%)‖, as shown in Figure 5.4.  
NS-2 has been chosen to simulate the ACM-MANoN in the present research. What 
distinguishes NS-2 from other simulators is the range of features it provides and its open 
source code that can be modified and extended. It provides substantial support for the 
simulation of TCP, routing and multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local and 
satellite) networks.  
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Figure 5.4: Simulator usage from MobiHoc survey [62] 
                      
 
NS-2 is a discrete event and an object-oriented simulator targeted at networking 
research; it was developed by the University of California at Berkeley and the VINT 
project [112]. There are several versions of NS-2. We have used version NS-2.31 in our 
simulation. The simulator is installed on the Linux-based operating system Ubuntu 
7.10.  
 
The NS-2 simulator is based on two languages: an object oriented simulator, written in 
C++, and an OTcl (an object oriented extension of Tcl) interpreter, used to execute the 
user‘s command scripts. It has a rich library of network and protocol objects. There are 
two-class hierarchies: the compiled C++ hierarchy and the interpreted OTcl, with one-
to-one correspondence between them. The compiled C++ hierarchy allows us to achieve 
efficient simulation and faster execution times. This is particularly useful for the detailed 
definition and operation of protocols, allowing the reduction of packet and event 
processing time.  
 
In the OTcl script provided by the user, we can define a particular network topology, the 
specific protocols and applications we wish to simulate (and whose behaviour has 
already been defined in the compiled hierarchy) and the form of the output that we wish 
to obtain from the simulator. The OTcl can make use of the objects compiled in C++ 
Chapter 5 Security Management Techniques  
93 
 
Figure 5.5: Schematic structure for NS-2 
through an OTcl linkage (done using tclCL: a Tcl/C++ interface [111]) that creates a 
matching of OTcl object for each of the C++. Therefore, from the user‘s perspective, 
NS-2 is an OTcl interpreter that takes an OTcl script as input, and produces a trace file 
as output (Figure 5.5).  
One of the compensations of this split-language programming is that it allows for the 
fast generation of large scenarios. This is because NS-2 can efficiently manipulate bytes 
and packet headers, and implement algorithms that run over large data sets. For these 
tasks, run-time speed is important. C++ is slow to modify, but its speed makes it 
appropriate for protocol implementation. On the other hand, a large element of network 
research involves slightly changing parameters and configurations, or exploring a 
number of scenarios. In these cases, iteration time (change the model and re-run) is more 
significant. Since configuration runs once (at the beginning of the simulations), run-time 
of this part is less important. OTcl runs slower but can be altered very quickly making it 
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5.5.3   Simulation Environment of the Security Mechanism  
A TCL script file for mobile ad hoc wireless simulations provided by the NS-2 
distribution was modified to fit the simulation environment of the security mechanism. 
In this file, it was necessary to define the type of each of the network components that 
nodes compromise. A mobile node consists of network components such as Link Layer 
(LL), Interface Queue (IfQ), MAC layer and the wireless channel from which nodes 
transmit and receive signals. In addition, in the TCL script file, it is necessary to define 
other parameters such as type of antenna, radio-propagation model and type of ad-hoc 
routing protocol used by mobile nodes.  
 
The size of trace files generated by running the TCL script file is huge – of the order of 
tens of megabytes. The total size of all trace files generated in all experiments of the 
ACM-MANoNs algorithm is around 31 GB. These files were analysed to obtain the 
performance metrics. In order to extract certain lines and discard the rest from the 
generated trace file for analysis, the ―grep” UNIX command was used. Grep [84] is the 
most useful command provided by the UNIX operating system, and allows file filtering.  
A new file consisting only of those lines from the original file that contain a given 
character sequence can be created. For example, the output traces in NS-2 might contain 
all the types of packet that are part of protocols such as the routing and MAC protocols, 
while the present work concerns itself only with the packets generated by the security 
protocols that implement the two algorithms. In this case, only the required information 
need to be filtered from these trace files. Subsequently, a visual basic tool has been 
developed to take those filtered files as an input, and then calculates the evaluation 
metrics of the two algorithms. An example of using this tool will be discussed in the 
next two chapters. 
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5.5.3.1   Simulation Environment of the Security Mechanism  
The following metrics are used to evaluate the proposed security mechanism in terms of 
communication cost. Success Ratio measures the ratio of the number of successful 
certificate authentication requests over the total number of certificate authentication 
requests that should take place during the simulation time. Average Delay measures the 
average latency to authenticate a certificate successfully. Overhead measures the total 
number of packets transmitted as part of the security protocol (ACM-MANoNs) that 
provides certificate authentication for MANoN nodes. Finally, Average Number of 
Retries measures the average number of retries before a node successfully authenticates 
a certificate.  
Each metric mentioned above has been simulated in three different scenarios: the 
mobility scenarios with different pause time values (0, 10, 40, 60, 100), the speed 
scenarios with different node speeds (1, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30), and the network size 
scenarios with different numbers of nodes (10, 20, 40, 60).  
 
The other factors affecting the performance of the security algorithms ACM-MANoN 
need to be justified before using them in the simulation, the details of which will be 
shown in the next two chapters.  
 
 
5.5.3.2   Parameters Values 
Currently, there is no single benchmark of MANoN scenarios to test a protocol [62]. 
The MANoNs community needs a way to characterise simulation scenarios in order to 
evaluate and compare protocols and performance, and to ensure that protocols are 
rigorously tested. 
In an attempt to generate results that would be representative to some potential real 
world scenarios (which might be encountered by the algorithm), simulations were run 
with parameter values close to the available real ones. Without loss of generality, the 
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security protocol evaluations are based on the simulation of 50 wireless nodes for some 
scenarios, and different numbers of nodes varying from 10 to 60 for other scenarios. 
These nodes form the MANoNs, moving about over an area of 1000m x1000m for 500 
seconds of simulated time. The square site models situations in which nodes can move 
freely around each other, and where there is a small amount of path and spatial diversity 
available for the routing protocol to discover and use. A 1000m
2
 
space was chosen 
because it is four times the transmission range of 250 metres, which allows the 
possibility of a reasonable number of nodes between the source and destination nodes. 
This is because a higher number of intermediate nodes results in quicker route breaks. 
On the other hand, a smaller number of intermediate nodes does not give an indication 
of the realistic security protocol.  
 
In the simulation model, the mobile nodes are placed randomly within the simulation 
area. In terms of a mobility model, a Random WayPoint Model (RWP) [111] is used for 
different values of pause time, maximum node speed, and network size. The random 
waypoint model is one of the most widely used mobility models in the performance 
analysis of mobile wireless networks [50]. In the Random WayPoint Model, nodes are 
initially placed randomly within the simulation field. Each node selects a destination 
randomly and independently from other nodes, and it moves towards this destination 
with a constant speed. When a node reaches its destination, it stays there for a given 
pause time before it starts to move to another random destination. In this manner the 
pause time value reflects how often nodes move during the scenario, which in turn 
reflects the amount of topology change.  
 
In order to generate the movement of the mobile nodes, the CMU's scenario- generating 
scripts have been studied to create these files and make use of the scenario-generation 
utility ―setdest‖. The node-movement generator is available under the ~ns/indep-
utils/cmu-scen-gen/setdest directory created when NS-2 is installed. The IEEE 802.11 
Medium Access Control (MAC) Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) [60] protocol 
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Table 5.1: The parameter values used in NS-2 based simulation 
is used in the simulation to get the link breakage feedback signal. The physical radio 
characteristics of each mobile node‘s network interface, such as the antenna type, 
transmit power, and receiver sensitivity, were chosen to approximate the most common 
commercially available wireless LAN radio, such as the Lucent WaveLAN [106] radio.  
The radio propagation range for each node was 250 metres and the channel capacity was 
2 Mbps. The propagation model used in the simulation was the two-ray ground 
reflection model. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the other simulation parameters.  
 
 Scenario Name Mobility (Pause Time) 
Scenario 




Pause Time (s) 0, 10, 40, 60, 100 10 10 
Max Node Speed 
(M/s) 
20 1, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 20 
Number of Mobile 
Nodes 
50 50 10, 20, 40, 60 
Simulation Time 
(s) 
500 500 500 
Network Space (m) 1000 x 1000 1000 x 1000 1000 x 1000 
Radio Range 250m 250m 250m 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 IEEE802.11 IEEE802.11 
Radio Propagation 
Model 
two-ray two-ray two-ray 
Antenna Model Omni Antenna Omni Antenna Omni Antenna 
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5.6    Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of new security mechanisms for securely managing 
MANoN. These security mechanisms implement the objectives of authentication, 
authorisation, availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation of 
proceeds (1), proceeds (2), proceeds (7), and proceeds (8), as defined in Chapter 4.  
The security mechanisms assume a heterogonous wireless environment in which 
MANoNs are operating in an area covered by other infrastructure-based wireless 
networks, such as WLANs and cellular systems. Those security mechanisms propose 
two algorithms for two different scenarios.  
 
The first algorithm, called ACM-MANoN, tackles the issue of managing digital 
certificates where all MANET nodes are participating at the same time in other 
infrastructure-based wireless networks. The key management system in this case will 
use the threshold cryptography PKI. This algorithm, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, will provide a high security, efficient, distributed and scalable key management 
service with high availability.  
 
The second algorithm, BD-MANoN, assumes as a part of its network model that some 
MANET nodes belong to other existing and defined wireless networks. This security 
mechanism depends basically on nodes behaviour to decide whether the nature of each 











Algorithm1: Access Control Mechanism 
for MANoN (ACM-MANoN) 
Objectives 
 Define the prevention component for our MANoN 
 Describing our ACM-MANoN in a heterogeneous environment using 
threshold cryptography as key management service  
 Implementing our ACM-MANoN 
 Describing our ACM-MANoN in a formal description method 
 Evaluating our ACM-MANoN using NS-2 base simulation 
 
 
6.1     Introduction 
The integration of heterogeneous wireless technologies can improve network 
performance, thereby meeting different security requirements as will be shown in this 
chapter. The research into integrating ad hoc networks with other wireless networks 
such as cellular networks can be found in [71,47]. These focus on how MANoN can 
enhance cellular services.  
 
This chapter will examine the integration of heterogeneous wireless networks to enhance 
the performance of MANoN from a security perspective. It proposes a novel integrated 
access control mechanism system to improve the security level in the new type 
MANoN. The access control mechanism is based on threshold cryptography to achieve 
prevention techniques providing a high level of security management, availability and a 
management certification service for pre-defined nodes of the MANoN.  
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The following sections present the network and system model constituting the basis of 
ACM-MANoN. The ACM-MANoN certificates management framework is defined and 
the means of coping with misbehaving nodes in this algorithm is explained. Finally, 
ACM-MANoN will be evaluated and the obtained results are discussed and analysed. 
 
 
6.2 Network and System Model 
In this algorithm all the nodes comprising the ad hoc networks are involved in other 
infrastructure-based wireless networks such as WLAN and cellular systems. Therefore, 
each of the ad hoc nodes will belong to a PKI (MANET) creating the MANoN system, 
as shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
Our MANoN involves a number of MANET interconnecting with each other; in 
addition all PKI are pre-connected by wireless connection to exchange data, and to 
update information. Each PKI has a set of (t+1) CAs (Servers CASe and Combiners 
CAc) acting as administrators known as Back Bone Nodes (BBN). Those CAs are fully 
trusted by all nodes that belong to this PKI. It is relatively uncommon to have one node 
that belongs originally to more than one PKI, because this protocol is used either in 
civilian or military environments where the number of PKI within a given area is 
limited.  
This will include the PKI of the known mobile operators and wireless LANs in that area. 
For example, there is no common node that belongs to both the mobile operator Orange 
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Figure 6.1: Network Model of ACM-MANoN 
6.3 ACM- MANoN Certificate Management Framework 
This section describes the certificate management system of ACM-MANoN. It shows 
how public/private keys and digital certificates are created, presents the formalisation 
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6.3.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificates 
The use of our ACM-MANoN requires a key management service. We adopt PKI 
because of its superiority in distributing keys, and achieving integrity and non-
repudiation. In PKI, each node has its own Public/ Private key pair. Public keys can be 
distributed to other node, while private keys should be kept confidential to individual 
nodes. 
As mentioned each node has its own Public/ Private keys, each node will receive its own 
Authentication and Authorisation certificates from its own PKI (MANET). The 
Authentication certificate will be used as an Identity (Passport), whereas Authorisation 
certificate will be used as a security clearance. Each MANoN‘s node will hold its 
certificate in a Local Data Base (LDB). The main structure of ACM-MANoN digital 

























CA Digital Signature 







Figure 6.2: The Structure of ACM-MANoN Digital Certificates 
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The certificates contain:  
 Serial number: A unique integer value within the issuing PKI or CA (servers 
and combiners), that is unambiguously associated with the certificate. 
 Provider Network: Name of the network that issued the certificate. 
 Issuer Nodes: PKI or CA names that created and signed the certificate. 
 Period of Validity: Consist of two dates: the first and last on which the 
certificate is valid.  
 Subject Name:  Holder of the certificates.  
 Subject’s Public-key: The public key of the user. 
 Security Clearance: Level of the authorisation certificate which allow the 
subject to perform in any network with the same priority level (i.e. nodes in a 
specific network). 
 Certificate Policies: Certificates may be used in environments where 
multiple policies apply. So, this section will carry list of policies that the 
certificate recognised as supporting, together with optional qualifier 
information.  
 CA Digital Signature: Digital signature being signed either by the PKI or the 
CAs. 
 
6.3.2 ACM-MANoN Implementation  
As mentioned all nodes receive their keys and certificates (Authentication, 
Authorisation) from their PKI, moreover, MANoN service has its own Public/ Private 
keys, all CAs (Servers CASe , Combiners CAC) will receive a share of the private key (to 
sign certificates and perform threshold cryptography) and the public key in order for the 
CAS to be able validate other MANoN certificates.  
In this scenario network (1) and network (2) are defined in our MANoN system (public 
keys are exchanged between the CAs), so when node x from network (1) is trying to 
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              Figure 6.3: Request & Validation of the certificates      
 
engage and communicate with node y from network (2), node x will broadcast his 
request for an authorisation certificate (to perform in network (2)) attached with his own 
authorisation and authentication certificates that he had received from his original 
network, as shown below in Figure 6.3.  
              








Node x combine his 
Request for access with 
his certificates.
The combiner is trying to validate 
node’s x certificates with the 





After receiving the request from node x, the CAC in the correspondent network 
(Network 2) will validate the certificates by using the service public-key PPKI1 that node 
x belongs to, as shown in Figure 6.3. If the certificates are valid the CAC tries to find a 
set of (t + 1) correct partial signatures to generate a digital signature by the CAS 
(performing threshold cryptography) in order to create an authorisation certificate with a 
specific degree of security clearance depending on the security clearance (Certificate 
Policies) node x certificate carries, as shown in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4: Finding a set of legitimate users in order to perform TC     




(Set of t + 1)
The combiner is trying to find a set 
of servers in order to apply TC to 
produce an authorisation certificate 
signed by t +1 servers
 
 
After creating the authorisation certificate the combiner will forward the certificate to 
node x in order to use it in the network (2). As shown in Figure 6.5.  This algorithm is 
shown in our publication [4].                                       






The combiner forward the new 
certificate in order to perform and to 
use the services in the new MANET
                
  
It is important to check the validity of a certificate, to ensure it is not expired. Therefore, 
a request for a certificate could be made when it is expired and needs to be renewed, 
therefore if the confirmation of certificates is invalid either for lack of information (non-
predefined network) or expiration, then the request will be rejected and the new 
authorisation certificate will not be produced. Moreover, the security clearance of any 
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authorisation certificate must be clarified depending on the network it belongs to and the 
network it is performing in.  
 
Let us suppose that node x from US network is carrying an authorisation certificate of 
rank D (A is highest Z is lowest) if node x is trying to perform in France network the 
new authorisation certificate, which will be issued by France will carry Class C 
(depending on the policy defined & priority difference) giving node x a higher priority 
to perform in France (as France is defined as less priority then US). 
In the implementation of the ACM-MANoN, MANoN nodes try three times to 
authenticate a key. The reason of choosing three retries will be justified in the evaluation 
section. The time between each retry and the next one is called the Authentication Time 
Interval (ATI). After the three retries, if the authentication still can not be validated, 
authentication of this node has failed. The ACM-MANoN formal description is shown 
below.    
 
The following variables represent the parameters of the ACM-MANoN: 
 
 𝑛: number of networks in the MANoN; Networks are numbered from 1 to 𝑛; 
 𝑛𝑖: number of nodes, including certificate authorities, in the network 𝑖,           
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; Nodes in a network 𝑖 are numbered from 1 to 𝑛𝑖; 
 𝑡𝑖 : number of certificate authority servers in the network 𝑖, 1  𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑗 : certificate authority server 𝑗 of the network 𝑖, for 1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑡𝑖  and             
1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖: certificate authority combiner of the network 𝑖, for  1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝐷𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗 : authentication digital certificate of the node  𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for           
1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖  and  1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝐷𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑗 : authorisation digital certificate of the node  𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for             
1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖  and  1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
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 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑗 : public key of the node  𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for 1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖  and  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗 : private key of the node  𝑗 in the network 𝑖, for 1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖  and  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝑃𝑘𝑖: public key of network  𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 𝑆𝑖𝑗 : share for the certificate authority  𝑗 of the private key of network  𝑖, for             
1  𝑗 ≤ 𝑡𝑖  and  1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
 
Before defining our access control mechanism, healthiness conditions for the variable 
above must be defined. 
 
 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑃𝑏𝑢𝑣  for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑢 or 𝑗 ≠ 𝑣  
 𝑃𝑟𝑖 ≠ 𝑃𝑟𝑗   for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
 𝑃𝑘𝑖 ≠ 𝑃𝑘𝑗  for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
After showing the healthiness of our variables, our access control mechanism can be 
described by the following steps, where 𝑇𝑖  denoted the 𝑖th component of a tuple 𝑇: 
1. Granting certificate authority duties to nodes: 
∀𝑖, 𝑗.  1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖 ∧  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 ∧  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖 ∧  𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 + 1 .     (1) 
Here we choose the high ranked 𝑡𝑖  nodes of each network 𝑖 to play each the role 
of Certificate Authority Server and the node 𝑡𝑖 + 1 to be the Certificate Authority 
Combiner, for the network i.   
 
2. Issuing digital certificates to local nodes of each network: 
∀𝑖, 𝑗.   1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑖 ∧  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 ∧
 𝐷𝐶𝑥𝑖𝑗 =< 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖 , 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑗 , … , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑗 > ∧  𝐷𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑗 =<
𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑒𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖 , 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖𝑗 , … , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑗 > .       (2) 
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where 𝑐𝑖𝑗  is the security clearance of the node 𝑗 in the network 𝑖; 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗  and 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗  
are the start and end date of the authentication digital certificate; 𝑠𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗  and 
𝑒𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗  are the start and end date of the authorisation digital certificate; and the 
digital signature of the certificates 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑗  and 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑗  are calculated by the 
certificate authority combiner 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖  of the network 𝑖 by performing a threshold 
cryptography involving the certificate authority servers 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑣  and their shares 
𝑆𝑖𝑣  of the private key of the network 𝑖, for 1 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑡𝑖 . 
Each node uses its digital certificates (authentication and authorisation) to 
request services within the network it belongs to. However, in order to access 
services in an external network, a node needs to request from that network a new 
authorisation certificate in order to perform in it. 
 
3. A request for digital certificates from a node 𝑗 of the network 𝑖 to an external 
network can be modeled by a message of the form:  
  𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑋, 𝑌       (3) 
For some authentication digital certificate 𝑋 and some authorisation certificate 𝑌. 
 
4. Such a request   𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑋, 𝑌   is checked by the external network‘s CA combiner as 
follows: 
a) The requester is the owner of the authentication and authorisation 
certificates, i.e.  
 𝑋1 = 𝑗 ∧  𝑌1 = 𝑗 ; 
 
b) The network of the requester is the network where the digital certificates 
𝑋 and 𝑌were issued, i.e. 
 𝑋2 = 𝑖 ∧  𝑌2 = 𝑖 ; 
 
c) The digital certificates are not expired, i.e. 
 𝑋3 ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦 ≤ 𝑋4 ∧  𝑌3 ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦 ≤ 𝑌4 ; 
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Were today denotes the current date; 
 
d) The digital certificates 𝑋 and 𝑌 are authentic using the public key 𝑃𝑘𝑖  of 
the network 𝑖 and a signature verification algorithm for threshold 
cryptography.  
 
5. Issuing digital certificates to an external node 𝑗 of the network 𝑖 for it to access 
services in the network 𝑘, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖. Here, we suppose that the corresponding 
request has been successfully authenticated and verified as per step 4 above. The 
node 𝑗 of the network 𝑖 will be issued a new authentication 𝑒𝑥𝐷𝐶𝑥𝑘𝑗  and 
authorisation 𝑒𝑥𝐷𝐶𝑦𝑘𝑗  digital certificates as follows:  
 
𝑒𝑥𝐷𝐶𝑥𝑘𝑗 =< 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑘 , 𝑘, … , 𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑥𝑘𝑗 > 
𝑒𝑥𝐷𝐶𝑦𝑘𝑗 =< 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑠𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑒𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑘 , 𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 , 𝑘, … , 𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑦𝑘𝑗 > 
 
Where 𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗  is the security clearance of the node 𝑗 of the network 𝑖 in the external 
network 𝑘; and digital certificate of the certificates 𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑥𝑘𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑦𝑘𝑗  are 
calculated by the certificate authority combiner CAC𝑘  of the network 𝑘 by 
performing a threshold cryptography involving the certificate authority servers 
CAS𝑘𝑣  and their shares S𝑘𝑣  of the private key of network 𝑘, for 1 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑡𝑘 . 
 
 
6.3.3 Digital Certificates Revocation 
Certificate Revocation is one of the basic services that should be provided by any digital 
certificate management system. In this algorithm there are two types of certificate 
revocation:  
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 Explicit revocation: When the CA belonging to PKI
 
revokes a certificate that it 
has issued for one of its nodes, and sends the corresponding revocation to other 
nodes belonging to the same network. If this is not possible for any reason such 
as the nature of the wireless network of this PKI the renewal of this certificate 
could be ended, resulting in an implicit revocation.  
 
 Implicit revocation: Each certificate is revoked after its expiration time. In 
general each certificate contains its issuing and validity times as determined by 
the issuer. Each CA should therefore update the certificates of its nodes before 
the expiration time.  
 
In both types of revocation, any information provided by the CA to its nodes about any 
certificate should be distributed through the exchange process. In this way the nodes 
belonging to other CAs will be provided with this new information.  
Consequently, all of a PKI's nodes are informed when any of them carries out an explicit 
revocation, and their LDBs are subsequently modified. This revocation will be 
transferred to other PKIs' nodes by certificate exchange. 
 
The CAs of the PKIs are responsible for updating those certificates that have been 
implicitly revoked. Once the node has got its new certificate it will update its LDB and 
then communicate the new certificate to its neighbours through the certificate exchange 
process. If one of the nodes does not receive the new certificate through the exchange 
and needs to validate the key, the new certificate will be requested from the CAs it self. 
  
6.3.4 Coping with Misbehaving Users 
In the ACM-MANoN algorithm, it is a more difficult task for malicious nodes to make 
other nodes accept false certificates. This is because all the certificates in this algorithm 
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are issued by a professional CAs and PKIs. Nevertheless, dishonest nodes can try to do 
the following: 
 
1. Issue certificates for itself. Its then signs the certificates with its private 
key, claims that these certificates are signed by a professional CA or PKI 
and uses its public key as the CA public key (this is because ACM-
MANoN requests that each node must hold the digital certificates and the 
corresponding public key of the CA). 
 
2. Try to compromise set of CAS (as our key management service employs 
share refreshing) over long period of time to gain the private key of the 
service PKI in order to generate certificates signed by the service public 
key for itself or different users.  
 
 
All these types of malicious behaviours can be detected and prevented by the ACM-
MANoN algorithm. Referring to ACM-MANoN code, which is defined in section 
6.3.2, the authentication within different CA of the key of a node, should pass two 
conditions: 
 
 The signature should be validated with the public key of the service PKI. 
 The public key of the CA or PKI should be compared with other public key 
certificates attached to the certificates issued by the same CA or PKI. 
 
In the first case, when any CA attempts to validate this certificate, the validation process 
will end successfully because the certificate is signed by the private key, which 
corresponds to the public key attached to the certificate. But there is another condition. 
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The CA will compare this attached public key with other public keys attached to 
certificates issued by the same PKI. In this case, there will be a mismatch with the 
origin. This node will then develop a bad reputation.  
 
In the second case, servers compute new shares from old ones in collaboration without 
disclosing the service private key to any server. The new share constitute a new (n, t + 
1) sharing of the service private key. After refreshing, servers remove the old shares and 
use the new ones to generate partial signatures. Because the new shares are independent 
of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new ones to obtain the 
private key of the service. Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise set of t+1 
servers between the periodic refreshing. This has been explained in chapter 2.  
The area that could be covered by the MANoN is limited and consequently, so is the 
number of PKIs. This includes the number of known mobile operators in this area 
(cellular systems), as well as the available WLANs that belong to some governmental or 
commercial places.  
Therefore, these CAs should be familiar and pre-determined; consequently, any forged 
CA should be easily detected, especially if there is cooperation between these networks. 




6.4 ACM-MANoN Evaluation 
Chapter 5 described the evaluation of the proposed ACM-MANoN mechanism, using 
the NS-2 simulator. This section explains the NS-2-based study of the ACM-MANoN 
algorithm. It shows what evaluation metrics and parameters values are used. The 
experimental results of the study will also be analysed. Finally, server issues regarding 
ACM-MANoN are discussed and the outcomes summarised. 
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6.4.1 NS-2 Based Evaluation 
This section tests the performance of ACM-MANoN in real network environments using 
the NS-2 simulator. The simulation environments, parameter values and evaluation 
metrics used in the experiments are presented. The results of these experiments will be 
shown and analysed. 
 
6.4.1.1 Simulation Environment 
 
The version 2.31of NS-2, was used to simulate the ACM-MANoN algorithm. NS-2 
simulator is installed in the Linux-based operating system Ubuntu 7.10.  
In order to reduce the effect of randomisation used in the simulation, each experiment 
was executed 30 times and the average calculated. Therefore, the size of the trace files 
containing the experiment results was huge. These trace files were filtered and sent to a 
Visual Basic tool in order to measure the evaluation metrics.  
In order to ensure repeatability, the ACM-MANoN implementation code, the mobility 
models generated and used in the experiments, tcl scripts and trace files were saved and 
will be provided for use by the MANoN and MANET community. 
 
6.4.1.2 Evaluation Metrics 
 
In the NS-2 based study, the performance of ACM-MANoN was evaluated using the 
following metrics:  
 Success Ratio measures the ratio of the number of successful certificate 
authentication requests to the total number of certificate authentication requests that 
took place during the simulation time in addition to the authorisation certificate 
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 Average Delay measures the average latency to successfully authenticate a 
certificate  
 
 Overhead measures the total number of packets transmitted as part of the ACM-
MANoN communication protocol to provide certificate authentication and 
authorisation services  
 
 Average Number of Retries measures the average number of attempts made before 
a node successfully authenticates a certificate   
 
Each metric mentioned above has been simulated in three different scenarios:  
 
 Mobility Scenario with different pause time values (0, 10, 40, 60, 100)  
 Speed Scenario with different node speeds (1, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30)  
 Network Sizes Scenario with different number of nodes (10, 20, 40, 60)  
 
The other factors affecting the performance of the ACM-MANoN algorithm, which 
need to be justified before using them in the simulation, are:  
 
• Routing Protocol 
• Authentication Time Interval (ATI) 
 
6.4.1.3 Parameter Values 
The parameter values used in the NS-2 based evaluation have been discussed in Chapter 
5. Table 6.1 provides a summary of these simulation parameters.  
There are other parameters that need to be set while performing the experiments. These 
parameters play an important role in ACM-MANoN, Authentication Time Interval 
(ATI) of the digital certificates, number of PKIs, and the number of CA in each PKI. 
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Table 6.1: The parameter values used in NS-2 based simulation 
Choosing the values of these parameters will be a trade-off between ACM-MANoN‘s 
performance and its communication cost, as will be shown in the next section. 
 The values chosen for these parameters in running the experiments are 1 second for 
ATI, 4 for the number of PKIs, and minimum number to apply threshold cryptography 
of 4 CAs (3 CASe and 1CAC). The selection of these values is justified in the following 
section. 
Scenario Name Mobility (Pause Time) 
Scenario 




Pause Time (s) 0, 10, 40, 60, 100 10 10 
Max Node Speed 
(M/s) 
20 1, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 20 
Number of Mobile 
Nodes 
50 50 10, 20, 40, 60 
Simulation Time (s) 500 500 500 
Network Space (m) 1000 x 1000 1000 x 1000 1000 x 1000 
Radio Range 250m 250m 250m 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 IEEE802.11 IEEE802.11 
Radio Propagation 
Model 
two-ray two-ray two-ray 
Antenna Model Omni Antenna Omni Antenna Omni Antenna 
 
 
6.4.1.4 Results and Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, each result presented in this section is achieved by averaging 30 
runs. The corresponding traces files, after a filtering process, were sent to a Visual Basic 
tool, which is developed in order to measure the different metrics as shown in Figure 
6.6.  
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Figure 6.6: Visual Basic tool used to measure the evaluation metrics of MANoN 
The performance of ACM-MANoN, in terms of success ratio, delay, overhead and 
number of retries could be much affected by other factors such as ATI and routing 
protocols. In order to choose proper values for these factors, to be used throughout the 
simulation, a set of experiments were executed. The results of these experiments are 




As can be seen in Figure 6.7, changing the value of ATI (the time interval between two 
consecutive retries) mainly affects the delay. As the value of ATI increases, so does the 
delay. Meanwhile, the success ratio and average number of retries remain almost 
unchanged. Figure 6.8 illustrates the slight increase of overhead due to decreasing ATI. 
Based on these observations, the value of ATI used in the experiments was 1 second. 
 
The average delay metric is measured in the simulation in the following way:  
 
Delay (simulated) = certificate authentication (END) – certificate authentication 
(START)  
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Figure 6.7: Success ratio, Delay, and Average Retries versus ATI 
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Figure 6.9: Comparison between the simulated and calculated delays   
When studying the impact of ATI on the average delay of the certificate authentication 
ACM-MANoN, that average delay can be calculated using the following formula:  
 
Delay (calculated) = (ATI * Number of Retries) - ATI  
 
Figure 6.9 shows a comparison between the simulated average delay and the calculated 
average delay. It can be observed from this comparison that the calculated average delay 
almost matches the simulated average delay. 
 
 
A set of routing protocols including Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [91], 
Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) [92] and Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) [61] is implemented by NS-2. The routing protocol used in all experiments 
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Figure 6.10: Success Ratio, delay and average retries versus routing protocol  
all the evaluation metrics used to test ACM-MANoN performance. The results of this 




AODV gives the best success ratio, with a little more delay and average number of 
retries than DSDV. DSDV gives the lowest delay and average number of retries, but 
presents a problem regarding the large amount of overhead it causes in ACM-MANoN 
(Figure 6.11).  
 
In contrast, DSR is the best routing protocol regarding the overhead but conversely the 
worst regarding the success ratio, delay and average number of retries. All in all, AODV 
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6.4.1.4.1 Success Ratio 
The Figures (6.12-6.14) will show the success ratio versus the three different scenarios 
of mobility, speed and network size. As mentioned before, the success ratio measures 
the number of successful certificate authentication requests to the total number of 
certificate authentication requests that take place during the simulation time in addition 
to the authorisation certificate. 
 
It is assumed that each node will make at least one authentication request. Therefore, the 
total number of authentication requests made during the simulation time is equal to the 
number of nodes trying to enter the MANET.  
It is worth mentioning that the maximum number of retries the security protocol permits 
affects the success ratio in these three scenarios. Therefore, a study has been done to 
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Figure 6.12: Success Ratio, delay and Number of Packet versus number of retries   
experiments. Figure 6.12 shows that the success ratio, delay and overhead of ACM-
MANoN increase with the number of retries. Three retries have been chosen in testing 
the performance of ACM-MANoN. This is because after 3 retries there is not a 





Figure 6.13 shows the success ratio against mobility and network size. Mobility is most 
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Figure 6.13: Success Ratio versus mobility and network size   
much affected by mobility. In general, the success ratio increases with high mobility 
situations and large network sizes.  
Moreover, the effect of mobility is more noticeable with a small number of nodes, 
especially if that number falls below 30. This is due to the number of neighbour nodes. 
The number of neighbour nodes based on transmission range and simulation area can be 
calculated using the formula 
                                 











For example, when the network size is 10, the number of neighbours is around 1.96, but 
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Figure 6.14: Success Ratio versus speed and network size   
effect of mobility increases with a lesser number of nodes, because high mobility 
reduces the effect of fewer neighbourhoods.  
Figure 6.14 shows the success ratio against speed and network size. The ACM-MANoN 
is not strongly affected by speed, but in general, as speed increases so does the success 
ratio. The influence of speed is more noticeable with small network sizes in a manner 






Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the average delay versus mobility, speed and network size. 
As mentioned before, the average delay metric measures the average time taken to 
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Figure 6.15: Average delay versus mobility and network size   
Regarding mobility, the average delay reduces by decreasing the pause time as shown in 
Figure 6.15. In addition, large network size leads to an increase in average delay.  
Increasing network size will increase the communication load, resulting in a longer wait 
in the links‘ queues, more dropping of packets and a greater number of retries, all of 
which consequently causes more delay. The queue size used in the experiments was 50 
packets. A network size greater than 20 nodes will cause a correspondingly greater delay 




As speed increases, average delay decreases as shown in Figure 6.16. Also, the average 
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Figure 6.16: Average delay versus speed and network size   
 
 
6.4.1.4.3 Overhead  
Figures 6.17 and 6.18 demonstrate ACM-MANoN overhead in terms of the number of 
packets generated by this security protocol. There are three types of packets in ACM-
MANoN algorithm: certificate packets, request packets and reply packets. For the 
MANoN with N nodes, the total number of generated packets is equal to the number of 
certificate packets, the number of request packets (Max(N)) and the number of reply 
packets (Max(N)).  
 
This explains why the overhead is almost unchanged for the same number of nodes 
(Figure 6.17 and 6.18). The overhead has been calculated against the network mobility, 
speed and size. As mobility decreases the overhead increases slightly, especially when 
network size is greater than 10 nodes, as depicted in Figure 6.17. It is also obvious from 










0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Avarage Delay Vs Speed and Network size









Chapter 6 Access Control Mechanism for MANoN 
126 
 
Figure 6.17: Overhead versus mobility and network size   
 
 
As the nodes speed increases, it can be observed that the overhead remains almost 
unchanged for ACM-MANoN (Figure 6.18); the overhead slightly decreases when the speed 
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6.4.1.4.4 Average Number of Retries 
The average number of retries metric, which measures the average number of retries 
before a node successfully authenticates a certificate, has been calculated against three 
different scenarios mobility, speed and network size. The results of these studies are 
shown in Figures 6.19 and 6.20.  
 
In general, the average number of retries increases as the mobility and speed decrease, 
as can be seen in Figures 6.19 and 6.20. It can be also observed in these two figures that 
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Figure 6.19: Average number of retries versus mobility and network size   
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As we know that it is impossible to simulate all the possible situations that could take 
place in the real world, we can not exactly predict how any security protocol is going to 
behave. However, the results shown above give, to some extent, a clear idea of how 
ACM-MANoN is going to perform in real network environments.  
 
ACM-MANoN has been simulated in different scenarios with different parameter 
values. The selection of these parameter values has been justified. In real applications of 
ACM-MANoN, these values could be selected based on the business requirements of the 
applications themselves. Consequently, a higher priority could be given to some 
evaluation metrics than to others. That will certainly affect the choice of these parameter 
values. 
 
6.5 Discussion  
Sections 6.2 to 6.3 have presented the ACM-MANoN algorithm. In section 5.4 the 
evaluation of ACM-MANoN has been shown and analysed. However, attention should 
be drawn to some important issues, including ACM-MANoN applications, ACM-
MANoN security attacks and ACM-MANoN certificates. These issues will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
6.5.1 ACM-MANoN Applications 
This section presents examples of ACM-MANoN applications in the military and 
civilian environments. An example of ACM-MANoN for military use is shown in 
Figure 6.21. NATO [82] was used to show how ACM-MANoN could be applied 
effectively in such environments. NATO provides a forum in which the United States, 
Canada and European countries can consult together on security issues of common 
concern. If these countries are located in a battlefield representing a MANoN space, 
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Figure 6.21: Military Applications for the ACM-MANoN 
each one of them should have a PKI to ensure secure communications between the 
members of their networks. Since these countries collaborate, they could agree to 
distribute their CAs‘ public keys. Under these circumstances, ACM-MANoN will very 
securely authenticate certificates belonging to the same or different CAs (more 
explanation will be provided in chapter 8). 
 
 
An example of applying ACM-MANoN in the civilian environment is shown in Figure 
6.22. If an area like Leicester town centre is chosen to represent the network space of 
MANoN, then the set of possible infrastructure-based wireless networks that could co-
exist are the mobile operators known in this area such as Orange, O2, Three and 
Vodafone. 
 
Chapter 6 Access Control Mechanism for MANoN 
131 
 
Figure: 6.22 Civilian applications of ACM-MANoN algorithm  
 
6.5.2 ACM-MANoN Security Attacks 
Before trying to classify the different attacks that the ACM-MANoN algorithm might be 
subjected to, it is important to understand fully their behaviour and to ascertain if they 
are really causing any damage to the service provided by ACM-MANoN. 
In the case of a misbehaving node, which has created a fake identity with a fake digital 
certificate, this type of behaviour is non-harmful as all public keys of the system are 
installed in the Local Data Base (LDB) of the CAs, so when the comparison is made 
with the LDB, public key will not be known and the node will not gain authorisation 
certificate to perform in the system, if this identity is not for any other honest ad hoc 
node this misbehaving action has no impact on the MANoN.  
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6.5.3 ACM-MANoN Certificates 
This section considers various subjects related to ACM-MANoN certificates, such as the 
formatting, and revocation processes.  
 
 Certificate format: The main structure of ACM-MANoN‘s digital certificates is 
presented in section 6.3.1. Even though these certificates are issued by different 
PKIs, there should be a common structure for the digital certificates used by all 
them. This can be achieved by following the certificate format defined by ITU-T 
in its recommendation X.509 [54].  
 
 Certificate revocation: If certificate renewal is the responsibility of MANoN 
nodes, there will be no guarantee that nodes will collaborate to keep track of the 
revocation process in an honest, effective manner. This is a strong advantage of 
the ACM-MANoN algorithm: it pushes the revocation process based on the 
existing infrastructure regardless of whether or not the node cooperates. 
 
 
6.6 Summary  
A novel access control mechanism security protocol for managing digital certificates in 
MANoN called ACM-MANoN is proposed. This protocol assumes that all MANoN 
nodes are part of other infrastructure-based wireless networks.  
 
Using a small amount of information from these wireless networks has provided a big 
improvement in managing the digital certificates. The trust model used by ACM-
MANoN is a heterogeneous hierarchical one. Each of the existing wireless networks has 
a minimum number of four professional CAs of servers and combiners belonging to PKI 
network. The CA issues digital certificates for the nodes belonging to its network and 
other networks.  
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ACM-MANoN deals with threshold cryptography as it is the key management service 
with a high level of security, CAs applied in previous research lack this high security 
demand such as cluster head (CH) [64, 29].  
 
This security mechanism provides a highly secure prevention technique. It supplies 
MANoN with digital certificates issued by professional CAs. Other approaches 
regarding security management have serious shortcomings regarding the level of 
security achieved, assumptions taken and the total computation and communication 
costs, as discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, ACM-MANoN improves the availability of 
the key management service in MANoN. This is due to the support given by existing 
infrastructure-based wireless networks.  
 
Availability has been shown in the results in terms of delay and the average number of 
retries. The maximum delay recorded in all experiments in all scenarios was less than 
0.9 seconds. In all the results recorded, the average number of retries was less than 2. It 
can thus be shown that ACM-MANoN constitutes a highly available key management 
service to MANoN.  
 
An interesting observation resulting from the experiments intended to test the impact of 
the network size on the performance of ACM-MANoN is that this security protocol is 
scalable. ACM-MANoN provides high success ratios with large networks.  
Both delay and average number of retries rose only with an increase in network size. 
There was an increase in overhead, in terms of the number of packets transferred in the 
network (certificate, request and reply packets), with an increase in network size.  
ACM-MANoN could be successfully applied in different scenarios and applications. It 
offers flexibility in different ways. There are no constraints or conditions on the 
application of ACM-MANoN except the network model, which assumes that MANoN 
operates in heterogeneous wireless networks and MANoN nodes are managed 
simultaneously by these wireless networks.  
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As shown by the experimental results, ACM-MANoN has performed well with different 
numbers of PKI, network size, pause times and speeds. Based on the evaluation metrics 
used to test the performance of ACM-MANoN including success ratio, delay, number of 
retries and overhead, the results of NS-2 studies demonstrate an efficient management 
service provided by ACM-MANoN.  
 
ACM-MANoN is evaluated using the NS-2 simulator. The results of the evaluation 
confirm that ACM-MANoN is a fully distributed security protocol that provides a high 
level of secure, available, scalable, flexible and efficient key management services for 
MANoN. It is obvious that ACM-MANoN is a fully distributed security protocol. It 
depends on number of CA in our MANoN called (servers and combiners), which are 
responsible of managing and validating digital certificates of MANoN nodes.  
 
Applications of ACM-MANoN in civilian and military environments have also been 
discussed. Various issues regarding ACM-MANoN such as simulation methodology, 













Detection Algorithm for MANoN 
Objectives 
 Defining our detection component for MANoN 
 Implementing our BD-MANoN 
 Designing an architecture framework for our BD-MANoN 
 Describing our BD-MANoN in formal description method 
 Dealing with attacks in the BD-MANoN  
 
7.1     Introduction 
The integration of heterogeneous wireless technologies can improve network 
performance, thereby meeting different security requirements, as will be shown in this 
Chapter. The research into integrating MANoN with other wireless networks such as 
cellular networks can be found in [71, 116]. These focus on how MANoN can enhance 
cellular services.  
 
This chapter provides a novel behavioural detection algorithm BD-MANoN for 
managing certificates, and on order to fulfil detection security management 
requirements. BD algorithm is based on the behaviour of nodes‘; to achieve this 
detection, a set of BBN will carry out the observations in order to differentiate between 
malicious and normal nodes in the MANoN. 
 
The following sections present the network and system model constituting the basis of 
BD-MANoN. The BD-MANoN certificate management framework is defined and the 




means of coping with misbehaving nodes in this algorithm is explained. Finally, this 
algorithm will be evaluated using several case studies. 
 
 
7.2 Network Design and System Model 
In the BD-MANoN algorithm, some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other 
infrastructure-based wireless networks such as WLAN and cellular systems, and will 
therefore belong to their PKIs creating the MANoN system, as shown in Figure 7.1.  
Other non-managed MANET nodes which are not involved in any other wireless 
networks will be observed by our detector nodes (BBN) in order for those undefined 
nodes to be able to gain access to our MANoN system, as will be shown in the following 
sections. 
 
Similar to our ACM-MANoN algorithm in the previous chapter, our MANoN will 
consist of a number of MANETs interconnecting with each other. Nodes in our MANoN 
will be classified thus: General Nodes (GN) i.e. regular ground nodes are typically 
soldiers equipped with communication and computation limited devices, and Back-Bone 
Nodes (BBN) are usually special units, such as tanks and personnel carriers, which have 
more extensive facilities than regular ground nodes. BBN nodes can establish direct 
wireless links for communication amongst themselves. This type of node will carry out 
the CA (Servers CASe and Combiners CAC) duty signing and creating new certificates 
for different nodes in the MANoN system. 
 
It is assumed that all wireless transmission links in this network are bidirectional. 
Moreover, two kinds of network cards will be presented. The first is a GN with an ad 
hoc network card. The second is BBN that possesses both one ad hoc network card and 
one heterogeneous network card; BBN can communicate with neighbourhood nodes and 
other heterogeneous networks (such as satellite, unmanned aerial vehicle, or cellular 




Figure 7.1: Network Model of BD-MANoNs 
networks). In this system environment, we assume that there exists a wide area covered 
heterogeneous network such as satellite, unmanned aerial vehicle or cellular networks, 
as depicted in Figure 7.2. The wide area covered heterogeneous network can connect 
with the internet. Moreover, its service area is fully covered with a large place (e.g. 
island of Bahrain) or super machines (servers). 
 
In addition, some PKIs are pre-connected by wireless connection to exchange data and 
update information. Each PKI has a set of t+1 CAs acting as administrators; those CAs 
are fully trusted by all nodes that belong to this PKI. It is relatively uncommon to have 
one node that belongs to more than one PKI, because this protocol is used either in 
civilian environments or military environments where the number of PKIs within a 










This will include the PKIs of the known mobile operators and wireless LANs in that 
area. For example, there is no common node that belongs to both mobile operators 
Orange and O2, or two nodes that belong to both the UK and US armies. 
 







7.3 BD-MANoN Certificate Management Framework 
This section describes the certificate management system of BD-MANoN. It shows how 
public/private keys and digital certificates are created, and presents the syntax code of 
the BD-MANoN algorithm. It illustrates the process of certificate revocation. It also 
shows how the new detection algorithm operates in our MANoN system. 
 
7.3.1 Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificate 
Like ACM-MANoN, our BD-MANoN algorithm requires a key management service. 
We have adopted PKI because of its superiority in distributed keys, and its having 
achieved integrity and non-repudiation. In PKI, each node has its own Public/ Private 
key pairs. Public keys can be distributed to other nodes, while private keys must be kept 
confidential to individual nodes.  
Figure 7.2: A wide-covered heterogeneous network 




As already mentioned, each node has its own Public/ Private keys, and each node will 
receive its own Authentication and Authorisation certificates from its own PKI 
(MANET). The Authentication certificate will be used as an Identity (Passport), and the 
Authorisation certificate will be used as a security clearance. Each MANoN‘s node will 
hold its certificate in a Local Data Base (LDB). The main structure of BD-MANoN 
digital certificates is shown in Figure 7.3.  
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The certificates contain:  
 Serial number: A unique integer value within the issuing PKI or CA (servers 
and combiners) that is unambiguously associated with the certificate. 
 Provider Network: Name of the network that issued the certificate. 
 Issuer Nodes: PKI or CA names that created and signed the certificate. 
Figure 7.3: The Structure of BD-MANoN Digital Certificates 




 Period of Validity: Consist of two dates: the first and last on which the 
certificate is valid.  
 Subject Name:  Holder of the certificates.  
 Subject’s Public-key: The public key of the user. 
 Security Clearance: Level of the authorisation certificate which allow the 
subject to perform in any network with the same priority level (i.e. nodes in a 
specific network). 
 Certificate Policies: Certificates may be used in environments where 
multiple policies apply. Therefore, this section will carry a list of policies 
that the certificate recognises as supporting, together with optional qualifier 
information.  
 CA Digital Signature: Digital signature having been signed by either the 
PKI or the CAs. 
 
 
7.3.2 Implementation of Behaviour Detection  
As mentioned above, all nodes receive their keys and certificates (Authentication, 
Authorisation) from their PKI. Moreover, each MANoN service has its own Public/ 
Private keys, and all BBN (Servers CASe, Combiners CAC) will receive a share of the 
private key (sign certificates and perform threshold cryptography) and the public key in 
order for CAC to validate other MANoN certificates.  
Hence, based on our assumption that an undefined node (node x) is trying to engage into 
our MANoN system, a new authorisation certificate (with less security clearance) will 
be required which will be produced from our BBN (divided into two types: Local BBN 
and Global BBN). Since node x is undefined in our system, our CAs will not be able to 
validate its certificates, as the network public key of network x is unavailable; therefore, 
our BBN will carry out the duty of observing this node.  




Therefore, when node x from network (1) (Network (1) is undefined in our MANoN) 
tries to engage and communicate with node y from network (2) (Network (2) defined 
into our MANoN), first of all, node x will broadcast his request for an authorisation 
certificate (to perform in MANoN) attached with his own authorisation and 
authentication certificates which he had received from his original network. In the 
second place, after node x received its authorisation certificate (provisional), our LBBN 
and GBBN will carry out the responsibility of observing it. This security clearance may 
evolve or be revoked, based on node x activity in our MANoN system.  
As we are dealing with an infrastructure-less MANoN, node x will be observed based on 
his Routing Information Table (RIT); this RIT will show a history of all activities being 
performed by node x. Before defining the observation process, we need to show the 
architecture components. Figure 7.4 will illustrate the behaviour detection architecture. 
 
The components of our behaviour detection architecture are: 
 
 General Node (GN): Regular ground nodes, for example typically soldiers 
equipped with communication and computation limited devices (Level 1). Its 
duty is to collect data and transfer them to BBN 
 
 Local Back-Bone Node (LBBN): They are usually special units located within 
the same MANET, for example tanks and personnel carriers which have more 
extensive facilities than regular ground nodes. LBBN can establish direct 
wireless links for communication amongst themselves (Level 2). Its 
responsibility is to collect data and observe nodes entering the MANoN system 
 
 Global Back-Bone Node (GBBN): They are usually special units from external 
networks, for example tanks and personnel carriers which have more extensive 
facilities than regular ground nodes. GBBN can establish direct wireless links for 




communication amongst themselves (Level 2). Its duty is to collect data and 
observe nodes entering the MANoN system  
 
 Data Collector (DC): The main buffer of collected data, located in both GN and 
BBN, enables the behaviour analyser to analyse all available data the system had 
collected. The data collector will be separated from other components to permit 
the data collector to operate simultaneously by collecting data from the different 
resources, and at the same time enables the behaviour analyser to process the 
transferred information [87] 
 
 Behavioural Analyser: The behaviour of the observed node will be abstracted 
(abstraction are shown below), so it will check whether the behaviour of the 
nodes is malicious (anomaly, misuse) or normal. The behaviour analyser 
comprises Policy Decider and Enforcer. The Policy Decider contains a set of 
policies, which are a set of rules that can dynamically change over time and by 
events (those policies contain the nature of acts showing the type of behaviour as 
normal or malicious). The Enforcer is a dynamic mechanism that enforces those 
policies. Checking whether the behaviour of nodes is legitimate is achieved by 
enabling the enforcer to compare our set of policies with the actual behaviour to 
decide the nature of the behaviour (shown in detail in section 7.3.2.2)  
 
 Behaviour Capture: The behaviour capture stores the history of behaviours that 
nodes might have (normal, anomaly or malicious) during specific period of  
time; this capture is always updated depending on the observed node actions, 
despite the fact that saving all behaviours is impossible; nevertheless, a 
reasonable number of behaviours must be stored  




































7.3.2.1 Syntax Expressions 
Before demonstrating categories of the behavioural detection architecture and 
implementation of the behavioural analyser, we need to explain our syntax and the 
variables of our behavioural detection algorithm using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL 
[67]: 




A short introduction is given on ITL to present our policies in a well suited formal 
description to express behaviour of our BD-MANoN and additionally constrains on the 
behaviour of our enforcement mechanism that represent policies.  
•  𝑃 : is a property; a property 𝑃 is a formula written in underlying logic (e.g. using 
ITL) 
• 𝑕𝑖  : is the behaviours 𝑖,  𝑖 ≥ 1; 
• 𝜍𝑖  : is a states 𝑖,   𝑖 ≥ 1;  
• 𝑇 : is a trace which is a portion of 𝑕𝑖;  
• 𝑉𝑎𝑟 : is a set of interesting variables; 
• 𝑉𝑎𝑙 : is a set of semantic values.  
 
The key concept of ITL is State 𝜍𝑖 .  State is considered to be a (in)finite sequence of 
states, where State 𝜍𝑖   is a function from the set of variables to the set of values.  
  𝜍𝑖  : 𝑉𝑎𝑟 → 𝑉𝑎𝑙 
Behaviour 𝑕𝑖   is a sequence of States 𝜍𝑖 ,  
𝑕1 ≜  𝜍1 𝜍2 𝜍3 … 
Trace 𝑇  is a portion of Behaviours 𝑕𝑖  
We are seeking to prove that a given observation (Trace) will satisfy a Property. 
𝑇 𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑃... (1) 
To show the satisfaction, we consider (1) as a semantic level. 
      𝑃  ≜ Set of all possible behaviours, each satisfying the Property  𝑃 




Table 7.1: Syntax of ITL 
The syntax of ITL is defined in Table 7.1 where 𝜇 is an integer value, 𝛼 is a static 
variable (does not change within an interval an interval), Α is a state variable (can 
change within an interval), 𝜐 a static, 𝑔 is a function symbol and 𝜌 is a predicate symbol.    
 
 
 The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows:  
 skip: unit interval (length 1, i.e., an interval of two states). 
 
 𝑓1  ; 𝑓2: holds if the interval can be decomposed (―chopped‖) into a prefix and 
suffix interval, such that 𝑓1 holds over the prefix and 𝑓2 over the suffix, or if the 
interval is infinite and 𝑓1 holds for that interval. Note the last state of the interval 
of the interval over which 𝑓2 holds. 
 
 𝑓∗: holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals such 
that for each of them. 𝑓 holds, infinite number of finite intervals for which 𝑓 
holds 
 
 𝑣: value of 𝜐 in the next state when evaluated on an interval of length at least 
one, otherwise an arbitrary value. 
 
 Fin 𝜐: value of 𝜐 in the final state when evaluated on a finite interval, otherwise 
an arbitrary value. 
 




Following are some samples of formulas with their informal meaning. 
 I = 1 holds for an interval if I‘s value in the initial state is equal to 1. 
 
 skip; I = 5 holds for an interval if I‘s value in the interval‘s second state is equal 
to 5. 
 
 I = 1; I = 3 holds for an interval if I‘s value in the initial state is equal to 1 and 
the value of I is equal to 3 in some other state (not necessary the second) of the 
interval. 
 
 (true; I = 0) holds for an interval if I‘s value is never equal to 0 within the 
interval. 
 
Obviously common temporal modulates such as  (always) and  (sometimes) can be 
expressed. Following are few ITL examples: 
The statement ―I is always greater then 2 and some times less then 5‖ can be expressed 
by the formula   
     (I > 2) ∧  (I < 5) 
Meanwhile, the formula 
     [(I = 1) ∧  (I = 2)] 
Describes an interval of time in which the variable I at some time equals 1 and at some 
later time equals 2. Properties of time can also be expressed. For instance, if I always 
equals 1 and J sometimes equals 3 then we can infer that the sum I+J sometimes equals 
4: 
[ (I = 1) ∧  (J = 3)] ⊃  (I + J = 4) 




These examples express only a indistinct idea of the utility and convenience of temporal 
logic. As will be shown, temporal logic offers a natural means for recounting such 
dynamic notations as stability, termination and interval length.   
 
7.3.2.2 Behavioural Analyser 
As depicted in Figure 7.4, each BBN will embrace a behaviour analyser. The structure 
of the behaviour analyser consists of the policy decider and the enforcer. The policy 
decider uses a set of policies (properties) to decide whether behaviour is malicious or 
not. At the beginning, we define all policies as normal policies (indicating good 
behaviours), and during the running of the system, some of those policies will be 
dynamically changed into malicious policies (indicating anomaly, misuse behaviours) 
based on specific actions and events the system might go through. Moreover, normal 
policies will not stay mandatory good, as those policies are dynamic, and different 
situations might change them into malicious policies. Meanwhile, the enforcer is a 
mechanism that enforces those policies. The mechanism of enforcing those policies will 
dynamically change based on specific actions and events. (For example. when security 
alerts in airports are elevated in any country, different procedures will be put in place to 
handle the security situation). Evaluation details will be shown in chapter 8 (case 
studies).  
After defining the structure of our behaviour analyser, we will use the policy categories 
as a comparison model to check new node activity, and whether those activities are 
normal or not. Therefore, the question now is: how does our behaviour detection 
operate?    
When node x tries to operate in our system, the GN and BBN will audit the data from 
the RIT of node x; basically these audit data will create the state of node x. In other 
words, our audit data is originally the function from the set of variables to the set of 




Figure 7.5: Creation of States 
Table 7.2: Route Information Table for Node x 
values. As a result, a new state of node x will be created whenever there are new data in 
the RIT, example of the RIT is shown in Table 7.2. 
    
RREP T F 
RREQ F T 
DROP F T 
 
 
Table 7.2, shows that each state is created from the new entry in the RIT for instance: 
[𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃 ∧  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 ∧  𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃] from the equation each action is a state which is a 
function from a set of variables to the set of values. Moreover, Figure 7.5 shows how 




The sequence of these states will create the behaviour, and since there is an infinite 
number of behaviours it is impossible to observe all types of behaviour. Therefore, our 
observers try to make an observation on node x activity; they will slice a trace of node x 




Figure 7.6: Trace satisfies a Property 
behaviour and try to satisfy it with our properties to find if node x activity is legitimate 




As can be seen in Figure 7.6, 𝑕 represent the behaviour of node x, while 𝑇 is a slice of 
node x observed behaviour, so that a comparison with our 𝑃 can be made to find 
whether or not this behaviour is found to be identical to our policy category; if not our 
BBN will try to analyse the manoeuvre of node x behaviour in a specific period of time 
by collecting more data. Eventually, it shows whether the behaviour is going towards a 
diversion or normal act.  
For example, if node x was discovered attempting to enter a specific area, he is not 
allowed to enter or to endeavour to access a specific log file, when it did not have the 
authorisation to do so; this behaviour will be considered as malicious or misuse.  
After a specific period of time and based upon the BBN observation, a decision will be 
taken to decide whether to upgrade or revoke nodes certificates. This mechanism is 
shown in our publication [4]. 
 
 




7.4 Coping with Misbehaviour Users 
In the BD-MANoN algorithm, it is easier for malicious nodes to make other nodes 
accept false certificates. This is because some certificates are issued by undefined CAs, 
networks or even certificates signed by the nodes themselves. In these cases, our BBN 
will carry out the observation task to distinguish the malicious from the normal nodes; 
some malicious node examples which have been recognised by our BD algorithm are 
given here: 
 Forging Sequence Number (SN) 
In AODV, Sequence Number (SN) plays the task of guarantying loop-free routes 
and indicates the freshness of the routing information. SN increases under two 
conditions: when destination node replies with RREP and when source node 
request with RREQ; as a result, the SN updates only by the source and 
destination [93].  
Forging sequence number is a single attack type that can be launched from an 
insider node on an AODV routing protocol. As mentioned the SN refers to the 
freshness of route of the associated node. Whenever the SN is forged by a high 
number from an attacker the route will be changed towards the higher SN route.  
For example, when employing the AODV routing protocol in our MANoN 
scenario (see Figure 7.7), if source A tried to connect destination D, the normal 
route will be {A,B,C,D} but if M sends RREP m2 to B with SN.Dst equal to 100 
(>50 normal replay), it will take precedence over c2; with the same method to B, 








Our policy states that: 
Given node  𝐼, 
𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑐  denotes current SN.Src 
𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡  denotes current SN.Dst 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑟𝑐  denotes maximum SN.Src   
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝑠𝑡  denotes maximum SN.Dst  
 [ (( 𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑐 > 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑟𝑐 ) ∨ (𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑡 > 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝑠𝑡 ))] 
 
If SN.Dst and SN.Src of any nodes‘ packet is much greater than it should be, this 
act will be considered as malicious (an attempt to create man-in-the-middle 
attack)  
Given node I, 
 [ ( 𝐼𝐼𝑃 ≠ 𝑆𝑟𝑐𝐼𝑃  ∨  𝐼𝐼𝑃 ≠ 𝐷𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑃 )] 
 
If the packets are sent from nodes‘ IP address that is not equal to the original 
source IP address or original destination IP address  (shown in the routing 
forwarding table), it will be considered as a malicious act  
This attack can be detected and dealt with by our BBN. According to our BBN, 
the forwarding table in BBN SN.Dst=50. Based on our policies, if our BBN 
nodes detect any packets having SN that is much larger than it should be (100), 
or that packet has not been sent by the owner of SN (IP address is not equal to 
the source), then the BBN will treat it as an attack. 








 Wormhole Attack (Tunnelling) 
This is a cooperating attack done by two malicious nodes; an attacker receives 
packets at one location in the network and tunnels them to another location in the 
network, where packets are re-sent into the network (creating a traffic route 
through them) [48].   
As shown in Figure 7.8, if A wanted to connect E, the shortest path will be 
{A,B,C,D,E}; instead, X will pretend to have a direct connection to Y, creating a 
false short path {A,X,Y,E} which will enable A to choose the wrong path which 
is actually {A,X,B,C,D,Y,E}, preventing A from to choosing the really short 
path {A,B,C,D,E}.Even cryptography solutions, such as ARAN [97] cannot 
hinder this kind of attacks. Let ℓ be a Boolean function which is defined as:  
ℓ: 𝒩 × 𝒩 ⟶ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙 
For any two nodes, 𝓃1, 𝓃2 if ℓ (𝓃1, 𝓃2) = true, then a link between 𝓃1, 𝓃2 
exist, otherwise the nodes are not connected.  




Figure 7.8: Tunnelling Attack 
ℓ denotes whether there is direct link between 𝓃1and 𝓃2 and its defined 
as follows: 
ℓ: 𝒩 × 𝒩 ⟶ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙 
ℓ (𝓃1, 𝓃2)= true iff there exist a direct link between 𝓃1  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝓃2. 
Our policy states that: 
∀ 𝑛1, 𝑛2  ∈ 𝑁.  ℓ (𝓃1, 𝓃2) 
 
Based on Figure 7.8, by checking the IP.Header of any node (X) gets a RREP 
which is essentially not from the exact node (Y) that X is claiming; therefore, X 
will be considered as malicious and the connection between X and Y is fake. 
Based on our behaviour detection, the solution is simple: whenever our BBN 
checks the RIT of node Y, it will find that the RREP is not from X; therefore, our 








7.5 Summary  
As mentioned before, providing security management in our MANoN is our main goal, 
which will be achieved by providing the essential component prevention and detection. 
In chapter 6, prevention is presented in our ACM-MANoN mechanism, and has been 
evaluated using the NS-2 simulation tools. However, providing detection is much harder 
to deliver, as ad hoc networks are decentralised and infrastructureless nevertheless, in 
this chapter we have presented a novel behaviour detection algorithm, BD-MANoN, 
based on threshold digital certificates. This detection algorithm is abstracted from 
variables of the route information tables (RIT) of each node, in which the Back Bone 
Nodes (BBN) can decide whether nodes in any part of the MANoNs are malicious or 
normal. This decision is made based on a set of dynamic policies used to compare old 
with new behaviours in order to make such decisions. Actual examples are shown, to 
prove that the policies for ―forging sequence number‖ and ―wormhole attack‖ are indeed 
sufficient to detect and prevent such attacks.  
Moreover, this algorithm will be evaluated using specific case studies such as military 
environments. These will illustrate the enforcement of dynamically changing security 















Evaluation & Case Studies 
Objectives 
 Illustrate a military case study 
 Illustrate our ACM-MANoN 
 Illustrate our BD-MANoN with different scenarios 
 
8.1    Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc network of networks are considered to be the future of wireless networks 
owing to their specific characteristics (practical, simple, self-organization, self-
configuration, ease of use and inexpensive when operating in a licence-free frequency 
band).  
There are many applications to ad hoc networks, ranging from small, static networks 
that are constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile, having highly dynamic 
mobility such as: 
 In education, ad hoc networks may be deployed for student laptops interacting 
with the lecturers during classes 
 Health care and telecare systems   
 Inter-Vehicle Communications, ad hoc networks for vehicles, for example, 
sending instant traffic reports and other information between drivers  
 Electronic email and file transfer 
 Web services that can be used by ad hoc network users in case a node in the 
network serves as a gateway to the outside world  
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 A wide range of military applications, such as a battlefield in unknown territory 
where an infrastructure network is not available or impossible to maintain 
 Collaborative work for business environments 
 Emergency search-and-rescue operations, in disaster areas where it is almost 
impossible to implement an infrastructure network 
 Personal Area Networking (PAN) and Bluetooth 
 Electronic payments from anywhere (i.e. taxi) 
 Home Wireless Network and smart homes 
 Office Wireless Network 
 
In this chapter, we evaluate our security management system, with concentration on 
Access Control Prevention and Behaviour Detection techniques. A military case study 
with two scenarios will be introduced: the first scenario study will highlight our security 
management system, with concentration on our Access Control prevention technique 
(explained in chapter 6) for predefined armies in an unknown and unstable MANoN 
military environment system; this scenario will combine authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality and integrity to provide a privacy protection for elements and tactics.  
The second scenario study illustrates a security management system in an unstable and 
unknown military environment, showing Behaviour Detection techniques combined 
with policies, and carried out to provide a secure military system against unknown 
elements. 
8.2   Case Study 1: Military Environment 
 
This military case study shows a battlefield in unknown territory, where infrastructure 
deployment is hard to achieve or maintain; therefore, MANoN will be the perfect 
solution to such a scenario. As known, the military domain is a very challenging 
environment described by ambiguity and the need to be able to deal with significant and 
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disruptive dynamic changes. The military system goal is mainly concerned with the 
ability to satisfy a secure environment for its components, because opponents (enemies) 
are always trying their best to break down or destroy our activities. Therefore, our 
security management concentrates on prevention and detection mechanisms.   
 
8.2.1   Components Definition for Military Environment 
In the military environment, a critical system and the specification of the security 
requirements for its components are essential. Authentication and Authorisation are one 
among most important requirements to be fulfilled, but before defining and analysing 
these requirements, we need to define our military system and its elements. 
We will be dealing with a military alliance consisting of different armies (e.g. NATO 
[82]); each army will be defined as a MANET, whereas the whole alliance is defined as 
MANoN. Each one of those armies includes different elements, starting from a soldier to 
the commander-in-chief (officer). Usually in the military, the officers will have a 
specific hierarchy, in which each officer will have the authority to give orders or to 
communicate with different elements based on his/her military ranking in the system.  
 
 Each army will be classified as MANET 
 Merger of MANETs creates the whole military alliance which is a MANoN 
 Officers are based on hierarchical ranking  
 Soldiers in our MANoN will be defined as normal ad hoc nodes 
 Specific high ranked officers (e.g. Majors, Brigadiers and Generals) are defined 
as Back Bone Nodes (CA) 
 A set of policies will be defined in each MANET (army) 
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8.2.2   Securing the Military Environment 
Our military alliance will be a merger of different MANETs creating the MANoN. 
MANoN are dramatically shown in Figure 8.1. The first step in providing a secure 
military system is providing authentication between the MANoN components; this 
authentication process is granted by distributing the authentication certificates, which is 
initially granted from the MANET base station. This authentication certificate acts as an 
identity for each element in the MANoN military environment.  
As with the authentication certificates, the same elements will initially receive their 
authorisation certificates from their MANET base station; each certificate holds a 
specific security clearance to enable specific nodes to carry out leading and agile 
operations, and to give orders to different soldiers and officers. 
To cover our security management and to highlight the security mechanisms defined in 
previous chapters, we will show different scenarios for the military environment.   
 
Scenario One  
This scenario configures a military alliance with three armies (US, Canadian and 
British); each one of those armies will have a specific priority upon the other. For 
instance, the US will be categorised as priority one (Highest), while Canada will be 
categorised as priority three.  
This categorisation will be used to classify our authorisation certificates in each 
MANET. Before defining the ACM-MANoN to provide authorisation and 
authentication to other nodes, a few points must be clarified in our scenario: 
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Figure 8.1: MANoN community   
 
 
 Armies can join and disconnect without affecting the MANoN system 
 The public keys of the digital certificates are known between all elements in the 
whole MANoN system 
 All nodes (soldiers and officers) have received their authentication and 
authorisation certificates from their own MANET (each army has its own 
certificate)  
 Each MANET has a set of policies 
 
To provide security management to this scenario, the first step is to show our 
administration; as previously mentioned, the BBN (high ranked officers) will carry out 
the administration duty. Their duty is to guarantee that elements from different armies 
can communicate and engage with different elements in the MANoN system. 
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The second step is to provide the most essential components‘ prevention and detection, 
which are needed in any community. Such prevention and detection are needed for the 
authentication and authorisation of the MANoN elements. For instance, a lieutenant 
from the US army is trying to lead a Canadian platoon; this Lieutenant will be 
authenticated (verified) from the BBN of the Canadian army by his authentication 
certificate. Meanwhile, an authorisation certificate will be granted with a brigadier 
ranking, based on the policies (the priority of the Canadian army is less then that of US 
army) of the Canadian army to lead the platoon.  
The third step, is the containment and recovery component; usually, whenever a 
problem has occurred during any military operation, specific rules and procedures will 
take place; for example, if members of the Canadian platoon have been captured by the 
enemy, the enemy will try its best to extract the private key in order to gain access to all 
secret information, and to forge new certificates in order to break the system down. In 
this situation, the BBN of the Canadian army will try to re-generate new shares of the 
private key, to make sure that the private key is kept safe during military operations.  
Moreover, a periodic update of information via links through heterogeneous cards 
available with BBN (e.g. satellites and cellular) will be used to receive orders from the 
main station of the network to which the BBN belongs.  
To elaborate more on our security management system, and to show the authenticat ion 
and authorisation components provided between the military elements in the ACM-
MANoN, specification formalism will be introduced:  
𝑋𝑖  𝑗 : soldiers 𝑖 from the army 𝑗, 𝑖 ≥ 1; 𝑗 countries from the NATO; 
𝑌𝑖  𝑗 : officers 𝑖 from the army 𝑗, 𝑖 ≥ 1; 𝑗 countries from the NATO; 
Authentication and Authorisation between elements from the same army (US) in the 
MANoN military system 
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Authentication (X1 US, X2 US) between US soldiers in the same army is achieved based on 
the X authentication certificate, where X is received from the US base station. The 
certificate will be verified using the US public key. Similar to the authentication 
certificates, the authorisation certificate will hold a specific security clearance, and will 
be verified using the US public key. 
 
Authentication (Y1 US, Y2 US) between US officers in the same army is achieved based on 
the Y authentication certificate, where Y is received from the US base station. The 
certificate will be verified using the US public key. Similar to the authentication 
certificates, the authorisation certificate will hold a specific security clearance, and will 
be verified using the US public key. 
 
Authentication (Y1 US, X2 US) between US officers and soldiers from the same army is 
achieved based on Y and X authentication certificates, where Y and X are received from 
the US base station. The certificates will be verified using the US public key. Similar to 
the authentication certificates, the authorisation certificate will hold a specific security 
clearance, and will be verified using the US public key. 
𝑋𝑖  𝑗 : soldiers 𝑖 from the army 𝑗, 𝑖 ≥ 1; 𝑗 countries from the NATO; 
𝑌𝑖  𝑗 : officers 𝑖 from the army 𝑗, 𝑖 ≥ 1; 𝑗 countries from the NATO; 
 
Authentication between elements from different armies (US, Canada) in the MANoN 
military system 
 
Chapter 8 Case Studies 
162 
 
Concerning authentication (X1 US, X1 Canada), if a soldier from the US army wanted to 
authenticate a Canadian soldier, this will be verified using the Canadian authentication 
certificate. The certificate will be verified using the Canadian public key (public keys 
are distributed between the predefined armies in the whole military). In addition, if a 
soldier from the US tries to communicate with a Canadian soldier, then the US soldier 
will need an authorisation certificate from the Canadian army; this is granted by the 
BBN of the Canadian army, allowing communication with the Canadian soldier, based 
on the original authorisation certificate the US officer holds with respect to the ranking 
policy (security clearance) the certificate holds. 
 
Concerning authentication (Y1 US, Y1 Canada), if an officer from the US army want to 
authenticate a Canadian officer, this will be verified using the Canadian authentication 
certificate. The certificate will be verified using the Canadian public key. Meanwhile, if 
an officer from the US army tries to help or give an order to a Canadian officer, an 
authorisation Canadian certificate is required, which can be granted from the BBN of the 
Canadian army, based on the original authorisation certificate the US officer holds with 
respect to the ranking policy (security clearance) the certificate holds. 
 
With reference to authentication (Y1 US, X1 Canada), if an officer from the US army wants 
to authenticate a Canadian soldier, this will be verified using the Canadian 
authentication certificate. The certificate will be verified using the Canadian public key.  
Meanwhile, if an officer from the US army tries to lead or give an order to a Canadian 
platoon, an authorisation Canadian certificate is required; this can be granted by the 
BBN of the Canadian army, based on the original authorisation certificate the US officer 
holds with respect to the ranking policy (security clearance) the certificate holds. 
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Scenario two  
As with the first scenario, scenario two configures a military alliance consisting of three 
armies (US, Canadian and British), and each one of those armies will have a specific 
priority upon the other. For instance, the British army will be categorised as priority one 
(highest), while the, Canadian army will be categorised as priority three. In addition, 
new elements will be defined in this scenario (Japanese army, Red Cross and Red 
Crescent).  
This categorisation will be used to classify our authorisation certificates in each 
MANET. Before defining the BD-MANoN to provide authorisation and authentication 
to other nodes, some points must be clarified in our scenario: 
 
 Armies can join and disconnect without affecting the MANoN system 
 The public keys of the digital certificates are known between some (US, British 
and Canadian) elements in the whole MANoN system and unknown to others 
(Red Cross, Red Crescent and Japanese army) 
 All nodes (soldiers and officers) have received their authentication and 
authorisation certificates from their own MANET (each army has its own 
certificate)  
 Nodes that are undefined and trying to operate in different networks will receive 
a provisional authorisation certificate 
 Each MANET has a set of policies 
 
To elaborate on our security management system and to show the authentication and 
authorisation components provided between the military elements profundity in the BD-
MANoN, the following example is introduced:  
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If during war the British army needs reinforcements from Japan (example) and Japan is 
a non-NATO country, in order for the Japanese army to communicate with British 
forces and to engage into the battlefield, Japanese soldiers and officers will need to 
obtain a provisional certificate from the British BBN to perform in such situations. 
As Japanese forces are non-trusted, our BBN will monitor and observe their actions 
based on their RIT in order to check whether or not Japanese elements are acting in a 
normal or malicious manner. This checking is accomplished by comparing a trace of 
behaviours with the set of policies the British army has defined.   
Usually, showing all situations of comparing the trace of behaviours with the set of 
policies in our scenario is impossible; therefore, we provide different examples showing 
normal and malicious actions.  
 
In the first example, set during the war, if an order from a British officer has been given 
to Japanese troops and the soldiers did not obey these orders to follow an order from a 
higher ranked officer (conflict of orders), then our BBN will try to observe these acts 
and decide whether or not the act is normal; this is determined by a check against British 
policies. It is assumed that this policy will declare: 
 If an order from a higher ranked officer has been given, this order will be obeyed 
from all troops unless a conflict of orders with a higher ranked officer has 
occurred  
 
Therefore, based on this policy, the behaviour of the Japanese nodes will be considered 
to be normal when checked against this rule. 
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In the second example, set during the war, an officer from the Japanese army holds a 
low ranked authorisation certificate and tries to request a specific tactic from other 
officers in the British army (assuming our policy decline this request). Therefore, our 
BBN will try to observe this act and decide whether or not the act is normal; this is 
decided by checking the British policies. It is assumed the following exists: 
 If elements are trying to access unauthorised area or request unauthorised tactics 
consequently, such elements will considered to be malicious  
For that reason, the behaviour of the Japanese officers will considered to be malicious, 
and appropriate action will be decided upon towards the malicious elements.     
 
After showing normal and malicious behaviours being compared with pre-existing 
policies, the question will be: what if a specific behaviour or action was not found in our 
policies? For this situation, the trace of the behaviour can not be compared with any set 
of policies in the system, as that trace does not satisfy any of the policies. Therefore, our 
BBN will analyse the RIT comparing elements actions with similar policies to find 
whether the act is going towards a deviation or a normal act.  
For example, during the war, if elements switch off their devices - either to constrain 
power or for any other reason - the BBN will try to analyse the data and check if that 
switching is happening consistently. If so, this act will count as a deviation towards 
malicious behaviour. On the other hand, if it happens only once, then the BBN will 
consider it as normal behaviour.   
 
In the final example, if in the middle of a war, a truce (ceasefire) has been announced, 
then usually the Red Cross or Red Crescent will try to secure and rescue injured parties 
and provide health care to civilians. In this situation, the Red Cross elements will hold a 
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provisional authorisation certificate, which will be granted by the BBN from the army 
with which they are operating. 
During the operation of the Red Cross, observations will take place upon those elements 
to make sure that the operation is as it is supposed to be. In other words, they are not 
acting maliciously to gain secret information for the enemy. During these observations, 
a trace will be taken from the RIT of the Red Cross and a comparison against the army 
policies will be performed.  
An example, of such policies is the following:  
 During normal situations, officers and soldiers are eligible to communicate with 
outsider nodes or networks, but during war, every communication to an outsider 
network or node is considered to be a malicious act 
 
Based on this policy, ‗ceasefire‘ is not defined in our policies, so whenever members 
from the Red Cross try to communicate to an outsider node, the act will be considered as 
normal (as we are in ceasefire) but based on the situation (Red Cross members are not 
fully trusted) in which our dynamic BBN‘s enforcer will monitor actions extracted from 
the RIT of the Red Cross members. Therefore, the enforcer in the BBN will make ensure 
that such behaviour is considered as normal or malicious, based on the evidence the 
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8.3   Summary  
In this chapter, different case studies have been provided with specific concentration on 
a military case study in unknown and unsecure territory. This case study presents two 
scenarios.  
Scenario one defines three NATO countries (pre-connected) in a battlefield; each 
country holds a specific security clearance (ranking) over the other. This scenario shows 
the implementation and evaluation of our Access Control Mechanism (ACM-MANoN) 
providing authentication and authorisation between members of the same network and 
between other members of the MANoN. 
Meanwhile, scenario two defines three NATO countries with new elements (non-
defined); this scenario shows the implementation and evaluation of our Behaviour 
Detection mechanism (BD-MANoN), showing the detection technique between the 
NATO countries and the undefined elements, presenting different situations any military 
system might experience. Each situation gives a comparison with our policies to 
establish whether or not this situation satisfies our set of policies in order to detect 















Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summarises our findings, highlights the contributions and suggests 
directions for future work. 
 
9.1   Summary 
The growing interest in MANoN techniques has resulted in many communication and 
security protocol proposals. Security issues in ad hoc networks are currently attracting 
increasing attention.  
 
MANoNs are particularly vulnerable to attacks. This is because of their features of open 
medium, dynamic changing topology, lack of centralised monitoring and management 
point and the lack of a clear line of defence.  A full description regarding MANoN 
general information was introduced in chapter 2; it contained a discussion of the history 
and background, characteristics, challenges and network security concentrating on 
security requirements, attacks and full analysis of cryptography background regarding 
symmetric, asymmetric, digital certificates, PKI and trust.   
 
Security Management is a central aspect of security in MANoN. Solutions to the 
problem of public key management, intrusion detection and prevention techniques for 
security management in MANoN were presented in Chapter 3. Some of these solutions 
try to adapt the hierarchical trust model in order to provide secure, available key 
management services, such as the Z-H scheme and MOCA. Most of these solutions 
define a virtual CA using threshold cryptography. This CA comprises multiple mobile 
Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work 
169 
 
nodes that collectively provide certification services. These solutions are quite elegant 
and potentially offer a good measure of security and availability.  
 
Solutions regarding intrusion detection, such as providing a distributed intrusion 
detection system based on mobile agents technology, are also included. It provides a 
lightweight and low overhead mechanism to detect anomalous nodes in the system. A 
different approach is to use local and collaborative decision-making in anomaly 
detection. In this approach, each ad hoc node participates in detecting locally and 
independently malicious acts. Each node holds an individual IDS agent that monitors 
local activities, which enable it to detect local traces and respond to it [70 – 72].  
On the other hand, different security management schemes have been proposed; these 
include a Novel Computational Reputation Model for Wireless and Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks, which provides a prevention technique based on trust and reputation. This 
type of security management focuses on prevention technique, as it presents a set of 
management mechanisms based on trust and reputation to prevent malicious nodes from 
entering the trusted community.  Moreover, depending solely on the trustworthiness and 
reputation of nodes is not suitable for applications where high degrees of accountability 
and security are required [5, 29, 112]. 
 
In addition, a security management in a hierarchal system is introduced; this combines 
both threshold cryptography and cluster-head to distribute keys to its nodes, but does not 
provide any actual type of security management to the ad hoc networks.   
 
Solutions to MANoN‘s security problems in general and to security management in 
particular should be built upon a strong foundation. This means constructing a 
specialised security management for MANoN that helps in modelling it, addressing 
security challenges, defining security attacks and security requirements, and describing 
principles and plans to achieve all the objectives of these security requirements and then 
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proposing security mechanisms that enforce the implementation of these objectives. This 
methodology for securing MANoN was followed in Chapters 4-8.  
 
Chapter 4 defined this security management architecture, based upon the two ITU-T 
Recommendations, X.800 and X.805 that are used to define security architecture for a 
MANoN. The security architecture proposed a technology-independent security solution 
for a MANoN, which provides end-to-end communication that can be implemented 
using different security mechanisms.  
In Chapter 5, we presented a security management technique of two different 
mechanisms. Each mechanism defines one scenario. Chapter 6 expounded the first 
algorithm (ACM-MANoN), which manages the digital certificates in a fully defined 
MANoN environment, and then provided an evaluation using the NS-2 simulator. The 
second algorithm (BD-MANoN), which manages the digital certificates in a partially 
defined MANoN, was presented in Chapter 7 with an evaluation, also using a formal 
description and attacks case study. A military case study is presented in Chapter 8. 
 
9.2   Contributions  
The main contributions of this work to the existing literature on the subject are the 
definition of the novel the new comprehensive security architecture for MANoN. The 
security architecture is unique in the respect that no comparable proposal has been 
made. In addition, a security management system concentrating on two security 
algorithms has been proposed to manage digital certificates in a MANoN in two 
different scenarios. The heterogeneous environment assumption and the way it is used in 
defining these algorithms is of itself a novelty. The contributions are detailed in the 
following sections. 
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9.2.1   Security Architecture for MANoN 
The definition of the security architecture is based upon the two ITU-T 
recommendations, X.800 and X.805, which help in locating the global security 
challenges facing MANoN, realising their solutions, and providing the specification of a 
comprehensive, end-to-end security solution for MANoN that can be applied to any 
similar wireless service scenario exploiting such networks in order to predict, detect, and 
correct security vulnerabilities.  
 
The proposed security architecture identifies seven security requirements including 
authentication, authorisation, privacy, data confidentiality, availability, data integrity 
and non-repudiation that protect against major security threats attempting to attack 
MANoN. Such attacks are generated accidentally or intentionally, internally or 
externally and are active or passive. A methodical approach for securing MANoN has 
been illustrated by taking each proceed between any two of the components as a unique 
perspective for consideration of the seven security requirements, and presenting eight 
tables describing the objectives of these requirements for each proceed. In order to 
implement the objectives of the security requirements defined in these eight tables, a set 
of security mechanisms is needed. 
 
9.2.3 Security Management and Security Mechanisms for Managing 
Digital Certificates in MANoN 
Security in a MANoN can be achieved in two ways [119]:  
 
 Proactive security: prevents the MANoN from attacks  
 Re-active security: detects the intruders or malicious users and excludes them 
from the network  
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The research regarding proactive security is mainly about attacks prevention; in respect 
of reactive security, that primarily concerns the architecture in which to observe the 
network, the useful information to be gathered for intrusion detection, and to react to 
attacks. 
The present thesis is interested in both proactive securities that attempt to prevent an 
attacker from launching attacks in the first place, typically through different 
cryptographic techniques. In addition, the reactive approach tries to obtain and detect 
security terrorisation and react accordingly.  
Therefore, a security mechanism for managing the digital certificates in MANoN was 
proposed. This security mechanism implements the objectives of authentication, 
authorisation, availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation of 
proceeds (1), (2), (7) and (8), defined in the MANoN security architecture.  
 
The security mechanism assumes a heterogonous wireless environment in which 
MANoN operates in an area covered by other infrastructure-based wireless networks, 
such as WLANs and cellular systems. This security mechanism proposes two algorithms 
for two different scenarios.  
 
The first algorithm, called ACM-MANoN, tackles the issue of managing the threshold 
digital certificates in cases in which all the MANoN nodes are defined to other 
infrastructure-based wireless ad hoc networks. This algorithm provides a prevention 
technique against malicious nodes trying to break the system.  
 
The second algorithm, BD-MANoN, assumes as a part of its network model that some 
MANoN nodes are defined to other wireless ad hoc networks. This algorithm is carried 
out to distinguish and detect malicious nodes from inside and outside the system. This 
detection is achieved through behaviour detection.  
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This combination improves the security level by using threshold cryptography PKI, and 
simultaneously giving MANoN nodes the opportunity to participate in key management 
system services.  
 
These two algorithms have been evaluated in two ways, as shown below:  
 
 NS-2 based evaluation: The performance of the ACM-MANoN algorithm is 
tested in a real network environment, and their communication cost is measured 
using the NS-2 simulator, which was suitable for the present purpose. The 
evaluation metrics used in this study are success ratio, delay, average number of 
retries and overhead. Moreover, a formal description regarding the ACM-
MANoN prevention is provided. 
 
 Military Case Study: the performance of the BD-MANoN is evaluated using a 
formal description. In addition, a military case study in an unknown and 
unprotected environment is provided to show a real example of behaviour 
detection. 
 
9.2.3.1 ACM-MANoN  
 
ACM-MANoN proposes a security protocol for managing digital certificates in a pre-
defined environment. It is based on the hierarchical trust models used by the PKI of 
extant heterogeneous wireless networks. This algorithm deals with threshold 
cryptography BBN with a high level of security and availability. High ranked nodes 
with high equivalent power are nominated as servers and combiner nodes (BBN).  
ACM-MANoN was evaluated using the NS-2 simulator, formal description and case 
studies.  
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The results of the evaluation confirm and prove that ACM-MANoN is a fully distributed 
security protocol that provides a high level of secure, available, scalable, flexible and 
efficient prevention management services for MANoN. Moreover, the applications of 
ACM-MANoN in military environments were also discussed.  
 
9.2.3.2 BD-MANoN  
 
BD-MANoN proposes a security protocol for managing digital certificates in a partially 
managed MANoN with non-defined elements in the MANoN environment. It combines 
both the certification authority characteristics of PKI and behaviour detection algorithm. 
The current research attempts to adapt one of these two approaches to MANoN. The 
proposed solution of BD-MANoN solves the shortcomings (engage of undefined 
elements) of ACM-MANoN and enhances the level of security by combining those 
features.  
BD-MANoN was evaluated using a well-presented military case study. The results of 
the evaluation confirms that BD-MANoN is a fully distributed security protocol that 
provides a high level of secure, available, scalable, flexible, reliable and efficient 
detection management services for MANoN. 
 
9.3   Achieving Success Criteria  
 
To answer the research questions that we highlighted in Chapter 1, security solutions 
have been presented throughout the thesis in the form of: Firstly, Security Architecture 
providing end-to-end security solutions in order to predict and detect security 
vulnerabilities ―Chapter 4‖. Secondly,  Access Control mechanism to prevent malicious 
nodes form gaining access to our MANoN system leading towards providing other 
security requirements such as data-confidentiality and data integrity ―Chapter 6‖. 
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Thirdly, a Behavioural Detection algorithm as a second line of defence in order to detect 
insider nodes trying to bring the MANoN system down ―Chapter 7‖. 
 
9.4   Evaluation with Related Work 
 
This section will highlight the advantages of our approach by drawing a meaningful 
comparison with other existing works in the ad hoc wireless technology. To recap on our 
achievements, a clear comparison with the security architecture based upon the standard 
X.805 in the ITU-T recommendation will be provided. As it can be seen in section 4.2 
that our security architecture provides seven security requirements applied to four 
security layers and two security planes creating a logical division to a complex set of 
architecture components with eight proceeds which, makes applying security 
requirements more flexible. In the meantime, as shown in the recommendation X.805, 
the security architecture defines eight security dimensions with three security layers and 
three security planes creating nine proceeds in a tabular form making it more complex 
for users to apply the security requirements to such type of architectures.    
Meanwhile, refereeing to our security algorithms (ACM-MANoN ―Chapter 6‖ and BD-
MANoN ―Chapter 7‖) providing a comparison with similar studies is irrelevant as our 
security mechanisms are an integration of different components (Security 
Administration, Prevention & Detection, and Containment and Recovery) not to 
mention, the state-of-the-art Mobile Ad hoc Network of Networks (MANoN), which is 
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9.5   Future Work  
 
The following list highlights areas of research which are worth pursuing.  
 
 Security architecture implementation: The full implementation of the security 
architecture presented in Chapter 4 guarantees an end-to-end security solution 
for MANoN. This thesis implements part of the security architecture by 
proposing two security algorithms for managing digital certificates in MANoN. 
These algorithms enforce the objectives of authentication, authorisation, 
availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation in proceeds 
(1), (2), (7) and (8). Therefore, there are still other possible mechanisms by 
which it would be possible to achieve the objectives of all security requirements 
in all proceeds. An interesting observation is that the security architecture has 
provided MANoN with a clear line of defence 
 
 Security mechanism enhancements: Some of the future enhancements that can 
be made to the security mechanism BD-MANoN and its evaluation, provide a 
supported evaluation using the NS-3, which have all the detection components 
provided to implement the behaviour detection algorithm. Moreover, they can 
provide an Ana Tempura simulation and provide a comparison analysis between 
the results of NS-3 and Ana Tempura  
 
 
 MANoN challenges: There are interesting challenges in a MANoN, in addition 
to security, which are worth investigation in future work. These include:  
 
 Multicast routing protocols design  
 MAC layer protocols development  
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 Efficient load balancing approaches  
 End-to-End Quality of Service (QoS) provision  
 Power-efficient protocol design  
 Cross-layer design for wireless networks  
 Multipath routing approach development  
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